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Abstract
The guiding principle of this research is that the utilisation of information technology 
(IT) in any part of the world currently is taking place within the globalisation trends. The 
need to take a wider view of IT use has become important due to the ease with which IT 
and associated management practices now pervade countries. These practices, developed 
in the ‘west’ and applied in countries around the world, are becoming increasingly 
universal as a result of the globalisation process. The Nigerian economy was deregulated 
towards the end of the 1980s and different sectors of the economy - including banking - 
were liberalised with a view to promoting competition and efficiency. In the face of these 
environmental changes, organisations in Nigeria have, over the past few years, been 
investing extensively in IT and adopting global IT-based practices. Although studies have 
discussed the importance of adapting these global practices to suit the context of their 
implementation, few have actually focused on revealing the nature of these adaptations 
and the factors influencing them. The overall aim of this study, therefore, is to increase 
understanding of why and how adaptations take place, and what results are achieved. 
This understanding is achieved in the thesis by incorporating ideas from both resource- 
based theory and new institutional theory within a contextualist framework, to study the 
implementation of planned technology-based change programmes in two Nigerian banks. 
It is suggested that local adaptations to global IT-based practices involve an adaptation 
process where organisational resources and local institutional rules are employed 
rationally, as well as symbolically, to modify the techniques. Rationally, organisational 
members redefine the global institutional rules embodied in global practices in order to fit 
the organisation’s resource context and the demands of the immediate institutional 
environment. Symbolically, global practices are modified when organisational members 
ritually sustain organisational traditions and taken-for-granted practices about how to do 
things within the organisation or the wider societal context. Thus, such redefinition and 
symbolic processes specify the nature of local adaptations to global IT-based practices 
when they are being implemented in local contexts.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Nature of research problem
The theme of this research is the increasing interconnection within the emerging global 
economy1 and the implications for developing countries (DCs). According to Castells 
(1996), the global economy should lead to greater productivity and efficiency if 
organisations invest in a comprehensive programme of both institutional and 
organisational change. In recent times, organisations in DCs have been investing quite 
extensively in IT and are increasingly adopting management techniques such as Business 
Process Re-engineering (BPR) and Total Quality Management (TQM) with a view to 
becoming part of the global economy.
In Africa, on the advice of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the majority of countries embarked 
upon the task of deregulating and liberalising their economies. In addition, a number of 
organisations in different economic sectors have over the past few years been investing 
extensively in IT and adopting western management techniques (like BPR and TQM) 
with a view to taking part in the globalisation process (Kiggundu, 1992; Saxena, 1996). 
Despite these observed trends, there is still a dearth of studies that examine the 
experiences of organisations in implementing technologies and associated management 
techniques and, in particular, how they are able to accommodate and integrate these 
management techniques into their day-to-day operations. Realising the need for such 
studies, the International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP) Working Group 
9.4, organised a conference towards the end of writing this thesis to examine how 
processes of local adaptations are planned and achieved in developing countries and how 
local structures mteract with global pressures in contemporary times . This research also
1 Aptly referred to as “a networked, deeply interdependent economy” (Castells, 1996: 67)
2 See Appendix VI for a copy o f the author’s submission to this conference
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attempts to make a contribution in this respect. The background to the research rests 
squarely on three major perspectives: the globalisation discourse, focusing on the global- 
local interaction debate; information systems in DCs, especially within the theme of 
technology transfer; and planned information technology-based organisational change.
1.1,1 From the perspective of globalisation
In recent times, the need to study the wider context of IT use in DCs has been recognised 
as important due to the effects of the globalisation process. Indeed, the guiding principle 
of this research is that the utilisation of IT in any part of the world currently is taking 
place within such globalisation trends. A useful definition3 of globalisation given by 
Giddens (1990) refers to the concept as ‘the intensification of world-wide social relations 
that links distant localities in such a way that local developments become a function of 
events occurring many miles away and vice versa’. Similarly, Castells (1996) described the 
trend of an increasing interconnection of economic activities and social relations, which he 
referred to as a “networked deeply interdependent global economy”. Thus, globalisation 
essentially refers to a world in which societies (and culture) have, in one way or another, 
come closer together (Kiely, 1998).
It is this coming closer together and its implications that is central to much of the debate 
on globalisation. These debates have focused on what happens to local identities within a 
globalising world (Hannerz, 1991; Robertson, 1992; Kiely, 1998). Different scenarios 
have been painted as to the possible consequences of this interplay between local and 
global tendencies. Ranging from the highly deterministic “homogenisation” thesis of the 
global institutionalist school (McNeely, 1990) to the interactive ‘mutual influence’ 
arguments of Robertson (1992), these views posit different implications of the 
globalisation trend on local societies.
3 While, there is a general agreement on the importance o f the globalisation trend in contemporary times, 
there still exist some debates about what the term actually mean (Robertson, 1992).
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Within the business literature, Prahalad (1993) sees globalisation as a vigorous 
interaction between DCs, the industrialised countries and Multi-National Corporations 
(MNCs). For DCs to successfully compete within the global economy, the author 
prescribed building a ‘world-scale’ domestic market, developing domestic capabilities 
and opening up local markets to foreign competitors (usually MNCs). The view of 
increasingly integrated economic activities is further strengthened by Sen’s (1992) 
assertion that economic globalisation entails -  as a matter of must -  that DCs 
organisations take the international context or environment into account when taking 
decisions in contemporary times. Camoy et al’s view that “national economies now work 
as units at the world level in real time” (1993:5) is another similar conceptualisation of an 
increased level of integration within the global economy. The authors also agreed that 
advances in information and communications technologies have aided such a global 
integration.
Baudrillard (1983) takes a rather different view of the globalisation process and argue to the 
contrary that the increasing interconnection is based more on the dominance of culture than 
on economic factors. The author argued quite strongly that the major impact of the 
increasing use of technology in a global world has not led to an informed society but rather 
to a state of disintegration (1983:100). Similarly, Waters (1995) stated that economic 
motivation is slowly being displaced within the global order by symbolic ones ‘based on 
values, preferences and tastes’ (pg. 124).
In discussing the structure of the international system, the institutional school argues that 
the organisational forms and practices of nation-states, for example the educational 
system, state bureaucracies and, more recently, market enterprise, are the outcome of 
world-level directives for 'development’ and 'progress’. These directives are the 
rationalised myths which over time become institutionalised in the world system and 
which consequently press all countries to adopt common policies, objectives and 
practices - the result of which is homogenisation (McNeely, 1990).
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While arguing for convergence, the institutionalist school argues that despite the apparent 
economic inequalities within the wider system, both rich and poor countries evolve 
similar social arrangements and structures. Institutional theorists point to the fact that 
poorer countries, despite the disadvantage of being poor still establish massive 
government bureaucracies, and educational and military systems similar to those of the 
richer nations. As a result, the institutionalist school has focused on convergence not of 
functional economic and technical requirements, but on cultural and ideological factors 
that exist within the international system. The international system is viewed as an 
integrated social system organised around cultural rules that all countries within the 
international system subscribe to. It is these cultural rules which press all nations towards 
convergence, the institutionalists argue.
Hannerz's (1991) thesis of cultural homogenisation is another such view that examines the 
effect of globalisation on local cultures. Hannerz presented a scenario of homogenisation 
of the world cultural system, which he called “cultural imperialism”. It involves, in the 
author’s views, a 'large-scale transfer of meaning systems and symbolic forms’ along the 
dimension of the relationship between the centre and the periphery, with the periphery 
being the recipient of culture from the centre. This signifies a discerning note of caution 
about the homogenisation - and by extension negative - impact of such globalisation 
trends. He went on to state however, that after a certain level of infusion, the periphery 
will be able to reshape the culture imbibed from the centre to ‘its own specification’. He 
called this the cultural maturation tendency. As global meanings continue to operate 
within local settings, some form of ‘mutual influence’ takes place to the extent that the 
global culture becomes modified. This process of modification comes about when local 
people are able to master the global culture and tinker with them to such extent that a new 
form of the global culture, which is an outgrowth of the local culture and which is 
responsive to the local culture and needs, arises.
Still within this discussion of global culture is the work of Robertson (1992) who, in 
contrast, argues that global culture is not about to be homogenised. For him, the 
relationship between global and local culture (which he called universalism and
13
particularism respectively) is a two-way relationship in which localism is not about to be 
lost to a universal process such as globalisation. Instead, what takes place is a kind of 
duality of interaction in which the local will be infused with the global and vice versa. 
This, he refers to as the interpenetration of the universalisation of particularism and the 
particularisation of universalism” (pg. 100). Kiely (1998) also offered a similar 
interactive view of the global-local nexus by suggesting that globalisation is best 
understood by paying close attention to concrete local events and developments as 
opposed to viewing globalisation as a meta-theory.
Other studies have specifically addressed the impact of globalisation on less developed 
countries. Focusing on Africa, these studies have analysed the impact of the globalisation 
trend and came up with a number of conclusions. Studies from the political-economy 
perspective emphasised the declining power of the state as an originator of political actions, 
and the increasing role of the international system and international organisations such as the 
IMF and the World Bank (Mohan, 1996; Stubbs and Underhill, 1994). Peck and Tickell’s
(1994) description of the 'emerging’ structure as “local responsibility without power and the 
supra-national exercise of power without responsibility” best capture this view.
Within the banking industry, the globalisation process is more advanced in wholesale 
banking than in the retail sector (O’Brien, 1992:52). Compared to wholesale banking, 
retail banking is regarded as more local in nature as it is expected to be much more closer 
to customer needs and preferences (O’Brien, 1992; Frazer and Vittas, 1982). Yet, to 
completely isolate retail banking from global trends will be misleading. Frazer and Vittas 
(1982) identified substantial level of similarities between consumer financial needs and 
the ease with which new financial technology can be transferred across many different 
countries as reasons why the retail banking sector can be considered global. For Reinicke
(1995), the ease with which foreign banks are now able to penetrate local markets after 
deregulation constitutes a major aspect of the globalisation trend within retail banking. In 
addition, O’Brien (1992) identified the increasing ownership of local banks by foreigners, 
the increasing formation of alliances and mergers between banks of different national 
origins, and the important role that the new information and communications technology
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is playing in the area of systems support and the so-called 'back-office’ functions for 
banking activities. Here technology is making it easier and cheaper for banks to relocate 
these services away from their local base to areas of low cost.
Implicit in these discussions is an increasing integration of activities in the environment 
of retail banks. As technology has made it possible for banks to relocate some of their 
support services, enter into alliances and increase their presence in foreign territories, the 
discussion about the context of retail banks can increasingly be carried out from within 
the globalisation discourse. If globalisation entails a unifying of the environment of 
banks, then a study of the impact of globalisation on banking institutions in DCs becomes 
more important in view of some of the arguments about the possible homogenising effect 
such environments portend. According to Aldrich (1979):
“A  hom ogenous environm ent rewards the developm ent o f  standardised w ays o f  relating to the 
dom ain population, and m ay lead to the developm ent o f  an undifferentiated set o f  products and 
services” (pg. 66).
Clearly influenced by some of these concerns, studies in IS are beginning to examine 
whether the globalisation process portends homogeneity for developing countries’ (DCs) 
organisations or whether these organisations can utilise IT and IT-based management 
techniques according to the socio-cultural requirements of their contexts (Walsham, 
1998). In his contribution to the globalisation debate, Kiely (1998) used the term 
‘actually existing globalisation’ to explain the importance of examining globalisation 'as 
an agenda for concrete empirical investigation1. The importance of this is that 
globalisation is experienced in different ways by different people in different parts of the 
world, which therefore means that the local context matters; that global techniques 
employed in the ‘west’ cannot be implemented mechanistically in DCs without due 
consideration for the local context. Considering the local context may therefore imply 
some form of modification or adaptation of ‘western’ technology and techniques when 
they are being implemented in DCs.
15
1.1.2 From the perspective o f information technology (IT) transfer
Information technologies, developed in the industrialised countries of the ‘west’, are said to 
have been developed to satisfy the socio-economic needs of that context (Avgerou, 1995). 
However, given the increasing interconnection of social and economic activities in 
contemporary times, these technologies are rapidly being transferred to DCs. DCs’ 
organisations, in appreciation of the developmental potentials of the technology, are thus 
willing to exploit these potentials to achieve productivity improvement, organisational 
effectiveness and business competitiveness (Avgerou, 1995).
IT is increasingly being applied in a number of business sectors in DCs. In Africa, studies 
have revealed an increasing investment and adoption of the technology in business sectors 
such as banking where, in addition to automating their back office functions, banks are 
investing in customer-facing technologies such as ATMs and smart-card technologies 
(Dickinson, 1996; Gosling, 1996; Jason, 1998; Woherem, 2000). Other studies include the 
application of IT in health institutions in Nigeria and South Africa (Korpela, 1994; Braa and 
Hedberg, 2000) and other government offices such as the revenue collection and financial 
management information systems in Uganda (Zake, 1995). These various studies examining 
the transfer and use of IT in DCs have touched on important organisational, economic, 
social, political and cultural factors that influence IT transfer and use in these countries.
The use of IT in DCs has, over the years, been suggested as not living up to the 
expectations of their implementation (Madon, 1994; Waema, 1995). These difficulties 
have, at various times, been linked with the processes in place for transferring the 
technology. For instance, the research by Odedra (1990) identified five channels through 
which IT is being transferred to DCs namely: purchase of equipment, education and 
training, technical assistance, licensing, and direct foreign investment. The conclusion of 
her study was that these channels are not as effective as they should be. She suggested 
that a number of technology-related projects fail to achieve any significant positive 
impact because of the poor treatment of the local organisational context. She, therefore, 
argued persuasively that technology transfer must be accompanied by the technical
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know-how: that technology transfer is incomplete without the knowledge of using the 
technology. Other studies have also identified major problems with the transfer and use 
of IT in achieving organisational improvements. Such problems include an acute shortage 
of skilled and experienced IT professionals (Bhatnagar, 1991; Waema, 1995), weak 
telecommunications infrastructure to transfer data and for effective computerisation 
(Woherem, 1992) and problems of organisational culture which makes it difficult to 
utilise the technology as originally envisaged (Avgerou, 1995).
To effectively use the technology, studies have suggested the transfer of organisational 
forms and practices - which can be adapted to suit the local context - to accompany the 
transfer of IT (Morgan, 1991; Westney, 1991). These organisational forms or technology 
according to Avgerou (1995) can be in two forms. First, the physical technologies that are 
supported by organisational technologies such as in the development of database systems 
to provide information infrastructure for ‘institution-building’ programmes sponsored by 
international development agencies. The other consists of organisational technologies that 
are supported by certain physical technologies such as the adoption of management 
practices like TQM or business planning, which are usually supported by decision 
support systems to facilitate management work engendered by the new organisational 
forms.
Similarly, there have been calls for the development of IS models applicable to and based 
on research studies conducted in DCs. Kiggundu (1990) looked at the application of 
Socio-Technical Systems (STS) in DCs and concluded that its application has been very 
limited. He highlighted certain conditions that made it difficult for the method to gain 
wide acceptance. Some of these limiting factors are ‘organisational and management 
problems, technical and economic realities of countries and the level of discretion 
allowed to ordinary users within the organisation’. These problems are outlined in detail 
in Table 1.1 below.
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Table 1: Difficulties in applying Socio-Technical Systems in DCs
1 Organisations are managed as closed systems and are relatively unresponsive to environmental 
changes
2 Government plays a dominant and pervasive role in the functioning of organisations
3 Organisations tend to display little structure and have low tolerance for ambiguity and great 
uncertainty
4 Motivation to work stems from different sources, including the need for individual rather than group 
recognition by one’s superior
5 Developing countries’ organisations exhibit dysfunctional modes o f conflict management, closer social 
and emotional interactions, intergroup rivalry, little capacity for openness, trust, and rational 
expression o f feelings, and well-established hierarchical and social status barriers
6 Inadequate physical, managerial, and institutional frameworks exist for effective use of technological 
innovations
7 American theories o f management do not apply abroad
8 Organisations employ ambiguous, ill-defined, abstract, and symbolic measurement of performance and 
organisational goals
Source: Kiggundu (1990: 148)
To overcome some of these problems, Kiggundu called for an approach to the adoption 
of the STS method that allows for some form of adaptation and modification in different 
regions and countries. Rieger et al (1990) discussing the same issue, proposed a cultural 
configuration model based on the assumption that internal organisational structures and 
processes are conditioned in part by their ambient society’s culture. Similarly, Jaeger 
(1990) also hinted at the problem of an uncritical acceptance of western management 
theories. The author identified some “value configurations” of DCs and compared them 
with western management practices. The conclusion was that these values are very 
different from western values and result in behaviours that are different from those which 
exist in the west. A similar suggestion was raised by Elmandjra (1992) that, information 
technologies are a by-product of the particular socio-cultural environment within which 
they evolve and that an effective transfer and use of these technologies in DCs “must not
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count on the blind and automatic transportation of models” that have emerged in different 
environments.
These various suggestions imply the view that solutions and management techniques 
developed from the industrialised countries of the ‘west’ cannot be mechanistically 
implemented in DCs with the expectation of achieving the same type of results as in the 
‘west’. These views and suggestions have, therefore, called for the importance of local 
adaptations to western techniques to fit the context of implementation. However, the 
precise method of achieving these modifications and the factors that shape local 
adaptations are still poorly understood - leaving it a fruitful area for research. In line with 
this, the thesis explores the nature of local adaptations to the implementation of IT- 
enabled change programmes within the Nigerian banking industry.
In sum, the importance of local adaptations in the use of IT and associated organisational 
techniques has been examined from the technology transfer perspective. The western 
orientation of IT has meant that most established models of'best IS practices’ are drawn on 
research studies from organisations in the advanced industrialised countries of the west. 
Questions have been asked about the feasibility of applying such models in other regions 
(Avgerou, 1995; Elmandjra, 1992; Ein-Dor, et., al. 1993; Jaeger, 1990; Kiggundu, 1990; 
Martisons and Westwood, 1997; Rieger et., al, 1990). Raising such questions imply an 
acknowledgement of the narrowness of these models in managing and facilitating 
technology-based change and a recognition of differences in environments within which 
organisations operate.
1.1.3 From the perspective o f IT and organisational change
The literature on organisation change can be classified into three main categories 
(Slappendel, 1996). First are the writings on goal-based change which believe that the 
impetus for change arises from factors internal to the organisation (Child, 1972; Kirton, 
1980). Second is the adaptation model with its focus on external factors as the reasons why 
organisations change (Goodman, 1982; Hall, 1991; Levy and Merry, 1986). The third is the 
interactive process model of change (Slappendel, 1996; Pettigrew, 1985), which views
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neither structural properties nor managerial actions as the reasons why organisations’ 
change. Rather, organisational change is regarded as an emergent process based on the 
interaction of both internal and external forces, structural properties and managerial actions.
The goal-based perspective is based on the understanding that individuals are rational in 
their actions and are guided by the goals of the organisation - which all members strive 
hard to maintain. An approach to organisational change from this perspective is the 
planned approach to change. Planned change involves a deliberate, purposeful, and 
explicit decision to engage in a program of change (Levy and Murray, 1986). It normally 
originates in a decision from management to improve on how the organisation functions, 
to create and communicate a vision of the change initiative and to implement necessary 
changes (Levy and Murray, 1986; Wilson, 1992; Plant, 1987).
The planned approach to organisational change - because of its emphasis on top 
management decision-making - has resulted in a plethora of models aimed to develop and 
train managers in a set of competences regarded as necessary for managing change 
(Wilson, 1992). These models aim to assist management in understanding and exploiting 
opportunities engendered by a change in environment as well as avoiding threats 
(Johnson and Scholes, 1989; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Porter, 1980). It has also been 
suggested that planned change can be carried out through the changing of the culture of 
the organisation as a way of introducing change into the organisation4. Approaches from 
this perspective are based on the assumption that people's actions are a function of their 
values and cognition (Wilson and Rosenfeld, 1990; Wilson, 1992).
In addition to changing people's behaviour, a planned approach to change also focuses on 
changing the organisational paradigm. An organisation's paradigm is defined as the 
unquestioned assumptions through which all actions and procedures within the 
organisation get meaning (Ranson et. al, 1980; Sheldon, 1980). At a broad conceptual
4 This is based on the assumption that the culture of an organisation is an instrument that can be managed and 
manipulated by management. Culture is but one of many variables (others being size, structure, technology) 
which can be acted upon or controlled for organisational effectiveness (Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984; Smircich, 
1983; Meek, 1988).
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level, it is the unquestioned assumption about why the organisation operate and at a more 
concrete level it defines what is acceptable behaviour or the best way to approach a 
particular situation.
However, some argue that structures and people are not so readily amenable to change. 
According to Oliver (1997a) many activities within organisations are so strongly upheld 
by the organisation's prevailing culture that decision-makers no longer even question 
their appropriateness. These activities are usually upheld because their longevity is 
considered sufficient evidence of their usefulness. The reasons adduced for such 
institutional inertia are that the cost of making changes may be regarded as greater than 
the perceived benefits or it may be that appropriate alternatives cannot be conceived of or 
that such alternatives are regarded as unrealistic (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).
The planned approach to change has generally been criticised as ignoring - to a large 
extent -the social, political and economic context in which organisations operate. It has 
also been criticised because of its over-insistence on managerial control and authority in 
achieving a successful organisational change programme. The failure of the goal-based 
approach to consider organisational structures such as roles and positions as being able to 
influence and interact with some of the personal qualities of an individual led to a focus 
on structural characteristics of the decision-maker and of the organisation. Because a 
person occupies a particular role in an organisation, there are expectations which go with 
the role and the fact that such a person is expected to conform to the demands of the role 
means that individuals are not entirely free and independent. Therefore, behaviour such 
as decision-making is - to a large extent - socially mediated (Baldridge and Burnham, 
1975).
It is this focus on structural or contextual characteristics which informs the work of the 
adaptation school (Goodman, 1982). Unlike the goal-based school, this model views 
change as determined mainly by the structural characteristics of the organisation that is 
changing. It focuses on such impersonal characteristics as organisational size,
complexity, and centralisation of authority and on environmental components like 
customers, suppliers, other organisations and government institutions as the main 
determinants of change. In so doing, this perspective shares the objective and overtly 
simplistic view of change of the goal-based school. However, its main strength lies in its 
consideration of the environment within which the organisation operates.
The view of customers as a source of change is based on the idea that they are a source of 
ideas and that they also generate demand which the organisation will aim to satisfy 
(Marquis, 1982; Von Hippel, 1988). This is however dependent on the level of 
sophistication of customers - which differs across industries and between countries 
(Crocombe et al. 1991). The role of institutions and government institutions in promoting 
change in organisations has also been widely documented (see for instance King et al. 
1994). Other structural characteristics that have been touched upon in the literature are 
the size of an organisation where it is believed that large organisations, because of the 
large amount of resources at their disposal, are more disposed to change compared to 
smaller organisations (Fennell, 1984).
Unlike the two previous perspectives, the interactive process model conceptualises 
change as being the product of the interaction of structural influences or factors and the 
actions of organisational decision-makers. Change here emerges from the interaction of 
the two sets of forces, neither of which is solely responsible for change. It conceptualises 
the change process as a complex process of interaction which can best be understood 
through a holistic approach that considers the ‘complex and paradoxical relationship 
between action and structure’ (Slappendel, 1996).
A number of studies have been carried out from this perspective and have come up with 
different explanations of the process of change. Walton (1987) carried out one such study 
on the international shipping industry. The study concluded that an industry’s capacity 
for change is influenced by the interaction between external forces such as environmental 
trends and other components such as the vision, the need, the social context as well as the 
institutions driving the process of change. Other notable work from this perspective are
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the comparative study of innovations in four major organisations by Starkey and 
McKinlay (1988) and Pettigrew’s studies of strategic change in ICI and the UK National 
Health Service (Pettigrew, 1985; 1992). The interactive model avoids a unidirectional 
view of change and the causes of change because change is regarded as a function of the 
interaction of forces. This therefore helps in capturing the full complexity of 
organisational change by rejecting the rational model of change and embracing the more 
subjective and non-rational aspects of organisational life.
Similarly in information systems (IS), IT and organisational change models have evolved 
from early teleological models to more subjective and dynamic models which consider IS 
as social systems (Land, 1987). IS as social systems implies a shift in focus from looking 
at issues of how computers function as hardware and software to an acknowledgement of 
the organisation that accommodates such technical systems. This has led in the main to the 
study of how organisations are structured, concerns about the people within the 
organisations who use the technologies, and how these organisations operate.
The increasing emphasis on the organisational context of IS has been accompanied by a 
change in focus from the use of computers within a specific organisation to a much 
broader perspective analysing inter-organisational factors that influence IT use (Reekers 
and Smithson, 1996) and more recently to a focus on national and international factors 
that influence the use of IT in organisations (Barrett et al., 1997; Harindranath, 1997; 
Walsham, 1998). The literature on IT and organisational change will be considered in 
more details in chapter 3. These developments reflect an increased understanding of the 
diverse factors that influence the use of IT and the appropriate approach required to 
studying them. One such approach that is increasingly being adopted is the contextualist 
approach.
A contextualist approach to the study of IT and organisational change focuses on the 
interaction of the multi-level structures and systems within which IT is embedded and the 
process of change that takes place over time (Walsham, 1993). However, the 
contextualist model has been criticised as lacking an adequate theoretical underpinning
and a conceptual model for linking the external context and the inner organisational 
context (Pettigrew, 1992). One of the aims of this thesis therefore is to attempt the 
development of such a conceptual framework for the study of technology-based change 
in Nigerian banks. In the thesis, concepts and ideas from institutional theory and the 
resource-based approach are combined within a contextualist perspective to study 
planned technology-based change within the Nigerian banking industry. Such a 
combination provides the theoretical underpinning missing in Pettigrew’s model and it 
allows for an examination of both rational and symbolic pressures that influence the 
process of implementing technology-based organisational change initiatives at various 
contextual levels. A rational view of organisational functioning assumes that 
organisational behaviour is deliberate, and systematic while a symbolic view believes that 
organisational behaviour is compliant, habitual, unreflective and socially justified 
(Oliver, 1997). The interesting question from this perspective is how do broadly-based 
social norms and pressures in the inter-organisational arena interact with intra- 
organisational resources to influence the implementation of IT-related organisational 
change within the Nigerian banking system? An attempt will be made to provide answers 
to this question in much of our discussion in Chapter 6.
The importance of adopting these views in this study lies in the somewhat different 
conceptions of the interaction between organisations and the environment that the two 
theories hold - highlighting the rational on one hand and the symbolic on the other. 
Although each theory elaborates on important aspects of the interaction, neither captures 
on its own the full complexity of issues involved in IT use in organisations. A combined 
model that focuses on both the rational and symbolic factors that influence organisational 
change seems to potentially aid our understanding better. The resource-based view will 
be used to examine rational factors that influence IT and organisational change and the 
institutional theory will be used to examine the more social and in particular symbolic 
elements involved in the use of IT and associated organisational changes.
A good theory of change, it has been suggested, must be able to explain 
change/continuity, actions/structures as well as internal/external sources of change
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(Pettigrew, 1987; Van de Ven et., al, 1988; Walsham, 1993). Approaching organisational 
change from an institutional perspective combines both political5 and cultural6 elements 
of the change process and is thus useful in explaining continuity and change. Indeed, 
Zucker (1986) asserts that ‘once institutions are established they may persist, even though 
they are collectively sub-optimal’. This points in the direction of explaining continuity.
1.1,4 Setting the scene: The Nigerian Banking Industry
In Nigeria, change programmes manifest themselves across the economy and society as part 
of a general package of reform known as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). SAP 
in a general sense is a comprehensive programme of reform aimed at restructuring the 
economy by introducing changes in the country’s public and private organisations. It 
involves amongst others, a reduction in government spending to reduce public deficit; 
devaluation of currencies and the privatisation/commercialisation of nationalised industries. 
It also involves the opening of exchange rate dealings - hitherto controlled by the 
government - to 'market forces’; and the lifting of trade restrictions (EIU, 1993; Logan and
5 The political perspective provides a view o f organisations as consisting o f more than one super-ordinate 
goal; organisations are coalitions o f people with divergent interests some o f which may be in harmony or 
could be opposing (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). While the political perspective agrees that people are 
individually rational; collectively they are less so. Divergences in interest could be as a result o f different 
expectations o f the future, differences emanating from occupying different positions within the organisation 
and differences in individual ambitions and interests. It is argued that some o f these differences may be 
resolved through the use o f political tactics such as coalition formation, co-optation, withholding or 
exploiting information and employing the use o f outside expertise such as consultants (Eisenhardt & 
Zbaracki, 1992). The importance o f politics to organisational actions are divided between those who view 
politics as essential and effective to organisational functioning (Quinn, 1980; Pfeffer, 1992) and those that 
argue that politics is detrimental to the organisation (Gandz & Murray, 1980).
6 An important component of the institutional argument is culture. Indeed, the reference to shared systems 
of rules and symbolic interactions is heavily laden with cultural ideas. The root o f culture as a concept has 
been largely traced back to the field o f anthropology where, at various times, culture has been 
synonymously used with other concepts such as customs, norms, beliefs or belief system, rituals and 
ceremonies (Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984; Meek, 1988; Sackmann, 1992). In an attempt to narrow down this 
complexity, the study o f culture and organisational change has been broadly classified into two main 
schools: studies focusing on managing culture for change and those on the evolution o f  cultures in 
organisations (Ogbonna and Harris, 1998). These two perspectives consequently view culture as something 
an organisation has and something an organisation is respectively. The implications for organisational 
change are that culture can be managed and manipulated during a change program as well as under specific 
situations such as in periods o f crisis. However, recent work on the study o f culture has however criticised 
these two views and questioned the extent to which organisational culture can be managed or manipulated by 
management in the process of organisational change (Ogbonna, 1993; Willmott, 1993). These studies, while in 
agreement with the view that the culture o f organisations does change, however, argue that management or 
change agents cannot determine the direction and impact o f such change before hand.
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Mengisteab, 1993; Olukoshi and Nwokwe, 1994). Just as in most of Africa, this programme 
was supported by a loan agreement from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)7. The effect 
of SAP on the Nigerian banking sector was in liberalising the process of setting up new 
banks. This was considered essential for promoting ‘competition, innovation and efficiency’ 
(Ebhodaghe, 1991).
Three major events mark out the Nigerian banking industry as an interesting case. Since 
government liberalised the industry in September 1986, there has been an explosion in the 
number of licensed banks, which increased dramatically from 29 commercial banks and 12 
merchant banks in 1986 to a peak of 66 commercial banks and 51 merchant banks by 1995. 
Secondly, the increase in the number of banking institutions did not produce the much- 
expected financial deepening and economic upturn (Utomi, 1996; Lewis and Stein, 1997). 
Instead, by the mid-1990s the industry experienced a major financial and credibility crisis in 
which a large number of banks were closed down by the government. The number of banks 
closed down rose from 8 in 1989 to 51 by the end of 1995. Recently, in January 1998 
government closed down 26 additional banks comprising 13 commercial banks and 13 
merchant banks.
The third event is the proliferation of banking technology within the industry. Nigerian 
banks now spend an increasing amount of resources on IT in order to improve their services. 
In a 1998 survey of banking institutions in Nigeria, Woherem (2000) found that the average 
annual IT budget of banks increased from 126 million Naira8 in 1997 to 265 million Naira in 
1998. A number of IT-based banking products such as smart cards, home and Internet 
banking are being introduced into the sector. Banks are also increasingly automating their 
processing systems with a view to providing faster and better quality service to customers. 
In order to raise awareness, an increasing number of seminars and workshops are being 
organised by bankers and IT vendors. To cater for the increasing appetite of the industry for 
technology, quite a large number of IT vendors and software houses have developed in 
addition to the ones that have already been in the country.
7 In a study by Mohan (1996) it was revealed that 38 out of the 43 countries (or 88%) which have introduced 
the programme had entered into an agreement with the IMF as part o f their SAPs.
8 110 Naira = U.S. $ 1 (August, 2000)
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The history of computerisation efforts within the banking industry in some industrialised 
countries (i.e. U.S.A.) showed that larger banks were the prime movers of designing and 
implementing new technological solutions because they could more easily afford the 
substantial cost involved (Arthur Andersen, 1986). However in Nigeria, the big banks are 
only just joining in response to the threats posed by the new banks that came in after 
liberalisation. The sheer number of branches had been a burden on them given the 
logistics of computerising such a huge network of branches. In addition to investing 
directly in IT, these (old) banks with the aid of consultants are introducing IT-related change 
programmes such as BPR.
There is also an increase in the level of activities of large multi-national enterprises some 
of them IT/management consultants who advise local banks on how to become global 
players (Price and Johri, 1992). In Nigeria, a number of wholly owned foreign banks and 
others jointly owned, are now operating within the banking system. In addition, a number 
of multi-national IT/Management consultants are working with banks to introduce 
strategic plans and major restructuring programmes in the wake of the liberalisation and 
the increasing level of competition. Despite these increased activities within the Nigerian 
banking industry, the precise nature of changes taking place within the industry and the 
factors driving these changes have not been studied. Most studies have only focused on 
conducting cross-sectional examination of factors that influence IT adoption (Ogbechie, 
1997; Woherem, 2000), without a detailed study of the nature of associated 
organisational changes that have taken place within the industry. Therefore, the Nigerian 
banking sector can indeed be considered an appropriate setting for a study which aims to 
examine the interplay of global trends and local situations. A more detailed discussion of 
the developments within the Nigerian banking system is undertaken in chapter 4.
1.2 Purpose of the research
In the face of major environmental changes such as deregulation and liberalisation, 
developing countries’ organisations have introduced western management techniques and 
are increasingly using IT. Studies have focused on the importance of adapting these
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techniques to suit the context of their implementation. However, few of these studies 
have actually focused on revealing the nature of these adaptations and the factors 
influencing such adaptations. The overall aim of this study, therefore, is to increase 
understanding of why and how do these adaptations take place, and what results are 
achieved. This is pursued by examining the implementation of IT and planned 
organisational change initiatives in two Nigerian banks. These banks are two of the three 
oldest surviving banks within the industry and in the aftermath of the liberalisation of the 
banking industry embarked on major programmes of restructuring. Focusing on such 
banks with a long history of operation will provide a rich social and historical context for 
analysing the change initiatives and factors influencing their implementation.
1.3 Research question
The broad research question to which this study is directed is as follows:
How are global technology-based organisational change practices adapted within the local 
context of Nigerian banks?
In order to answer these questions, the following issues of interest have been identified for 
analysis:
■ Identification of wider practices in IT and organisational change in banking both from 
an international (global) perspective and within the Nigerian context.
■ A systematic exploration of the process of implementing IT and organisational change 
programmes focusing on the adaptations that takes place during implementation.
■ An explanation of the nature of local adaptations to global change programmes.
1.4 Contributions of the research
The research makes three major contributions.
The field of IT in DCs in recent years has attracted an increasing amount of attention. 
More recently, there are increasing concerns about the impact of the liberalisation and 
globalisation trends on DCs and consequently organisations in DCs are increasingly 
investing in IT and management techniques developed in the ‘west’ and adapting them to 
fit their local context. However, despite these observed trends there is a lack of detailed
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study as to how these various developments are taking place and the factors influencing 
them (Sahay and Walsham, 1995). How local adaptations are planned and achieved are 
still not properly understood. This study will therefore contribute to the body of studies 
interested in explaining the nature of local adaptations to global practices. This kind of 
study can act as a pool of knowledge which change agents can tap into and learn from.
Secondly, by combining both institutional theory and the resource-based model, this 
study aims to contribute to the growing body of knowledge that combines both rational 
and symbolic views to explaining organisational phenomena (Oliver, 1997; Dacin, 1997). 
Although in IS, much has been made of the interactive model of IT and organisational 
change, studies that combine two seemingly contrasting views such as the resource based 
view and the institutional theory are not common. This thesis offers a contribution in this 
direction by adopting a paradoxical stance to study the interaction between the 
organisation’s resource context and established rules and procedures within the 
institutional context and how this in turn influence and is influenced by the change 
process.
Thirdly, by making explicit the influence of an organisation’s resource context and its 
wider institutional settings on the adaptation process, a third contribution of this study is 
to make some tentative suggestions for change agents in DCs attempting to implement 
change programmes developed in different contexts.
1.5 Research methodology
Moving on from a discussion of the nature of the research problem, we now consider the 
research methodology. In previous sections we concluded that a rational and linear 
approach was not sufficient to study organisational change and that a processual, non­
linear and interactive approach which considers 'changing' as opposed to 'change' was 
more suitable. Such an approach would consider the multi-level contextual factors, 
including wider social/cultural rules and regulations and how they interact with the 
change process. In addition, this approach would assist in the task of putting into
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operation, the various ideas and concepts highlighted from the previous section. Finally, 
to study IT and organisational change within the Nigerian banking sector would require 
an approach that gives a rich description of the developments as well as an interpretative 
approach which gives due cognisance to the meaning which people attach to their 
everyday situations.
1.5.1 An interpretive research approach
It has been suggested within the IS field that researchers should make explicit the 
philosophical assumptions underpinning their research (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991; 
Walsham, 1995). Within the IS field, research strategies have traditionally been divided 
into two camps: the positivist approach and the interpretive approach. The positivist 
approach has been the dominant one within the IS field (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991) 
and it relies on the use of numbers. Such data are used deductively to explain and predict 
organisational phenomena and to provide generalisations about organisations. Positivist 
approaches assume that the relationship between social reality and humans is 
independent, objective and has a cause and effect relationship. This approach has 
however been criticised in the IS literature for its treatment of organisational reality 
which is regarded as complex and not easily amenable to statistical deductions (Galliers, 
1992). A more holistic and interpretive approach which captures the full reality of 
organisational behaviour in "its settings" has therefore being proposed and is increasing 
being employed in IS research (Walsham, 1993).
The epistemological stance for interpretive approaches is that knowledge is a social 
construction with the possibility of more than one interpretation to any particular 
phenomena (Walsham, 1993). Interpretive research aims at understanding the 
‘intersubjective meanings embedded in social life’ (Gibbons, 1987). Therefore, valid 
knowledge is gained through an understanding of these interpretations and meanings that 
people ascribe to their actions. Interpretive approaches believe that to theorise about any 
particular social phenomena would involve an understanding of that phenomena, which 
can only be achieved by ‘getting inside’ of the phenomena; hence the rejection of an 
objective reality which can be observed ‘from afar’ and replicated across organisations.
30
Within the IS discipline, a number of interpretive approaches have been employed in IS 
research such as phenomenology (Boland, 1985), Soft Systems methodology (Checkland, 
1981), and ethnography (Bentley et. al., 1992; Harvey and Myers, 1995). These studies 
have focused on achieving a deep understanding of the social and organisational context 
in which IS are being implemented and the mutual interaction between these systems and 
their contexts.
Markus and Robey (1988) suggested such an interactive approach when discussing the three 
dimensions of causal structure used in explaining IT-related change. The first is a 
technological imperative where IT is seen as an external agent and the dominant force for 
change. Within this perspective human choice and action is constrained by the force of the 
technology. Next is an organisational imperative where humans have unlimited power and 
choice over technological options and the outcome of IT use. The choice and use of 
information technology depends on the information needs of the organisation and how 
decision-makers within the organisation go about satisfying these needs. This perspective 
however could be criticised for its neglect of environmental conditions which could 
constraint or preclude the making of such choices. Finally, they considered and argued for 
the interactive perspective, which posits that the way we use IT, and with what outcomes is 
a function of both human choice and contextual characteristics.
Given the nature of IT and organisational change discussed in previous sections and our 
embrace of an interactive model, we believe a research approach which aims to interpret 
and analyse - from the participants viewpoint - the social context of IT use in Nigerian 
banks is appropriate in this study. This becomes important given the research goal of 
understanding the nature of local adaptations in the implementation of technology-based 
organisational change initiatives in individual banks. Such adaptations, research has 
shown, are a function of the different meanings which organisational participants 
ascribed to their experiences of technology implementation (Orlikowski, 1996) and 
which interestingly in some cases have occasioned different outcomes to similar
31
technology in different organisations (Barley, 1986). Therefore in this research we will 
employ an interpretive stance and use the case study as the research strategy.
The interpretive approach has been criticised as lacking rigour, precision and credibility 
compared to the positivist approach because it is more open to distortion as a result of the 
values or purpose of the researcher (Galliers, 1992; Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Also from 
the viewpoint of the researched, criticism made of interpretive approach is that 
individuals are not always in a position to give a full account of their actions or intentions 
and that, more often, all they can offer are anecdotes of what they did and the reasons for 
their actions (Giddens, 1984).
1.5,2 The case study strategy
According to Walsham (1993), case studies are perhaps the most appropriate strategy for 
conducting empirical research from an interpretive stance. Case studies are defined as an 
empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary issue or event within its real-life 
context, especially where the boundary between such issues or event and its context is not 
clearly defined (Yin, 1994). Therefore the case study approach is especially useful in 
such situations where the contextual conditions of the events being studied are critical 
and where the researcher has no control over the events as they unfold. The case study 
strategy has been argued to be particularly useful for practice-based problems where the 
experiences of the actors are important and the context of action is critical (Galliers, 
1992; Lee, 1989).
This is so because the case study approach allows for a ‘thick description’ of the 
phenomena under study (Yin, 1994). Such ‘thick descriptions’ gives the researcher access 
to the subtleties of changing and multiple interpretations (Walsham, 1995) which would 
have been lost in quantitative or experimental strategies (Yin, 1994). The case study 
approach has also been suggested as appropriate for the ‘why’ and ‘how’ type of research 
questions and research studies of the processual nature extending over a long period of 
time (Benbasat et. al., 1987; Yin, 1994; Walsham, 1993). In studying events within their 
natural setting, the case study strategy makes use of multiple methods of data collection
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such as interviews, documentary reviews, archival records, direct and participant 
observations (Yin, 1994).
Many of the criticisms levelled against the case study strategy relates to the fact that 
because it is specific to only a small number of cases, it is very hard to generalise to a wider 
range of situations. Also the richness and complexity of the data collected means that the 
data is often open to a number of very different interpretations such that researcher bias is a 
constant danger (Comford and Smithson, 1996). The lack of a detailed step-by-step data 
analysis method has also been frequently cited in the literature (Miles and Huberman, 
1994). Despite these limitations, especially that of not being able to provide 
generalisability in a statistical sense, Pettigrew (1985) still believes that case studies are 
useful in developing and refining generalisable concepts and that multiple case studies 
can lead to generalisations in terms of propositions. Walsham (1993) argues that the 
validity of the case study approach derives from the epistemological stance taken. Hence 
from an interpretive tradition, the validity of case study results derive from the 
plausibility of the logical reasoning used in analysing the case study findings. Similarly 
Yin (1994) argues that case studies are useful for analytical generalisations, where the 
researcher’s aim is to generalise a particular set of results to some broader theoretical 
propositions.
Given the interpretive stance adopted in this research and the nature of the research 
question of understanding ‘how’ Nigerian banks are implementing IT-enabled change 
programmes, we believe the case study approach is the appropriate research strategy. The 
same research question could have been approached using surveys designed to examine 
changing patterns in banks, showing for instance that banks are adopting a particular 
technique over others and implementing some types of technology as opposed to others. 
However, this may not reveal in detail the unique experiences of individual banks and the 
layers of factors influencing the change exercise. The case study approach was chosen 
because of its advantages in creating novel and rich insights especially in the study of IS 
in DCs and its focus on examining the rich social and cultural factors influencing local 
adaptations to the use of IT in such a context.
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1.5.3 Research Design
As stated, the purpose of this research is to understand and explain the nature of local 
adaptations to global techniques in DCs. This entails a detailed study of the wider and 
local contextual factors influencing such techniques, the process of implementation at the 
local level and the ensuing change resulting from the implementation process. Such a 
focus led to the adoption of an interpretive stance which seeks to uncover truth by 
understanding phenomena in its natural setting. This in turn led to the choice of the case 
study approach as the research strategy because of its emphasis on investigating a 
contemporary phenomena in its real-life context (Yin, 1994). A case study approach is 
therefore used to describe the implementation of IT-related management techniques in 
Nigeria banks. Over a two-year period beginning in 1997, two case studies were 
conducted in two banks which adopted both similar and contrasting approaches to 
restructuring.
1.5.4 Unit o f analysis
The study adopts a multiple-case design containing several embedded units of analysis. 
The first unit of analysis is the banking industry from an international perspective 
followed by the Nigerian banking industry. Given the emphasis on globalisation, it is 
suggested that the analysis of these units will provide a context for describing and 
analysing the case studies and the restructuring initiatives of banks in the two case 
studies. The two banks belong to the category of banks - referred to locally as ‘old 
generation’ banks -  which have been in operation before the liberalisation of the industry 
in 1986. These groups of banks are the institutions that have been affected most by the 
changes in the industry due to the liberalisation and the attendant changes thereof. Two of 
the three oldest surviving banks have been chosen.
Following Benbasat, et al., (1987) who suggest that the choice of case study sites should 
be deliberate rather than opportunistic, these two banks were chosen on purpose. One of 
them was among the first set of banks to implement a major restructuring programme 
soon after it was privatised in 1990 and the model upon which the programme was
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designed was recognised by industry analysts as worthy of note. The other bank created a 
major storm in 1997 as a result of its restructuring programme - ramifications of which 
are still very prevalent within the industry. It is believed that these two cases are 
representative of the experiences of old banks in repositioning their banks in the face of a 
changing environment.
1.5.5 Data sources
Data to support the description of changes in banking from an international perspective 
comes from secondary sources, mainly a literature review of existing body of knowledge 
on the subject. Data to support the description of changes within the Nigerian banking 
industry comes from both primary and secondary sources. Secondary data sources are 
mainly government publications, newspaper articles, and reports from professional 
bodies such as the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria (CIBN). Valuable insight 
was also gained from research studies available on the impact of deregulation and 
liberalisation on the performance of the industry. Primary data sources include bank 
managers and directors, bank operators and IT personnel, management consultants, 
professional bodies, regulatory agencies and IT vendors in Nigeria.
Case study data also comes from both primary and secondary data sources including 
interviews with bank operators, IT and operations directors, senior managers in charge of, 
and involved with restructuring initiatives, branch managers and staff as well as 
management consultants. Secondary data sources include training manuals, company 
memos, annual reports, and newspaper reports on the two banks. Valuable information 
was also obtained from books and reports written by former employees of the banks. 
Access was also given to one of the bank’s library where useful archival documents and 
newspaper cuttings were obtained.
1.5.6 Data collection and analysis
Perhaps the most important and valuable source of information in this study are personal 
interviews with bank employees. The first field study was undertaken between March and 
May 1997. The aim of this study was to form an image of developments within the
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industry as very little existed in the area of literature. What little information did exist 
were anecdotes of how the banking industry was changing and newspaper reports of the 
various initiatives the banks were undertaking. So this trip was intended to get a first­
hand knowledge of these developments. During the trip, interviews were conducted in 8 
banks (see Appendix IV for a breakdown of banks) including both commercial and 
merchant banks. In addition, we also conducted interviews at the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) as it became apparent from interviews with the banks that the CBN was very 
influential -  directly or indirectly - in what was happening in the other banks. We also 
interviewed major software vendors and management consultants whose activities are 
also quite prominent within the industry. In all, twenty-six (26) interviews were 
conducted during the pilot study.
During this first trip interviews were not tape-recorded. There were a number of reasons 
for this. First, being the initial visit it was decided that tape recording interviews would 
not be ideal given the fact that interviewer and interviewee are only just getting to know 
each other. This was further compounded by two other reasons: the political situation 
within the country and the crackdown on banks and bankers in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. Given the failure of the financial system in the early 1990s, government 
brought out a new decree to crackdown on fraudulent bankers involved in the financial 
distress within the country. Consequently, there was a general feeling of apprehension 
within the entire banking industry and people were not quite comfortable about 
discussing banking-related issues, especially with a stranger who could be a “government 
mole”. Also, the military had just renege on its promise to hand over power to civilians 
and this led to confrontations between the civil populace and the military. The military 
introduced a decree to quell dissenting voices and secret agents were used to ‘finger’ 
suspected government opposition. Therefore, the use of tape recorders at this time was 
regarded as inappropriate. Instead, extensive field notes were taken which were fully 
written immediately after the interviews. Interviews focused mainly on the nature of 
changes within the banking industry, how IT was involved in the process of change and 
banks’ responses to these changes. (See Appendix V for full list of interview topics). It
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was at this first visit that the initial contacts were made in the two banks used in the case 
studies.
The second field work, which was essentially in the two case study banks, was conducted 
between June and September 1999. The second trip was much easier than the first given 
that the researcher has established some contacts in the two banks, which then facilitated 
the data collection. Also the data collection itself was more focused compared with the 
first trip which was more of an introductory trip. Using a form of retrospective event 
history (Tuma and Hannan, 1984), data was collected on the changes that have taken 
place in the bank since the last visit in 1997. As Glick et., al. (1993) pointed out, 
‘researchers interested in organisational change are very often absent when important 
changes occur’. They went on to further state that the major challenge facing researchers 
then is how to get data consistently on events and processes that may occur while the 
researcher is not present. As a result, the first port of call in the banks was the contacts 
made during the first trip. Interviews with these informants gave us a general overview of 
the changes that have taken place and it pointed us in the direction of how to carry the 
research forward in terms of what the major events and processes were and the person(s) 
to contact in this respect.
Data for the case studies was collected mainly through the use of semi-structured 
interviews. Given the nature of the changes that have taken place and the range of issues 
that needed to be covered, interviews were conducted with a broad spectrum of staff 
ranging from directors and senior managers right through to branch staff such as tellers 
and customer service officers. Interviews during this round were tape recorded and 
transcribed accordingly. All the interviews were conducted in English and therefore there 
was no need for translation, which helped in avoiding some potential problems of 
misinterpretation of interview results which takes place when translating interview data. 
Although this problem was avoided, other limitations of this form of data collection such 
as ensuring that useful data are extracted from the transcripts and the reliance on the 
research experience and skills of the interviewer are fully acknowledged.
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In the two banks, a total of thirty (30) interviews were conducted with directors, senior 
managers, branch management and staff. In order to harmonise the data gathered during 
the empirical study, multiple sources of evidence were employed. Further data about the 
banks were gathered from company reports, books and reports on the banks, newspaper 
reports of the banks’ restructuring activities dating from 1995, training guides written by 
consultants and used in training sessions for staff, and financial and banking industry 
reports written by independent financial audit companies. Interviews were also conducted 
with the consultants involved in the change initiatives.
A major problem acknowledged with a study adopting a retrospective account is the risk 
that evidence may be distorted through “errors of recall” (Glick et al., 1993). Errors of 
recall occur where informants, perhaps due to laps of memory, selectively neglect some 
events that are important or focus on some that are unimportant. If too many important 
events are omitted, the theoretical explanations may be inaccurate and may lack 
descriptive relevance and if too many unimportant events are included, they may be 
falsely accepted as important possible antecedents of other changes (Glick et al., 1993). 
However, it is impossible to avoid this risk because, given the constraints of time and 
finance, the researcher cannot observe all the changes directly. However, the risk has 
been minimised by the use of multiple sources of evidence and also by focusing explicitly 
on important developments which were identified as having a major influence on the 
change process. Thus, this method of triangulation and cross-checking helped to maintain 
the validity of the case studies.
1.6 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is organised into 7 chapters. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical perspectives for 
the study of technology-based change. The resource-based view and institutional theory 
are discussed and their contributions and limitations to the present study are discussed.
Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework based on the contextualist approach to 
studying change. The chapter starts with a brief discussion of different contextualist 
models and reviews their applicability in this study. Pettigrew’s contextualist model is
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then discussed further as the main analytical framework for our study. Major concepts 
from IT and organisational change models, resource-based view, and institutional theory 
are incorporated within the contextualist approach to present our conceptual framework. 
Based on the contextualist approach, chapter 4 is devoted to describing the wider 
contextual factors within which IT and organisational change is taking place in Nigerian 
banks. The chapter starts with a review of the literature on the transformation of banks -  
focusing on changes to the rules and procedures governing the activities of banking from 
an international perspective. This will provide the context to describing developments 
within the Nigerian banking industry, which is the next level of analysis. The section on 
the Nigerian banking industry starts with a historical evolution of the industry and traces 
developments from the pre-independence era to the era of indigenisation and heavy 
government involvement, and through to the era of liberalisation and beyond. The section 
on the Nigerian banking industry then looks at developments within the industry since 
liberalisation to highlight changes in the rules and procedures governing the activities of 
banking within the Nigerian system.
Chapter 5 introduces the case study organisations. The chapter starts by describing the 
organisational context of the banks with a view to presenting the inner context within 
which the restructuring took place before describing the interaction between the context 
and the process of IT and organisation change.
Chapter 6 presents a discussion of the case studies highlighting the major adaptations and 
modifications that took place in both banks and presenting a synthesis of the factors that 
were found to influence them. The chapter then presents the theoretical and practical 
implications of the findings before presenting some tentative guidelines for 
recommendations as to how the implementation of technology-based management 
techniques may be implemented in DCs with better results.
Lastly, chapter 7 provides a conclusion to the thesis. The major points of the thesis are 
summarised, the implications to the globalisation debate are discussed, and finally, the 
limitations and potential areas for further research are reused.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical perspectives for the study of information 
technology and organisational change
2.1 Introduction: selecting theoretical perspectives
The goal of this chapter is to set out the theoretical frameworks for studying IT and 
organisational change within the Nigerian banking system. As the research intends to 
study how Nigerian banks are responding to global pressures of deregulation and 
liberalisation, an organisation-environment interaction perspective to the study of change 
was identified as appropriate. The organisation-environment interaction perspective 
focuses on the importance of the environment in the welfare of organisations and its 
central message is that organisations affect and are affected, to varying degrees, by the 
environment within which they operate (Goodman, 1982).
Central to this argument are the twin issues of choice and determinism (Astley and Van 
de Ven, 1983; Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985). While one view argues that organisations, and 
particularly management, have autonomy in deciding how they deal with their 
environment, the other perspective believes that much of this choice is constrained by 
environmental forces. From the first perspective, management relies on understanding 
changes engendered by a shift in environmental conditions - as well as assessing their 
internal strengths and weaknesses - to exploit the opportunities and circumvent threats 
brought about by the environmental shifts (Johnson and Scholes, 1989). For the 
environmental deterministic school, objective and symbolic factors within the 
environment compel organisations to adapt and conform in order to achieve a fit. 
Organisational change, therefore, can be seen as a process of choice and selection on the 
one hand and on the other, as a process of complying with mandatory environmental 
demands. The argument therefore focuses on the level and strength of choice and 
determinism in the process of change (Astley and Van de Ven, 1983).
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Strategic change models focus on improving management analytical strengths in 
understanding organisational environments and how to exploit the resources and capabilities 
of the organisation in order to secure a competitive position. This particular view is most 
influential within the strategic management school. A common goal of the strategic 
management school is to identify an organisation's position in relation to its environment. 
This is done with the aid of analytical models and frameworks (Johnson and Scholes, 1989) 
which identify specific aspects of the environment that are considered important to the 
organisation's competitive success.
To exploit changes in the environment, the strategic management school posits that 
organisations are endowed with different resources, which they can successfully deploy 
to achieve a change programme. It is these resources, controlled or owned by the firm, 
(Wemerfelt, 1984; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) which enable them to conceive, choose 
and implement change (Barney, 1986, 1991). This is the view of the resource-based 
approach, which has been strongly associated with the works of Penrose (1959) and 
Wemerfelt (1984). In essence, the ability of an organisation to respond to environmental 
imperatives, or indeed to exploit opportunities in the environment, depends largely on the 
stock of resources owned or controlled by the firm. The implication of this for 
organisational change is that the factors that facilitate change are the financial, 
technological and human assets of the firm, and also the managerial ability to effectively 
co-ordinate and deploy these resources.
However, this approach to managing has been challenged with the argument that the 
socio-cultural, political and historical contexts within which decisions are made also 
influence the nature of such decisions made (Oliver, 1997a). Decision-making and 
organisational behaviour is not just based on the level and type of resources that 
organisations possess but also on some taken-for-granted assumptions about how to do 
things within the organisation. Decisions are also based on widely held beliefs and 
expectations of the wider environmental context about the appropriate ways of doing 
things in the organisation's environment. These widely held beliefs originate from the 
environment of the organisation and find its way into the organisation either through
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political or regulatory demands or through normative prescriptions of professional 
associations such as management consultants. This is the argument of the new 
institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).
It is the view of institutional theorists that organisational actions are the direct effects of 
ideas and beliefs that have their origin in the socio-cultural environment of the 
organisation (Greenwood and Hinnings, 1996; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991). Therefore, organisations are compelled - of necessity - to conform to 
these environmental prescriptions in order to survive. Such organisational actions are 
simply not a response to economic and competitive demands but also to institutional 
demands and pressures such as regulations from regulatory authorities and prescriptions 
from professional and trade associations.
Organisational responses may be influenced by social expectations about the appropriate 
ways of doing things, by the way “exemplar” organisations operate, and also by the 
convention of how things are done within the organisation. For a study of organisational 
change, this means that the ability of the organisation to change depends - to a 
considerable extent - on environmental prescriptions (rational concepts of work) which 
may constrain the ability of the organisation to change as they wish. Thus, in explaining 
organisational change, the important thing is to see how managerial choice and actions 
are constrained or enabled by institutional factors. The new institutional theory 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1992) and the resource-based view (Wemerfelt, 1984) are the 
two theories that we will examine in this chapter.
2.2 The Resource-based view of the firm
The resource-based view - as a subset of perspectives within the strategic management 
school that focus on the role of resources and competition in assessing organisational 
behaviour - gives primary consideration to the stock of resources and competencies that 
organisations possess and how these can be successfully harnessed to influence the 
environment. Firms are seen as a bundle of resources and capabilities which they own or are
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in control of. Such organisational resources includes its physical capital resources such as 
the firm's properties, plant and equipment, its financial strength, its geographic location, its 
customer reach and its stock of human capital (Barney, 1991; Mehra, 1996). These 
resources will therefore allow the management of an organisation to conceive of and to 
implement strategies to transform the organisation.
Capabilities, on the other hand, are referred to as the firm's capacity to deploy its resources 
to achieve a desired end (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). Capabilities are regarded as tangible 
or intangible processes such as innovative marketing and distribution method, 
manufacturing flexibilty, short product development cycles and responsivess to market 
trends. According to Amit and Schoemaker (1993), capabilities are firm specific and are 
often developed by combining the physical, human and technological resources at the 
management level.
Similarly, Grant (1991), in distinguishing between resources and capabilities, argued that 
resources are the physical, human and technical capital owned and controlled by the firm; 
capabilities involve the creative and innovative coordination or integration of these 
resources. It involves a complex pattern of coordination between the human capital on the 
one hand and between the human capital and other firm resources on the other. Because 
capabilities are developed through learning by repetition, it is firmly embedded in the 
regular and predictable patterns of activity within the organisation. These regular and 
predictable patterns of activity are known as organisational routines (Grant, 1991: 122). 
Another example of capabilities is innovation capability9 (Collis, 1994), which refers to 
managerial ability to make dynamic improvements to the activities of the organisation in 
response to changes or developments within the environment.
Another interesting concept within the resource-based view is the ‘dynamic capabilities’ 
concept introduced by Teece and Pisano (1994). By ‘dynamic’, they refer to the changing
9
Collis (1994) also talked about functional capability which is the ability to perform some basic functions 
within the organisation and entrepreneurial capability which refers to the ability to develop new ways o f doing 
things within the organisation. . The innovation capability is particularly useful here because it interfaces with
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character of organisational environments and the need to align resource-based thinking 
and theorising with developments in contemporary times. Of particular interest is their 
insistence on ‘capabilities’ as emphasising “the key role of strategic management in 
appropriately adapting, integrating, and re-configuring internal and external 
organisational skills, resources and functional competencies toward changing 
environment” (pg. 538). Three strategic dimensions of the firm make up dynamic 
capabilities. These are the firm’s processes, its positions and the paths available to the 
firm.
Processes include the managerial and organisational means of how things are done within 
the organisation. These processes essentially play three roles in determining dynamic 
capabilities, namely: coordination/integration; learning and reconfiguration. Coordination 
activities of management involve integrating internal and external activities of the firm 
with its external relations and alliances with its suppliers, its customers and consultants. 
Learning involves management continually searching for new ways of doing things and 
integrating them into the organisational routines. Reconfiguration and transformation 
addresses the need for management to be continually aware of developments in their 
environments and to be able to conceive of and to successfully initiate programmes of 
change - in response to environmental opportunities - if and when the need arises. 
Decentralisation, ability to scan the environment and to evaluate competitors are 
suggested as some of the ways that management can carry out this task.
Positions are the current endowments of the firm such as its reputational, relational 
locational and firm-specific assets. Examples of these are the firm’s image, its stock of 
technology, its customer base, its geographic location, its relations with suppliers and its 
strategic alliances with competitors. Financial liquidity of the firm is also another 
business asset that determines the firm’s profitability and market positioning. Finally, 
Paths refer to strategic alternatives available to a firm and the attractiveness of 
opportunities within its environment. This include path dependencies, which explains the
the environment and the locus of power clearly lies within the organisation as management’s ability to make 
dramatic improvements to the organisation vis-a-vis environmental changes is made very explicit.
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importance of historical ties and commitments in influencing both the current position of 
the firm and in determining its future possibilities and options.
2.2.1 Application of resource-based view in information systems 
In information systems, the application of resource-based theory is only just gaining 
ground. It has been used to explain how firms can create competitive value from three IT 
assets - human assets, technology asset, and relationship asset (Ross et al. 1996). It has 
also been used to examine how the use of IT for sustained competitive advantage resides 
more in the organisation’s IT managerial know-how rather than in the technology itself 
(Mata et al. 1995). Clemons and Row (1991) examined how differences in structural 
resources such as vertical integration, diversification and resource quality influenced IT 
innovations. Ciborra and Andreu (1998) also applied the resource-based view in 
developing an organisational learning model that addresses the relationship among 
strategic capabilities, and routinisation loops in core capability development.
Similarly, Grant (1996) applied the resource-based view, in conjunction with the 
evolutionary theory of the firm, to develop an information systems capability framework 
which examines an organisation's capacity to effectively conceive of, acquire, deploy, 
and sustain the IS requirements needed to support its business objectives. Such capacity 
resides in the organisation's IS-related processes and practices and its IS endowments or 
resources situated within a context of environmental factors which influence IS 
investment opportunities and decisions. An important element of the IS capability 
framework is the purposeful action of management in setting the direction for the 
strategic use of IT. Management plays an active role in building organisations' IS 
capability by guiding the design, acquisition, deployment and integration of CBIS within 
the organisation.
The resource-based view argues that because firms are endowed differentially, they have 
differential capacities to absorb and assimilate information technology (Boynton et al., 
1994). By implication this suggests that when firms invest in technology, the way they 
use the technology and with what outcome will be different due to the moderating
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influence of organisations’ IT assets (Soh and Markus, 1995), its managerial IT skills 
(Mata et al., 1995), and its complementary resources (Clemons and Row, 1991).
2.2.2 Assessing the resource-based perspective
The resource-based view of the firm has great potential to examine the strengths and 
weaknesses of the organisation and how this influences the process of implementing IT 
and organisational change. Of particular importance to us in this research are the 
organisational resources and capabilities which are deployed in the process of change. 
From this perspective, the inner context of organisations is construed in terms of 
resources and capabilities which organisations possess and can exploit differentially to 
respond to changes in the environment. It is the task of management to effectively 
combine these resources and develop appropriate strategies when responding to 
environmental shifts. Such a view suggests an active engagement with organisational 
environments as opposed to a passive recipient of environmental pressures.
When organisations implement strategies to change, they should exploit their resources and 
capabilities which are inimitable and idiosyncratic (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 
1991; Peteraf, 1993). As a result, organisations would change in different ways, if they are 
fundamentally heterogeneous in terms of their resources and capabilities. However, the 
source of such knowledge is important and one that needs to be taken into account. If all 
organisations within a sector use the same or similar resource providers such as consultants 
and software vendors, then there is the possibility that these resources may not be 
idiosyncratic and inimitable. This view is similar to Dierickx and Cool's (1989) assertion 
that the source of accumulation of resources determines, to a large degree, the extent to 
which such asset or resources can be imitated.
By implication, the resource-based view also argues that the ability of the organisation to 
implement IT and organise a successful organisational change program will depend on 
the ability to exploit resources in innovative ways - which their competitors cannot. This 
point is stated very clearly by Grant (1991) that the firm’s resources and capabilities are 
the “crown jewel” of the organisation that needs to be protected as they ‘play a pivotal
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role’ in the firm’s competitive strategy. He went on to state that “the essence of strategy 
formulation then, is to design a strategy that makes the most effective use of these core 
resources and capabilities” (pg. 129). The implication of this for organisational change is 
that the factors that facilitate organisational change are the assets of the firm, the 
cumulative experiences of dealing with IT and organisational change, technological 
opportunities available to the firm and lastly managerial ability to effectively coordinate 
and deploy these resources. This emphasis on resources and capabilities is clearly 
relevant to the study of how organisations change and to this study. Nevertheless, the 
resource-based view has a number of limitations.
First, although the resource-based view talks of the environment of the firm, the main 
concern however lies with the firm and what internal strength the firm has to be able to 
compete effectively in the environment. The primary focus of the resource-based view is 
the individual business unit, and as such, it does not adequately address the social context 
of other organisations within which the particular firm is embedded. Barney (1991) 
describes the ‘rigorous analysis of organisation’s internal strengths and weaknesses’ and 
Barney and Zajac (1994) talks of ‘strategically relevant behavioural and social 
phenomena inside (own emphasis) a firm’ as the main objectives of the resource-based 
view. So for organisational change, the main motive for change will be for efficiency and 
productivity reasons and that organisations change to become better at what they do, to 
achieve fitness with their environment and to gain above normal profits in doing so. 
Because organisations are different and they are differently equipped to deal with 
changes in their environment, they change and respond to such environmental pressures 
in different ways. This ignores, to a large extent, the wider context of social tradition, 
conventions and regulations which govern economic activity and which also could affect 
the ability of organisations to behave mainly in a “rational” way. Thus what may seem to 
be a perfectly rational decision may, in the end, fail to yield any optimal solution.
Second, the resource-based view largely ignores the power/political context within which 
organisations' decisions are made. The political perspective views organisations as 
networks of people with divergent interest whose values and interests do affect and are
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affected by the change process (Walsham, 1993). These interests result in the use of 
power to see that personal interests are achieved. Understanding change therefore 
requires an examination of the role played by powerful people or groups within and 
outside the organisation and what influence they bring to bear on the change process.
Thirdly, the resource-based view also does not cover in much detail the effects of the 
inter-organisational field. Although it talks about collaborative alliances with suppliers of 
complementary resources, the symbolic implication of these alliances is poorly treated. 
For instance, it has been suggested that the wider social and political context within 
which a firm operates impact on the decisions of the organisation (Oliver, 1997a). 
Government mandates and professional expectations clearly can affect the decisions that 
an organisation makes and how it exploits its resources. The banking industry is one of 
such industry that over the years has witnessed tremendous amount of changes in its 
regulatory context. In Nigeria, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is highly influential in 
the activities of banks. Also the symbolic implication of hiring an IT/management 
consultant to conduct an organisation's restructuring exercise is not adequately covered 
by the resource-based view.
Finally, in emphasising the importance of capabilities, the resource-based view argues that 
because capabilities are firmly embedded in organisational routines or established way of 
doing things, they provide a stable environment and a necessary resource base from which 
management can tap into when dealing with the environment. Organisational actions are 
usually structured around these set of procedures that guide actions and provide a kind of 
structure; they are regarded as extremely useful in facilitating organisational change (Oliver, 
1997b). However, this may not always be the case. According to Selznick, organisational 
procedures - after a certain level of acceptance - may become “infused with values beyond 
the technical requirements of the tasks at hand” (Selznick, 1957)10. In other words, they 
become institutionalised and may persist well after their useful technical contributions are 
past (Scott and Meyer, 1991). By becoming institutionalised, these procedures become 
taken-for-granted and unquestioned as the appropriate way of doing things.
10 Quoted in DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).
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According to Oliver (1997a) many activities within organisations are so strongly upheld 
by the organisation’s prevailing culture that decision-makers no longer even question 
their appropriateness. They are usually upheld because their longevity is considered 
sufficient evidence of their usefulness. When such arrangements become taken for- 
granted, they may hinder the ability of the organisation to respond to changes in its 
environment. Mehra (1996) talks about the fact that a firm's resources could circumscribe 
its competitive flexibility to change its strategic direction given the fact that firms "feel 
most comfortable acting in the neighbourhood of what they already know best". Leonard- 
Barton, (1992) gave an example of where an organisation’s traditional core competences 
developed over a long period of time prevented the development of newer products lines 
and adaptations to a changing business context. Oliver (1997a) gave the example of 
Chrysler’s inability to see the importance of the small car, which resulted in the company 
thus excluding itself from cashing in on the boom in the sale of small cars. As such, 
management may not always be in a position to consistently deploy resources to exploit 
opportunities and to change and adapt to changes in the environment. This, largely, is the 
argument of the institutional theory, which will be examined next.
2.3 The Institutional Theory
The term institution is somewhat problematic to define. This is in part due to the plethora 
of definitions available in the literature. Strang (1994) highlights this problem when he 
noted that “... there are as many definitions of institutions as there are analysts interested 
in the concept”. Different versions of the term institutions have been suggested in the 
literature such as: (1) an organised, established procedure experienced as external to the 
consciousness of individuals; (2) as any established social entity which persistently exerts 
influence and regulatory controls over other social entities and which have the tendency 
to outlive those entities it influences and regulates; (3) as a social order or pattern that has 
become taken for granted as the appropriate way of behaviour and (4) as a way of 
instilling values in social practices (Jepperson, 1991; King et al. 1994; Scott, 1987b; 
Scott and Christensen, 1995).
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Scott (1987a) further highlighted this dilemma when he suggested that persons 
conducting an institutional inquiry of any particular phenomenon must first make explicit 
which version or versions of institutional theory they are adopting. In line with this 
suggestion, we adopt the view of institutional theory which posits that the inner and outer 
contexts of organisations consists of socially prescribed and accepted ways of behaving 
that have become taken for granted as the appropriate ways of doing things within the 
organisation and its wider context. These prescribed and accepted ways of behaviour take 
on a rule-like structure as organisations are expected to adhere to them for survival and to 
achieve legitimacy (Scott and Meyer, 1991). Legitimacy is further explained as an 
evaluation method which places emphasis on meeting societal expectations, and which 
may be at odds with the internal efficiency needs of the organisation (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991). This institutional view in organisational analysis entails a re­
conceptualisation of the environments of organisations from the technical-rational 
perspective to a focus on the social and cultural (in particular the symbolic) features of 
the environment.
What a symbolic approach to the study of organisations and their relationship with the 
environment imply, is that organisations are systems of shared meanings. To understand 
such processes, there is the need to look beneath superficial processes and interactions 
like economic elements contained in the technical-rational perspective (Pettigrew, 1979; 
Smircich, 1983). The symbolic features of the environment, which the institutional theory 
focuses on, are ritual activities and rationalised myths or norms. Rationalised myths are 
the system of beliefs, socially constructed and widely shared11, about what the purposes 
of an organisation or a group of organisations answering to the description of a sector are, 
and what constitutes appropriate ways of conducting the business of such sector. 
Examples of these myths are the rules and procedures that govern the activities of 
organisations. Ritual activities are those activities that are carried out to sustain (through 
the tendency of being repeated) these systems of social beliefs. These ritual activities and 
rationalised myths together constitute the institutional context of the organisation.
11 Which is why it is rationalised.
50
2.3.1 The role o f the institutional context
It is the view of institutional theorists that organisational actions are the direct effects of 
these ideas, values, and beliefs that have their origin in the institutional environment of the 
organisation (Greenwood and Hinnings, 1996; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Therefore, 
organisations are compelled, of necessity, to conform to these environmental prescriptions 
in order to survive. Such prescriptions, according to the institutional theory, may not 
necessarily be for reasons of efficiency or for economic considerations because 
organisational actions are simply not just a response to economic and competitive demands 
but also to institutional pressures such as regulations and normative prescriptions from 
regulatory and professional bodies respectively. Organisational responses could also be to 
social expectations about the appropriate ways of doing things and from leading 
organisations within an industry. This means that organisations change, not always to 
become better at what they do, but also to become aligned with their institutional 
environment. Therefore the source of change for the institutional theory are: the (wider) 
institutional expectations of normative prescriptions from professionals, regulatory demands 
of government agencies and also the benchmark or standards set by organisations that are 
perceived as exemplars within the industry.
An example of such institutional expectations or environmental prescriptions, which we find 
particularly relevant to this study is Tillquist’s (1996) “cultural models” of Business Process 
Reengineering (BPR) - as a form of IT-enabled change programme. Directed specifically at 
IT and organisational change, the author posited that cultural models represent a taken-for- 
granted framework or a shared assumption through which organisational members and 
members of a professional community perceive IT-enabled organisational change initiatives. 
These frameworks or assumptions represent the taken-for-granted assumption about the 
appropriate ways of carrying out organisational change programmes and thus present 
management and change agents with ‘a set of cohesive rules, and belief systems, which are 
organised within a particular vision of the change initiative’. Consequently, the planning and 
implementation of the change initiatives are organised around these cultural models.
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Four cultural models or normative prescriptions of BPR were identified. The first 
prescription suggests that organisational change is enabled by computerisation. This implies 
that IT is capable of enabling work productivity, foster competitive advantage and also 
facilitate coordination and collaboration. The second cultural model identified is that BPR is 
an engineering metaphor, which involves the radical redesign of business processes. Here, 
organisational systems are viewed as processes that can be formally engineered to optimise 
performance. This leads to breaking organisational tasks into processes that can be measured 
with performance metrics. Thirdly, it is expected that the values and beliefs held by 
organisational members are equal to the overall organisational goals and beliefs. The 
underlying assumption here is that organisational members are all committed to the success 
of the organisation, and as such they can be motivated to work unselfishly in the best interest 
of the organisation and attaining collective goals. Finally, reengineering work is suggested 
as being personally-rewarding to the employee. Under this assumption, workers become 
satisfied and achieve a great sense of accomplishment from their job because they are 
empowered to assume greater responsibilities. According to Tillquist (1996) these systems 
of belief concerning the organisation of work informs how IT-enabled change initiatives, 
under BPR, is planned and implemented; they become the prescriptions that regulate 
organisational decisions and actions involved in the planning and implementation of IT- 
based change.
2.3.2 The concept o f societal sector
Another important concept from the institutional theory is that of the organisational field 
or sector. Scott and Meyer (1991) introduced the concept of societal sector to argue that 
in modem times, the relation between organisations and their environments does not just 
involve their immediate environment but that organisations, in addition to the local 
context, are also involved in non-local and vertically structured relationships. A societal 
sector is defined to include all organisations within a society supplying similar types of 
product or service as well as those other organisations which they interact with to 
produce the service or product. Such organisational sets include suppliers, financiers and 
regulators.
52
A similar concept is DiMaggio and Powell's (1991) 'organisational field' which they 
described as a composition of organisations that constitute a recognised area of 
institutional life such as suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies 
and other organisations that produce similar services or products (pg. 64). According to 
the authors, the structure of an organisation field cannot be discovered a priori. In other 
words, the extent to which these different organisations are structured into an 
organisational field (or institutionalised) can only be discovered through empirical 
investigation.
The mechanisms for such institutionalisation are the mimetic influences amongst the 
different organisations, the coerciye_power of government and its agencies and the 
normative—prescriptions of professional organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
Building on this work, Swanson and Ramillier (1997) argued that as IS professionals, 
management consultants and other agents of change move across organisations they tend 
to spread their traditions of practice. These traditions in turn, may impact on the change 
efforts of organisations and may also become taken-for-granted rules and prescriptions 
which govern the practice of utilising IT and to which all organisations must adhere to in 
order to survive.
Mimetic influence stems out of the need to reduce uncertainty. The introduction of a new 
technology or work procedure is usually accompanied by a measure of uncertainty arising 
out of the lack of or inadequate knowledge of doing new things or utilising the new 
technology. To reduce uncertainty, people and organisations tend to imitate others who 
have gone through similar processes and model themselves on them. According to March 
and Olsen (1976)12 "when goals are ambiguous and technologies are not properly 
understood, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organisations may 
model themselves on other organisations". The argument here is that such modelling 
would provide solutions that are less costly to the imitating organisation because the 
models would have previously been tried and tested by other organisations. Models can
12 Quoted in DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 69)
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also be diffused directly through employee transfer or indirectly through 'knowledge- 
mediating organisations' (Attewell, 1992) such as consulting firms.
Coercive influence also arises as a result of the use of power. It stems from political 
influence which an organisation may exert over other organisations that depend on it for 
resources or survival. If an organisation depends on another for resources, then the 
supplying organisation might exert some pressure on the dependent organisation and 
compel or persuade it to conform to certain demands. Other examples of this influence 
could be in the form of force, or it could be a government mandate (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983).
2,3,3 Implications for organisational change
From an institutional perspective, the environments of organisations are not just stocks of 
resources from which the organisation must find an efficient combination. Rather, 
environments are perceived as a composition of societal rules and beliefs to which the 
organisation must adhere to for survival. What this means for a study of organisational 
change is that a technical-rational perspective alone as a basis for choosing efficient 
organisational structures and processes is not enough (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and that 
socio-cultural factors are equally important in achieving a successful organisational 
change programme.
It is also the view of institutional theory that these socially prescribed and accepted ways 
of behaving become taken-for-granted and therefore become institutionalised. Once this 
happens they take on a rule-like status, where non-compliance is looked at unfavourably 
and is consequently sanctioned. These institutional rules become binding, and 
organisations are 'driven to incorporate them within their organisations’ (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1983). For the study of organisational change, it means the ability of the 
organisation to change depends to a considerable extent on institutional prescriptions 
(rational concepts of work) which may constrain the ability of the organisation to change 
as they wish.
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Thus, in explaining organisational change, the important thing is to see how managerial 
choices and actions are constrained or enabled by institutional factors. What this mean for 
organisational participants is that, although they act, they only do so within the 
constraints of the institutional environment. This is quite unlike the other perspective, 
where organisational decision-makers are actually capable of manipulating or altering 
their environments by exploiting resources and competences. A manifestation of 
institutional influence within the African continent would be the 'messianic rhetoric’ 
about the purity of market forces being preached and encouraged presently by 
international agents such as the IMF and the World Bank. Thus, questioning the 
appropriateness of an uncritical transfer of 'western’ management practices to DCs 
benefit from an institutional perspective.
2.3.4 The new institutional theory and IS
There have been relatively fewer studies in IS that employ insights from the institutional 
theory to IS phenomena. Notable exceptions to this are Silva (1997) who examined how 
the adoption and subsequent institutionalisation of IS in organisations is a power political 
process. Kling and Iacono (1989), employing institutional ideas argue for legitimacy in 
the practice of IS development so that there can be congruence between theory and 
practice.
Swanson and Ramillier (1997) also introduced the concept of an ‘organising vision’ of an 
IS innovation to explain the process whereby new IS innovation is institutionalised to 
encourage widespread diffusion. King et a l’s paper on institutional factors in IT 
innovation, while stressing the importance of institutions and institutional forces in 
creating and spreading widespread IT innovation, calls explicitly for an “institutional 
point of view in information systems research” (1994: 147). The authors argued for the 
importance of institutions in understanding social change based on the fact that 
institutional theory willingly embraces the wider context within which any form of social 
change is embedded. Also, because IT innovations are 'inseparably bounded up in the 
network of institutions both as recipients of institutional forces and as shapers of 
institutional reality’.
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Similarly, Christiaanse and Huigen (1997) applied the institutional perspective to the 
study of inter-organisational information systems (IOS) implementation and suggested 
cultural bias, structural order, and supply-push/demand-pull as factors that influenced the 
implementation process. In their conclusions, these authors also called for further 
research -  from an institutional perspective -  to the study of IS innovations in complex 
network settings.
While institutional ideas are increasingly been employed in IS research and evidence and 
arguments for institutional influence in IT adoption is increasingly being advanced, a 
systematic study of IT and organisational change, which captures the dynamics and 
complexity of changing within the current globalisation trend, combining both rational 
and symbolic ideas have been largely neglected - leaving this a fruitful area of inquiry.
2.3.5 Assessing institutional theory
According to Scott (1995), institutional theory derives much of its relevance in 
contemporary studies because it provides a counterbalance to the set of theories - such as 
the resource-based view - that gives primacy to economic and materialistic forces that 
shape organisational actions. From an institutional perspective, the environment could 
also be seen as an embodiment of rules and socially prescribed and accepted standards or 
ways of behaving to which the organisation must conform. Therefore, these 
environmental rules and constitutive expectations (norms), more than the organisation’s 
resources and capabilities are important in explaining change.
Several of the arguments of the institutional theory have been used extensively in 
research in the field of sociology particularly in organisational analysis. Shenhav and 
Kamens (1991) using data on scientific publications carried out a cross-sectional study to 
examine the effect of adopting ‘western’ science by developing countries. Galaskieicz 
and Wasserman (1989) studied the effect of mimetic processes on contribution activities 
of corporate organisations to nonprofit organisations. Oliver (1988) also looked at the 
structural characteristics of voluntary service organisations to determine the level of 
isomorphism.
56
Most of these studies have used cross-sectional data to study the level of similarity 
between organisations and their institutional environments. While these have contributed 
to institutional debates they have not been able to address the dynamics of the process by 
which organisational change occurs. In view of this there is a dearth of studies, which 
takes a temporal approach to studying the role of institutional factors in organisational 
behaviour. One of such studies by Tolbert and Zucker (1983) which attempted a 
longitudinal study focused on showing that isomorphism occurred over a period of time 
and not how it occurred. Slack and Hinnings (1994) raised a similar point about the 
importance of a temporal study of institutional change as a way of testing the durability 
of institutional arguments.
The focus on the societal sector or organisational field means that in the study of 
organisational change, attention should not just be restricted to organisations that are in 
direct competition with each other, but also to others that support or provide complementary 
resources. An explicit focus on these institutional forces is particularly useful as it affords 
the chance to identify and examine the various institutions and the different roles they play 
in lubricating (or not) the IT adoption process.
The institutional theory has been criticised that in most of the existing literature the 
empirical settings had been public service organisations with very little research on 
private enterprises (Powell, 1991). A number of studies have also come up with contrary 
results to the institutional argument of homogenisation. Studies such as Scheid-Cook 
(1992) which examined the response of mental health organisations to a new policy 
programme concluded that the responses of these mental health organisations were highly 
variable to a common institutional demand. Instead, she suggested enactment as an 
additional response to institutional demands.
The study by Orru et al (1991) applying institutional arguments to the study of businesses 
in three East Asian countries concluded that while within each country there is evidence 
of isomorphism, however these businesses differ across countries - leading to the 
suggestion of inter and intra-societal isomorphism. The study also suggested that while
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firms in each of these countries were highly subjected to local institutional traits, they 
were also highly successful business enterprises. This led the authors to suggest that both 
institutional and technical-rational pressures can both co-exist in organisations and that 
institutional pressures do not necessary imply a neglect of efficiency factors.
Still on the issue of institutional pressures and efficiency, Powell (1991) also challenged the 
idea that an institutional pressure that increases resource flow to an organisation, thereby 
increasing survival chances, should be regarded as inefficient (pg. 190). In the same article, 
he argued that imitation or mimetic process of isomorphism is not necessarily always bad. 
He suggested that in complex environments, organisations might model themselves on 
diverse set of organisations thereby leading to a novel recombination of forms borrowed 
from dissimilar sources. In addition, when organisations borrow ideas from different socio­
political environments, it may lead to a new hybrid arrangements or local modifications and 
thus “partial diffusion” due to the influence of local cultures and forms of resistance (Powell 
1991:199).
As a result of some of these criticisms and due to the increasing empirical evidence that 
suggests that both institutional and technical-rational factors can, and do operate alongside 
each other, an increasing number of studies are beginning to regard them as complementary 
and therefore combining them into a single framework. This is in recognition of the fact that 
organisational behaviour is rarely a product of a single factor. Notable examples in this 
respect are the works of Oliver (1991; 1997 a and b), Dacin (1997) and Hung and 
Whittington (1997). The results of these studies show the importance of the socio-cultural 
context in which rational strategic decisions are made and how such contexts influences and 
are influenced by these rational decisions. However, these studies have been carried out 
mainly in the industrialised countries of the west and none from a developing country 
environment.
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2.4 Combining organisational resources and institutional norms: the 
paradox approach
In the foregoing discussions, we have presented two perspectives that provide two 
different conceptions of the interaction between organisations and the environment. 
These two theories highlight the strategic choice of organisations on one hand and the 
quasi-deterministic power of the environment on the other. As we can see from these 
discussions, each of the theoretical perspectives contributes uniquely to a broader 
understanding of IT and organisational change (see Table 2.1). The possibility of 
combining their insights offer significant benefits in the study of organisational change 
by pointing out the limitations of the other and thus highlighting issues for further 
investigation (Child and Smith, 1987). As a result, the factors influencing IT usage and 
the organisational changes that ensue may not be adequately explained independently by 
either of the two theories because of their narrowness in addressing the complex issues 
involved in IT use in organisations. A combination of both theories leads to a better 
understanding of the various developments in Nigeria vis-a-vis the increasing use of IT. 
The benefit of a combined theoretical approach to a study such as this present one is put 
across quite succinctly by Kling et al., (1992:39):
"Research in the information systems field has demonstrated that parochial theoretical research 
perspectives often produce little research of lasting value. We suspect that good theories of IT and 
organisational change are unlikely to be built from discrete intellectual perspectives which rest on 
narrow disciplinary and ideological assumptions. Our objective must be to study technology in 
the context of organisational and institutional practices, informed by robust economic and 
sociological theories" (pg. 39).
While the resource-based view emphasises objective factors and conditions such as 
resources and capabilities which management makes use of in interacting with the 
environment, the institutional theory aims to explain symbolic and cultural features of the 
environment such as traditions, conventions, norms and taken-for-granted elements of 
organisational behaviour which tend to influence and constrain decision-making in 
organisations. The resource-based view focuses on activities of individual firms related to 
managing and deploying resources to interact with the environment, while the 
institutional theory focuses on the wider organisational field or sector.
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The resource-based view takes an objective and somewhat rational view of organisational 
behaviour while the institutional theory takes a more subjective and symbolic view of 
organisational actions. A rational view of organisational functioning assumes that 
organisational behaviour is deliberate, systematic and rationally justified while a social 
view believes that organisational behaviour is compliant, habitual, unreflective and 
socially justified (Oliver, 1997a). This study therefore takes a paradoxical stance 
(Cameron and Quinn, 1988) in examining the interplay between institutional pressures 
and organisational resources in the process of IT and organisational change within the 
Nigerian banking sector.
A paradox approach assumes that a particular phenomenon exist and operate in a 
pluralistic world of competing events and forces and often-contradictory values (Van de 
Ven and Poole, 1988). In relation to organisational studies, it acknowledges that there 
exist certain inherent contradictions in the behaviour of organisations that are intrinsic to 
effective organisational functioning (Cameron and Quinn, 1988). Such contradictions 
highlight both the rational and non-rational aspects of managerial work and 
organisational actions; it acknowledges that organisational actions consist of both issues 
of rationality and logic as well as issues of cultures and values.
The resource-based and institutional views of organisations (Wemerfelt, 1984; Barney, 
1991; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) highlight some examples of contradictions that exist in 
organisations: the rational versus symbolic motive for explaining actions within the 
organisation. An institutional perspective on the relations between an organisation and its 
environment gives the picture of a powerful and profoundly influential environment, which 
compel organisations to conform to its demands. The resource-based view on the other hand 
gives primary consideration to the stock of resources and capabilities that organisations 
possess and how these can be successfully harnessed to influence the environment. This 
implies an active engagement with the environment and a strong ability - on the part of 
organisations - to control and manipulate their environments.
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This distinction reflects a fundamental difference in the motives that both views assign to 
organisations in their dealing with environmental influences. For the rational perspective, 
organisational actions are determined by reasons of rationality and efficiency (Oliver, 
1997a), where such actions are constrained by economic reasons defined as barriers to 
resource acquisition and imitation (Barney, 1986; 1991; Schoemaker and Amit, 1994). From 
a sociological perspective on the other hand, decisions and actions within the organisation 
are mainly motivated by reasons of social justification and obligation to institutional mles 
(DiMaggio, 1988; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
These decisions are constrained by socially constructed forces that are essentially human in 
nature, like norms, habits, traditions and conventions. The contradictory outcome of 
organisational relations with its environment for the institutionalists is homogenisation; 
while for the resource-based view the outcome is heterogeneity.
The paradox approach does not choose between contradictions nor aim to resolve them. A 
paradox, according to Van de Ven and Poole (1983), is a real or apparent contradiction 
between equally well-based assumptions or conclusions. According to Cameron and Quinn 
(1988), paradox embraces clashing ideas. It is an approach, which gives explicit 
acknowledgement to the simultaneous presence of contradictory patterns of behaviour. This 
point was put forward quite clearly by Van de Ven and Poole that:
“(Paradox) involves contradictory and mutually exclusive elements that are present and operate 
equally at the same time; separately, each argument appear incontestably true, but taken together they 
appear contrary” (1988).
Paradox approach accepts that contradictions are an inevitable aspect of organisational life 
and more importantly it accepts that these contradictions cannot be resolved. Rather, the 
inevitability and unresolvability of contradictions is to be accepted and approaches 
developed to cope with and manage the consequences and dynamism between 
contradictions. In other words, the paradox approach suggests living with contradictions and 
to accept that at different times, and in different respects, each part of the paradox is both 
true and false (Van de Ven and Poole, 1988).
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Table 2 : Comparison of Theories
New Institutional Theory Resource-Based Approach
Theoretical
Foundation
The Social Construction of Reality (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967); Institutional environment of the 
firm (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983).
Resource-based view o f the firm (Penrose, 1959; 
Wemefelt, 1984; Barney, 1986)
Research Focus Socio-cultural factors affecting organisational 
behaviour
Strategic management o f organisational resources 
and capabilities
Unit o f Analysis Organisational field or sector Business organisations or firms
N ature of decision 
process
Habitual, symbolic and embedded in norms and 
traditions
Systematic, deliberate, purposeful and value- 
maximising
Key
Concepts
Institutions, rationalised myths, ritual activities, 
taken-for-granted assumptions
‘Organisation's resources’, management 
capabilities
N ature o f IT  and 
organisational 
change implied
Organisations responding to environmentally- 
derived rationalised concepts of work and IT use 
through coercive, mimetic and normative 
influences
Analysing and strategically deploying 
organisation's IT and other assets to exploit 
opportunities and circumvent threats in the 
environment.
Presumed
Outcomes
Social legitimation and suboptimal decisions 
which will only lead to isomorphic change or ritual 
conformity resulting from compliance to external 
rules.
Efficiency; profit maximisation, heterogeneity and 
competitive advantage
N ature of 
environm ent
Environment as a set of symbolic and cultural 
elements - norms, ritual activities
Environment as a set o f objective conditions -  
resources
Strengths
Focus on the ceremonial aspects o f organisational 
behaviour; theory offers the chance to examine the 
non-rational and taken-for-granted aspects of 
organisations behaviour
Offers the chance of examining organisational 
resources.
Weaknesses
Over-socialised view of organisations; conformity 
to institutional pressures does not always detract 
from internal efficiency matters. Organisational 
responses to environmental demands are not 
always conformist; organisations define and create 
their environments
Importance o f the social and cultural context of 
decision-making not adequately considered; over 
economic view o f organisations and organisational 
behaviour
Contribution to 
present study
Analysis o f the cultural elements of the wider 
environment; widely held beliefs about the 
importance of IT within the Nigerian banking 
system; ceremonial aspects of IT and 
organisational change practices
An examination of individual bank’s resources and 
capabilities; decisions influenced by the 
organisation’s resources and rational 
considerations.
Paradox is used therefore in this research to examine the process of bank restructuring 
within the Nigerian banking sector. It is hoped this would help illuminate issues in IT and 
organisational change within the banking industry in Nigeria amidst the environmental 
imperatives of liberalisation and globalisation. At each stage of organisational change, 
banks in Nigeria face tensions between rational and non-rational forces that propel them 
through each stage of the process. It is argued in this research therefore, that local 
adaptations to IT and organisational change within the Nigerian banking system is a 
symbolic process of conforming to the demands of the institutional context as well as a 
process of actively deploying organisations’ resources and capabilities to manage the 
change programme. It is our goal in this study to provide a description of how these 
events unfold in Nigerian banks.
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2.5 Summary
In this chapter we have focused on two theories that provide two conceptions of the 
context of change and two rather different conceptions of the interaction between 
organisations and the environment. They highlight the rational and objective on one hand 
and the social and symbolic on the other. Although each theory separately elaborates on 
important aspects of the interaction, they however, do not capture the full complexity of 
issues involved in IT use in organisations. A combined model which focuses on both the 
rational and symbolic as well as internal and external factors that influence organisational 
change seem to better aid our understanding. An attempt at achieving this combination 
was made through the paradox approach, which acknowledges that organisational 
functioning is inherently contradictory. The resource-based view will be used to examine 
rational-economic factors that influence IT and organisational change in Nigerian banks 
and the institutional theory will be used to examine the more social and in particular 
symbolic elements of IT use and associated organisational changes. The next chapter 
presents the conceptual framework used in data collection and analysis incorporating 
these two theories.
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Chapter 3
Information technology and organisational change: a
conceptual framework
3.1 Contextualism -  Introduction
In this chapter, we set out the conceptual framework for presenting the case studies on IT 
and organisational change. The chapter starts with a brief review of contextualism and 
discusses a number of approaches from the contextualist perspective before going to 
examine, in more detail, the chosen contextualist approach.
Contextualism is a research approach that studies the interaction between a particular 
phenomenon and the context within which it is taking place. Examples of this are 
Pettigrew’s contextualist approach (1985), Giddens structuration theory (1984) and Kling’s 
web models (1987). As a form of contextualist approach, the central message of 
structuration theory is that it is misleading to separate action from structure because they are 
inextricably interwoven and can best be understood in relation to each other (Giddens,
1984). In other words, the need to associate the analysis of social actions along with the 
analysis of institutions (or context) is very much in line with the contextualist approach. The 
value of this theory lies in its provision of ways to analyse this interaction between human 
agents and their environment. However, this approach has been criticised for the artificial 
separation of structure and action and may not be entirely suited to the present study 
(Walsham and Han, 1991).
Another useful framework within the broad umbrella of the contextualist approach used 
in IS research is the web model (Kling, 1987). This model looks at the social relations 
between participants concerned with the IS, the infrastructural support needed for IS use 
and the history of IS implementation within an organisation. Participants include users, 
developers, management, consultants and other individuals affected by the IS. Secondly,
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the web model also focuses on the level of infrastructural support available or needed vis- 
a-vis IS use. This support can be studied by looking at the 'production lattice’ which 
consists of equipment, consumers and providers of the focal IS. The third element of the 
web model is the history of IS implementation within the organisation. This will entail an 
understanding of the various procedures, structures and prior commitments that the 
organisation has made in the past. The web model may not also be entirely adequate for 
this study because it focuses more on describing the contextual factors that aid or hinder 
the implementation of technology. Its treatment of the context/process interaction has 
been adjudged to be a major limitation of the model's application to studies that seek to 
understand the two-way relationship between the context and the process of changing 
(Madon 1992).
3.2 Pettigrew's contextualist approach
Pettigrew's contextualist approach is a research approach that studies the interaction 
between a particular phenomenon and the context within which it is taking place. In a 
paper presented at the ‘Conference on Conducting Research with Theory and Practice in 
Mind’, Pettigrew (1985) introduced the contextualist approach as a means for studying 
organisational change and explained its usefulness over earlier approaches to 
organisational change. According to the author, earlier approaches are circumscribed 
because of their treatment of change as ahistorical, acontextual and aprocessual (pg. 12). 
The implication is a dearth of studies of organisational change which focus on 'changing' 
as opposed to 'change'. A contextualist study of change focuses on two levels of analysis - 
vertical and horizontal levels and the interconnections between the two levels through time. 
The vertical level refers to a category of the environment - i.e. the national environment or 
the international environment within which the change is taking place and the horizontal 
level refers to the successive interconnection of events in historical, present and future time. 
The main prerequisites to carrying out a successful contextual study are: a clear delineation 
of the sets of levels for analysis, an understanding of how these levels are connected and a 
clear description of the processes under investigation.
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Thus, a useful way to think about IT and organisational change is Pettigrew's contextualist 
approach, and it has been employed in studies considering the consequences of introducing 
information technology into organisations (Madon, 1992; Montealegre, 1997; Madon and 
Walsham, 1995; Nelson and Dowling, 1998). The central message of Pettigrew’s 
framework is that for a research on change to provide a robust theory which can also guide 
practice, it must examine change as a process and in a historical and contextual manner. 
This approach makes a distinction between the object of change (the content), factors or 
issues in the environment within which the change is taking place (the context) and how the 
change process unfolds in a temporal manner (the process). In the sections to follow, we will 
lay the foundations for a conceptualisation of IT and organisational change stressing the 
non-linear and subjective nature of change programmes. In particular, we will emphasise the 
importance of social and cultural forces in improvising or mediating IT and organisational 
change and examine the influence of organisational resources.
3.3 What is the nature of change? - Conceptualising the content of 
change
In this section we will examine the literature on organisational change and IT-enabled 
organisational change to lay the foundation for how the content of change is 
conceptualised in the present study. The content of change is the first part of Pettigrew’s 
model that will be examined.
3.3,1 Organisational change as planned
Planned change involves a deliberate, purposeful, and explicit decision to engage in a 
program of change (Levy and Merry, 1986). It normally originates with a decision from 
management to improve on how the organisation functions, to create and communicate a 
vision of the change initiative and to implement necessary changes (Levy and Murray, 
1986; Wilson, 1992; Plant, 1987). Planned organisational change also entails the use of 
external agents of change such as management consultants to initiate and/or support the 
change programme (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992; Ginsberg and Abrahamson, 1991).
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A planned approach to organisational change - because of its emphasis on top 
management decision-making13 - has resulted in a plethora of models aimed to develop 
and train managers in a set of competences regarded as necessary for managing change 
(Wilson, 1992). Such models aim to assist management in understanding and exploiting 
opportunities engendered by a change in environment as well as avoiding threats 
(Johnson and Scholes, 1989; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Porter, 1980). Planned change can 
also be carried out through the changing of people's behaviour and in how they relate to 
each other. The basic premise on which this approach is based is that good interpersonal 
relations within the organisation are an essential prerequisite for effective organisational 
functioning (Wilson, 1992). Still within this perspective are the sets of approaches that 
focus on changing the culture of the organisation as a way of bringing about change 
within the organisation14. Approaches from this perspective are based on the assumption 
that people's actions are a function of their values and cognition (Wilson and Rosenfeld, 
1990; Wilson, 1992).
Planned approach to change has generally been criticised as ignoring - to a large extent - 
the social, political and economic context in which organisations operate. It has also been 
criticised because of its over-insistence on managerial authority in achieving a successful 
organisational change programme. The uncritical acceptance of managers as agents and 
sole determinant of change, according to Wilson (1992) has been a major and enduring 
feature of management practices both in North America and in the UK in the last decade 
or so. However, in other cultures such as in Sweden and Japan, studies have revealed that 
there is a different approach to the management of organisational change (Wilson, 1992). 
In these countries, change management involves much more than just the top 
management and involves a careful consultation with a wider array of people within the
13 Such decisions are mainly strategic in nature in view o f the fact that they entail the organisation 
committing substantial amount o f resources, setting precedents and taking crucial actions which affect the 
long-term health and survival o f the organisation (Mintzberg et. al, 1976). In addition such change 
initiatives usually have implications for the entire organisation and its customers.
14 This is based on the assumption that the culture o f an organisation is an instrument that can be managed and 
manipulated by management. Culture is but one o f many variables (others being size, structure, technology) 
which can be acted upon or controlled for organisational effectiveness (Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984; Smircich, 
1983; Meek, 1988).
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organisation, which includes the shopfloor workers, foremen, and junior management in 
addition to top executives.
Dominant IT-enabled organisational change models have also focused on improving 
management analytical strength in understanding the environment of their organisations 
and how to exploit the potentials of IT in order to secure a competitive position for the 
organisation (Grant, 1996; Hammer and Champy, 1993; Porter and Miller, 1985; Scott- 
Morton, 1991). According to these models, change can be planned in advance with 
computerisation, organisational change is the direct outcome of computerisation and 
technology is expected to take a leading role in organisational change (Venkatraman et al., 
1993; Henderson and Venkatraman, 1993).
A number of approaches have been suggested in helping management plan for and 
implement IT-enabled organisational transformation. Models such as those of Benjamin and 
Morton, (1988); Davenport et al., (1989); Benjamin and Levinson, (1993) focused on the 
importance of having a strong management team to champion the change effort. Others have 
argued for the need to have a structural fit or appropriate technical fit with IT and the 
organisation (Davenport and Short, 1990; Venkatraman, 1994; McKersie and Walton, 1991; 
Earl et al., 1995; Globerstone et al, 1995).
This implies that the successful implementation of IT-enabled change is a deliberate and 
calculated attempt by management to deploy IT capabilities to change the organisation and 
introduce new forms of organisational practices through the radical redesign of existing 
processes. In these models, IT is seen as “an essential enabler” of organisational change 
which introduces new capabilities and makes essential information easily available to 
empower workers to make more ‘informed’ decisions. Information technology is also seen 
as a particularly useful tool for strategic organisational intervention and competitive 
advantage by bringing disparate business processes and geographically dispersed business 
units much more closer together. This makes the tasks of planning and coordinating easier to 
accomplish and the organisation thus becomes a well-orchestrated business unit able to 
compete effectively in the marketplace (Tillquist, 1996).
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This rather teleological view of IT use in organisation has however been criticised as "black- 
boxing" fundamental social, political, historical as well as technical problematic of 
organisational change which are essential for understanding the true nature of organisational 
change in reality (Tillquist, 1996). Organisations’ actions are rarely unidirectional and as 
such an interactive or emergent model that captures the dynamic relationship between the 
technology and the socio-organisational contexts seems to be more appropriate (Markus and 
Robey, 1988).
Other criticisms of IT-enabled organisational change programmes focus on the separation of 
technological change and organisational change and argue that such separation is rather 
‘artificial’ and does not capture the true nature of the interaction between IT and the 
organisational context of its implementation (Avgerou, forthcoming). Based on the ideas of 
the actor network school which views the content of change as including a ‘heterogeneous 
network’ of actors and IT-supported organisational processes (Callon and Law, 1989), the 
author argue that the content of change should not just focus on IT but also on these 
differentiated network of actors and institutions within which the technology is being 
implemented. Therefore, IT-related organisational change is embedded in and inseparable 
from the social and organisational processes that surrounds it.
To summarise, existing literature has shown the futility of a rational and overtly simplistic 
view of IT-enabled organisational change. Majority of studies now accept the wisdom of 
adopting more "socially rich" models which capture the full complexity of organisations and 
how they change (Tillquist, 1996). Such socially rich models would capture the dynamic 
relationship between technology innovation and social changes in the organisational context. 
Pettigrew et. al., (1992) emphasised the importance of complementing rational models with 
more eclectic ones able to identify the different causes of change such as the political, 
cultural as well as economic influences. A growing body of studies within the IS field are 
increasingly adopting these ‘socially rich’ models of IT and organisational change.
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3.3.2 Organisational change as emergent
Planned change initiatives in the form of IT-enabled organisational change can be viewed 
as strategic change (DeCock, 1996). Within the strategic management literature, some 
views of strategic change question the extent to which change can be planned in advance 
and carried out in a rational and linear fashion. They point to the emergent nature and 
hence, the subjective character of change which technical/rational models are unable to 
account for. The important tenet of the emergent perspective is that change is a function 
of the interaction or combination of a number of factors, that often time produces some 
unintentional consequences (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). In other words, change cannot 
always be planned in advance and so it occurs in an emergent fashion and that the result 
is not always what is intended. According to Mintzberg and Westley (1992), mostly, 
change occurs through inductive learning within the organisation, which means that ideas 
for change can also evolve in a bottom-up approach from within the lower rung of the 
organisation and not always from the top management (Quinn, 1980; Westley, 1990).
Mintzberg’s strategy typology (1978) and Mintzberg and Waters (1985) distinguished 
between intended, emergent and realised strategies to show that strategies are as much 
planned as they are unintended. According to the author, the most common definition of 
strategy (such as in planned change above) often portray strategy as the determination of 
the long-term goals of the organisation and the subsequent adoption of certain courses of 
action to carry out the intended strategy. Rather, he defined strategy as a ‘pattern in a 
stream of decisions and actions’ (Mintzberg, 1978). This definition, therefore, views 
strategy as consisting of both intended decisions and plans as well as realised or evolved 
decisions which emerge as a result of and/or despite the intentions.
There are three parts to this definition: at the two extremes are the intended and the 
realised strategies and in between are the set of strategies which connect the two together 
(Fig. 3.1). Intended strategy is the “deliberate conscious set of guidelines that determines 
decisions into the future” (Mintzberg, 1978:945). In the context of organisational change, 
this relates to the planned and deliberate effort of management to engage in some form of 
change activities. On the other hand, realised strategy is defined as “a pattern in a stream
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of decisions” (Mintzberg, 1978:935). The three types of strategy connecting intended 
strategy and realised strategy are: (1) deliberate strategies which are the intended strategy 
that gets realised as intended (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985:257). (2) unrealised strategies 
which are intended strategies that are dropped and do not get realised, perhaps “because 
of unrealistic expectations, misjudgements about the environment, or changes in either 
during implementation” (Mintzberg, 1978:945). (3) emergent strategies which are 
“patterns or consistencies realised despite, or in the absence of intentions” (Mintzberg 
and Waters, 1985:257).
Figure 1: Mintzberg’s Strategy Typology (Mintzberg, 1978)
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In addition, this view of strategy also distinguishes between decisions, which represents 
intentions and actions which represents the realised activity (Mintzberg and Waters,
1985). This proves particularly useful in the study of change because it allows us to focus 
not only on the planned initiatives relating to change, but also on the various patterns of 
action, some deliberate as a result of the intentions and others emergent arising outside of 
the deliberate plans. In addition, the distinction between intended and realised change 
helps us to consider the gap between the two as an opportunity to understand what IT and 
organisational change actually consists of in specific organisational contexts. Mintzberg’s 
strategy typology has shown that planned and deliberate approaches do not capture the true 
reality of how organisations function; the ‘object’ of organisational change consists of both
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the deliberate decisions or initiatives of management as well as the realised decisions and 
actions which may differ from what was intended.
3.3.3 Organisational change as improvisations
The underlying assumptions of the improvisation metaphor view organisational change as 
a continuous activity with diverse and varied origins, multiple actors with multiple 
interpretations and actions, which combines to make up the change process (Weick, 
1993). The view of organisational change as improvisations challenge the long- 
established static view of change which regards organisational change as planned and 
intended, contained in a blueprint or plan made by management at the beginning of the 
change exercise. Rather, the improvisation image views change as a recipe; a dynamic 
process that captures the actions that generate the objects specified in the plan. A recipe, 
just like a blueprint has a starting point and a set of actions to be taken, but unlike 
blueprints, recipes do not specify what the outcome of the actions and the plans will be. 
Rather, they are uncovered as they emerge from the interaction of actions and plans. 
According to Weick (1993), “design, viewed from the perspective of improvisation, is 
more emergent, more continuous, more filled with surprise, more difficult to control, 
more tied to the content of action, and more affected by what people pay attention to than 
are the designs implied by architecture” (pg 350). Given the centrality of actions and the 
their emergent nature, interpretations become the essence of change.
Interpretations involve translating external events and developments to fit with some 
internal structures that are part of a culture or familiar language (Daft and Weick, 1984). 
It is these interpretations and not the intended plans that guide actions which ultimately 
constitute the realised change. Thus, the realised change is more of the consequence of 
actions arising from interpretations than of decision-making and intended plans. While 
the improvisation metaphor gives due acknowledgement to the planned and intended 
aspects of change, it ultimately gives prominence to organisational members’ perception 
of the intended plans:
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“They may decide to start some activity, such as implementing a design, and they may also try to 
control how the activity will unfold. Nevertheless, this control is never complete, and unintended 
consequences are common place. These unintended consequences force people to revise their 
sense of what is happening and what can be accomplished. And it is these revised interpretations, 
rather than the initial decisions, that guide action and constitute the actual design in use. That 
design in use is shaped more by action than by plans, and more by interpretations than by 
decisions”. (Weick, 1993: 361)
The focus on interpretation in understanding change points in the direction of organisational 
enactment. The view of organisational change as an enactment process suggests that 
organisational change does not arise merely from organisations compulsively conforming to 
environmental pressures; that in fact organisations are active in creating and defining some 
of their own environments (Scheid-Cook, 1992). When organisations enact the environment, 
they create a context for action based on the newly enacted environment. Organisational 
enactment therefore entails a form of “reality construction” (Weick, 1977) whereby 
organisational members actively construct their own definition of the environment, which 
then informs how they interact with the environment. This means that the enactment process 
produces the context for action by creating the information which organisational members 
‘respond to’ (Scheid-Cook, 1992). This implies that the study of organisational change must 
take into account the possibility of multiple environments arising from multiple 
interpretations (Smircich and Stubbart, 1985). According to Pfeffer and Salanick:
If environments are enacted, then there are as many environments as their enacters, which may 
explain ... why different organisations and even different individuals within each may react 
differently to what appears to be the same context (1978: 73).
Given the importance of multiple interpretations and meanings as the essence of 
organisational actions, the question then arises as to how the organisation is able to 
function in a coordinated manner. According to Weick (1993), coordinated action is 
made possible when members agree on a number of meanings that are flexible enough to 
allow for local accommodation and individual expressions. Coordination occurs not 
necessarily because people hold identical views, but because they have similar views of 
what is happening and what it means. It is the similar or “equivalent” views that allow for 
both coordination and individual expression to take place simultaneously. Co-ordination 
and local accommodation therefore, is an important paradoxical requirement for change
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as it allows organisational members to accomplish collectively what they are unable to do 
individually, as well as cope individually with local and unintended developments.
Also from an improvisation perspective, organisational change is situated in the history 
and tradition of doing things within the organisation. The importance of history and 
tradition in shaping the organisational change process is demonstrated in Weick’s image 
of change as a bricolage and change agents as bricoleurs. A bricoleur is someone that 
makes use of whatever resources are available to perform any task at hand. Such 
resources may not exactly suit the current task at hand (i.e. they are not project-specific) 
but they are assembled and retained on the basis of past experiences and usage (own 
emphasis), and on the basis that some use may be found for them at some future time. 
Because change from an improvisation perspective is emergent and consists of 
unintended actions, the concept of bricolage has implications for the management of 
change as such task is not limited to a set of predefined tools and materials. The 
management of change relies on an understanding of the established ways of doing things 
and how this can be deployed innovatively to facilitate the change process. This 
obviously throws up a challenge to the clean slate view of some change techniques 
(Hammer and Champy, 1993) as the bricolage view of change gives a prominent role to 
the culture and established ways of doing things which such techniques tend to throw 
away with change.
Applying the improvisation metaphor to the study of IT and organisational change, 
Orlikowski (1996) presented a situated-change perspective of technology-based change 
where change is seen as emerging from the continuos struggle of organisational members 
in making sense of their daily experiences in their interaction with a new information 
technology system. This particular model of technology-related change focuses on the 
daily experiences and interactions of organisational actors over time, how they make 
sense of this interaction and try to improvise and adapt locally to changes brought about 
by the new technology. Similarly, Ciborra (1999) proposed a theory of IS based on 
“smart or competent improvisation” to suggest that the development and implementation 
of IT should be to support and enable everyday micro-practices in order to improve the
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effectiveness of IT in organisations. He argued that a focus on these ever-present 
practices bring a better understanding of the daily experiences on which organisations 
survive. Consequently, this can assist IS developers in developing a more effective IT- 
based solutions which makes use of people’s ‘intuition and ingenuity in daily affairs’.
3.4 Why does change occur? -  Conceptualising the contexts of change
The second component in this framework is the context. Pettigrew (1985) highlighted the 
importance of context and the need to explicitly state how context is defined in a 
particular research study. A contextualist study of change focuses on two levels of analysis: 
the inner and outer contexts. In this study, it refers to the contextual factors influencing IT 
and organisational change programmes and involves identifying the internal and external 
organisational forces that influence the change program under study.
In the inner context we examine organisational resource factors that influence the change 
programme and the outer context looks at institutional pressures (societal and cultural 
expectations) at the national and international levels. The use of ideas and concepts from the 
resource based approach to examine inner organisational context and institutional logic to 
examine outer context in a single study is not novel in this respect. Dacin (1997) and 
Hannan et al., (1995) combined both views in the study of the Finnish newspaper industry 
and European automobile industry respectively and posit that resource related forces are 
most likely to predominate at the local level and institutional forces would be more 
important at the global level.
3.4,1 Inner organisational context
In the first unit of the organisational context, we analyse organisational resources 
including issues of culture and organisationsl assets that influence the change process. 
Resources can be tangible such as the financial strength of an organisation and intangible 
such as its reputation. Organisational resources can support the change process and thus 
provide the vital ingredients for change (Barney, 1991), while resources could also hinder 
or act as a barrier to change when established patterns of operation becomes rigid and 
difficult to change (Leonard-Barton, 1992).
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An organisation’s resources include its culture, standard operating procedures, its 
reputation and other tangible resources and management capabilities which help shape 
the direction of the change process (Scott-Morton, 1991; Teece and Pisano, 1994). 
Capabilities refer to how management manages and co-ordinates internal and external 
activities and alliances such as inter-firm networking - domestic and non-domestic 
contacts and alliances (i.e. with management consultants; trade unions; with other 
financial institutions; with computer and telecommunications firms; and with the 
regulatory authorities); how new solutions are produced and retained within the 
organisation and finally how management respond and adapt to changes in the 
environment (Teece and Pisano, 1994). Managerial IT skills are another set of 
competences which are known to support IT and organisational change (Mata et al, 
1995). These managerial IT skills are management’s ability to conceive of, develop and 
exploit IT systems to support business functions. Managerial IT skills are developed 
historically through years of experimenting and working with new IT applications.
Other organisational resources are the idiosyncratic and firm-specific endowments and 
attributes such as the adequacy of the firm's financial base, geographic location of a 
particular advantage to the organisation such as the position of certain bank branches, 
technological assets that distinguishes the organisation from its competitors and also a 
firm's complementary assets which are assets that allow the firm to exploit new 
innovations (Teece and Pisano, 1994). Examples of these in a bank could be its customer 
base, branch networks or its reputation. Other forms of resources are the culture and 
tradition of doing things within the organisation (Fiol, 1991; Barney, 1986). From a 
strategic management perspective, Barney (1986) argued that organisational culture can 
be a source of competitive advantage if they are valuable, rare and inimitable and 
developed over time through the tradition of doing things within the organisation. With 
regards to planned organisational change, Schwartz and Davis (1981) argued that an 
organisation’s culture is capable of hindering or significantly altering the intended 
outcome of well thought out change initiatives in an organisation. According to the 
auithors, a lack of fit between culture and planned changes in an organisation may lead to 
a failure of the change initiative.
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3.4.2 Outer institutional context
The second unit of analysis is the outer context. Here we will examine broad social and 
normative expectations at the national and global levels -  referred to as the institutional 
contexts within which organisations operate. The study of institutions has received a lot 
of attention within the academic discipline of sociology. A central concern of the 
institutional theory is 'how local actions are situated in larger macro structures of social 
relations and meanings’ (Strang, 1994). The important message of the institutional school 
is that the environment or social context within which organisations operate is an 
extremely powerful force: one that needs to be taken into account in explaining social 
actions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1991). 
Institutional theory emphasises that the environment of organisations should not just be 
seen as a network of exchanges, but as consisting of socially prescribed and accepted 
ways of behaving, which organisations must adhere to for survival and legitimacy -  
hence, the notion of institutional context of organisations (Scott and Meyer, 1991).
The institutional context of organisations has also been referred to as ‘an organisational 
field’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). An organisational field consists of organisations in 
direct competition with each other as well as organisations that interact with each other 
either through the supply of resources or in the consumption of finished products. An 
organisational field also includes regulatory organisations overseeing the activities of 
other organisations. This means that the focus of attention should not just be restricted to 
organisations that are in direct competition with each other, but also to others that support 
or provide complementary resources. Focusing on these institutional forces is particularly 
useful as it allows for the identification and examination of various institutions and their 
different roles in the IT adoption process.
Following King et al. (1994), institutions can be defined as 'any established social entity 
which persistently exerts influence and regulatory controls over other social entities’. 
Influence is explained as the use of 'persuasions’ and regulations as 'a  direct or indirect 
intervention in the behaviour of other social entities under the institution’s sway’. Scott 
and Christensen (1995) regard institutions as structures of meanings and associated
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patterns of behaviour, which are enforced by regulatory processes. Combining both views 
of institutions, some of the influences and regulations institutions exert could involve the 
setting of standards or normative prescriptions; the use of coercion and modelling or 
mimetic influences.
To summarise, the contexts of organisational change includes the internal organisational 
context, which consists of the organisation’s resource base, its history and culture and 
standard operating procedures. Such influence could either be in the form of enabling 
changes taking place or inhibiting the change process. The second unit of interest is the 
outer context, which includes the social and cultural expectations of the wider societal 
sector. Such wider sector in contemporary times, as a result of the globalisation of 
economic and social relations, includes influences from both the national contexts and the 
global (international) contexts. Broad social and cultural pressures influence 
organisational actions in the form of normative prescriptions spelling out the appropriate 
ways of doing things (as templates which organisations adopt in their change efforts), or 
it could be in the form of coercive or political pressures and finally as mimetic influences 
when organisations model themselves on other organisations perceived as exemplars.
The introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the late 1980s 
marked the beginning of the deregulation of economic activities and specifically to the 
Nigerian banking industry, it marked the beginning of the process of liberalisation, which 
was accompanied by a huge increase in IT investment by banks. Liberalisation succeeded 
in increasing the number of banks operating in the country with the hope that it would 
expand the narrow base of the sector and, in addition, increase competition and 
innovation. Consequently, IT was seen as an important element of providing this 
increased level of service and banks began to invest increasingly in IT and introduce a 
whole number of restructuring programmes which brought about changes in operations 
and products offered to customers. In addition, banks started introducing some ‘best 
western management practices’ such as TQM and BPR.
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3.5 How does change occur? - Conceptualising the process of change
In the two previous sections we have suggested that organisational change is not always 
planned and that change is influenced by factors within the inner and outer contexts of 
the organisation, which leaves us in this part, to consider how change takes place. 
Pettigrew's contextualism has been criticised (Madon, 1992) for its lack of conceptual 
clarity on the meaning of process15. Similarly Van de Ven (1992) offered some 
suggestions on the need to clarify the meaning of change process adopted in any given 
study. Van de Ven and Poole (1995) identified four models of change commonly used in 
the literature: teleological, dialectic, lifecycle and evolutionary models. Each of these 
models provide different accounts of the sequence of events that take place to explain the 
process of change in an organisation.
3.5.1 The teleological model
The teleological model is based on the assumption that actions are aimed towards 
achieving a purpose or goal. Therefore, organisational change is a process of goal 
formulation, implementation and evaluation. The important factor is the final goal or 
purpose for which the action is taking place. There cannot be an action independent of a 
particular purpose and therefore to explain or understand how the action is unfolding we 
need to look at how goals are formulated and implemented towards achieving the stated 
goal or goals. This means that, whereas the model does not lay much emphasis on the 
path or process towards change, change itself is explained or understood by identifying 
the various activities that must be carried out to achieve the specified outcome. The 
success or otherwise of the change process is then assessed against these set of 
prerequisites to examine to what extent the desired outcome has been achieved. The 
underlying assumption of this set of theories is that organisational actions in relation to its 
environment are ‘rationally’ planned actions involving top management formulating 
goals and taking specific decisions and actions to achieve those goals.
15 Although in some of his latter work, he attempted to correct this by making explicit his theory o f process. 
See for instance his work on the UK NHS where he used the organisation transition model to explain the 
process o f change within the NHS (Pettigrew et al., 1992).
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This approach to change has however been criticised as ignoring to a large extent the 
social, political and economic context in which organisations operate. A teleological 
approach to change is based on a rational assumption of managerial task. A more 
sociological perspective of change will, in addition, give prominence to the institutional 
environment within which organisations operate. Such analysis will take widely held 
beliefs about the appropriate ways of doing things and taken-for-granted assumptions as 
its prevailing themes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).
3.5.2 The lifecycle model
The lifecycle model is based on the view that organisations grow and thus attempt to 
explain organisational development from initiation through to its termination (Hall, 
1991). According to Van de Ven and Poole (1995), the lifecycle model is also widely 
used, next to the teleological model, in the management literature to explain 
organisational change. According to this theory, change is immanent in view of the fact 
that the factors or forces that propel the organisation to change are contained within it. 
Organisational entities contain within it, the seeds of change which have been pre­
configured to control and regulate the change process. While development and change 
within the organisation may be influenced by developments outside of the organisation, 
ultimately such external forces are mediated by internal factors that have overriding 
influence to determine how the external developments eventually affect the organisation.
Change in a lifecycle model occurs in a single sequence of stages of events or activities, 
which are said to be cummulative and conjunctive (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). By 
cummulative it is assumed that each successive stage will acquire the characteristics of its 
preceding stage and retain them to transfer to subsequent stages. Therefore, each stage or 
event is seen as a necessary precursor of succeeding stages. In addition, each of the stages 
are said to be related and so they work in conjunction with each other because they all 
have a 'common starting point' and they all work together to achieve 'a common goal'. 
Consequently, each stage or event contributes its 'own piece of the final puzzle' in an 
orderly and predictable manner.
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3,5,3 The dialectical model
The third process model identified by Van de Ven and Poole (1995) is the dialectical 
model. According to the authors, this model is based on a general assumption that 
organisations operate in an environment of competing demands, events and contradictory 
values that compete with one another for domination and control. Change and stability is 
based on the struggle for domination and control between two opposing forces. Such 
competition or opposition could be internal to the organisation as in competition between 
different groups of employees or between different departments within the same 
organisation. It could be external to the organisation when its goals or actions are in 
conflict with the demands of other organisations such as its competitors or regulatory 
authorities. Therefore to explain organisational change, the focus is on the relative 
balance of power at any given point between the two opposing forces. The process of 
change is set in motion when one set of forces become powerful enough to engage and 
dislodge another set of forces which represents the status quo. A new status quo, different 
from the previous one, will then be formed. This process continues as long as there are 
new and sufficiently powerful set of opposing forces to challenge the status quo.
A dialectical model of change does not necessarily imply a creative model of change 
(Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). Forces for change may be motivated purely for selfish 
reasons or reasons less inclined to efficiency. Such forces for change may emanate, as a 
result of government regulation, which stipulates that all organisations should follow a 
procedure different from existing procedures. Depending on the context, such regulations 
may be backed by the force of the law or decrees and may not be challenged. At times, 
forces for change may evolve from the normative prescriptions of professionals who are 
deemed knowledgeable in certain issues (i.e. consultants) and such knowledge confers on 
them some measures of power which are sufficiently strong enough to dislodge 
prevailing wisdom or knowledge (Bloomfield, 1992). In addition, change is not always 
the outcome of collision between two opposing forces. At times, members of an 
organisation may wield enough power of their own to resist any attempt by new set of 
forces to change the status quo: thus maintaining the persistence of the status quo and 
hence, stability.
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3.5.4 The evolutionary model
The fourth and final model of change process is the evolutionary model. Evolution refers 
to ’the cumulative changes in the structural forms of collections of organisations across 
communities, industries, or the wider society' (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). These 
cumulative changes occur as a continuous cycle of variation, selection and retention 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Aldrich, 1979).
The natural-selection model, associated with the works of Aldrich, (1979); Aldrich and 
Pfeffer (1976) and Hannan and Freeman (1977) as a model for explaining organisational 
change, focuses on an organisational population (a collection of organisations i.e. an 
industry), hence it is also known as the population-ecology model. The model focuses on the 
process of change as opposed to the final (end) product of change. It is not explicitly 
concerned with whether organisations change to become efficient or similar but how they 
(organisations) adapt and achieve a 'fit' with their environment. As the environment 
changes, it forces organisations to change their internal structures to achieve a better 'fit' 
with it.
Variation, which triggers off the process, is introduced into an organisational population 
if a different form of the same set of organisations or an entirely new organisation is 
created. Such new organisations may be created from exposure to ideas from other 
societies or regions and through improved communications access or as in the case of the 
banking industry, through changes in the regulatory environment of the industry. An 
example of this could be the increased activity of building societies within the banking 
environment after deregulation. The increasing penetration of local markets by foreign 
banks and the creation of 'virtual’ banking organisations such as First Direct Bank in the 
UK, which is a type of bank that relies wholly on IT and does not employ most of the 
traditional ideas of a bank, are other examples.
Variations then provide the opportunity for external selection criteria, where customers’ 
choice and preference takes over and decide which form or variation will be selected and 
retained. The selected organisational form is then regarded as having achieved a 'fit’ with
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its environment. The failure of ATMs and a less than successful acceptance of smart 
cards in certain countries, could be explained as a lack of 'fit’ with the environment (i.e. 
these innovations failed to achieve a 'fit’ with the environment and were not selected). 
Once a particular organisational form is selected, the third and final stage will be the 
retention of the selected form where it is preserved and duplicated. In the case of ATMs and 
smart cards mentioned above, selection criteria may have favoured cash which was 
retained (institutionalised) as the form of payment system. The natural selection model 
has been criticised on the basis that it does not account for change in the environments 
themselves (Kanter et al., 1992).
3,5,5 IT implementation process models
Within the IS literature, research findings on the implementation of IT have generally 
been placed within models of process which differ in terms of the roles given to the 
environment and human action (Kraemer et al., 1989; Orlikowski, 1996). Five different 
models of: environmental determinism, managerial actionalism, organisational
evolutionism, institutionalism and systems interactionism were identified by Kraemer et 
al. (1989). Environmental determinism posits that external 'conditions and influences’ 
shape all aspects of the internal context of the organisation, including IT and 
organisational change (Glaser et al., 1983). This particular model is similar to what 
Orlikowski (1996) called the technological imperative model of technology-based 
organisational change, which considers technology as the main determinant of 
organisational change. The introduction of a new technology into an organisation is 
expected to provide new opportunities and capabilities, which organisations are expected 
to adopt.
Managerial actionalism on the other hand, ignores much of the external environment to 
focus on the actions of management in bringing about change. The type of technology 
and the way they are used, depends by and large on the information needs of the 
organisation and how decision-makers within the organisation go about satisfying these 
needs. This particular model is also similar to Markus and Robey’s (1988) organisational 
imperative model. A useful example of managerial actionalism model is the Kraemer-
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King model (1981) which describes a four-stage process from introduction and conquest 
to reassessment and consolidation, focusing mainly on managerial actions, in the form of 
a resource allocation system, employed to distribute computing resources within the 
organisation.
In the organisational evolutionism model, both organisational actions and environmental 
forces are seen as important in the process of change. However, the environment is seen as 
providing the impetus for a progressive and irreversible trend of change, and organisational 
actions are merely a reaction to environmental pressures. According to Kraemer et al. (1989) 
an often quoted example of this model within the IS literature is Nolan’s stage model (1973, 
1979). In this model, it is assumed that new technology comes into an organisation and is 
widely accepted, causing it to grow rapidly into every area of the organisation. Soon 
enough, the growth begins to cause some concerns for management who looks for ways to 
rationalise the growth and associated costs before the technology is eventually integrated 
fully into the organisation. However, the stage model has been criticised for an over­
generalised approach to technology diffusion and as such in later writings on the stage 
model, it has been extended to treat new technology differently as each technology is 
expected to have its own separate evolution track (McFarlan and McKenney, 1983).
In the institutionalism model, actions of decision-makers are recognised as important in 
deciding technology-based change. Although these actions can be idiosyncratic and at 
times can be seen to be ‘rational’, they are actually a part of a broader set of visions and 
actions, which makes them to be institutionally derived. This means that decision-makers 
in an organisation act in concert with decision-makers in other organisations, therefore 
organisational actions are actually grounded within the larger institutional forces that 
surrounds them. Swanson and Ramillier (1997), influenced by this line of thinking, 
developed a model of the process of adopting an IS innovation which they termed an 
“organising vision”. This model implies that decisions for the implementation of new IT 
innovations in an organisation are generally influenced by the (wider) general views 
about the importance of the new innovation created by a heterogeneous network 
(community) of actors in the inter-organisational field where the organisation is situated
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and participates. Therefore, the rational or informed choices made by management are 
actually made possible by the larger institutional arrangements within which management 
operates.
The fifth and final model examined is the systems interactionism model, in which both 
environmental forces and organisational actions interact recursively in the change 
process. The environment influences what actions are taken within the organisation and 
these actions (or the outcome) in turn influence (and sometimes alter) the environment by 
providing the contexts for further actions. Organisational actions are seen as either 
reactive in response to environmental demands or deliberative, taken in anticipation of 
future environmental changes or other reasons which seem relevant to the actor.
This particular model is increasingly being adopted in IS research. Markus and Robey 
(1988) argued for an emergent perspective of IT and organisational change, which posits 
that the way we use IT and with what outcome, is a function of both human choice and 
environmental characteristics. Similarly, the structurational model put forward by 
Orlikowski (1991) also argued for an interactional approach to the study of technology 
use within organisations. Technology-based change, she argued, should be viewed as a 
non-deterministic process which takes into account the role of technology, human choice 
and actions involved, as well as the socio-historical context of the organisation. Similar 
studies from an interactionist perspective include Montealegre (1997) in her study of an 
agro-industrial organisation in Guatemala. She employed structurational ideas in 
examining how the organisation was able to successfully implement new IT systems by 
drawing on rules and resources from the organisational, environmental and IT contexts 
and in turn how the implementation process informed these contexts. Implicit in these 
models is a dynamic view of IT and organisational change process that involves the 
technical/rational choices and actions of managers as well as the subjective and 
sometimes ‘irrational’ elements of the environment and managerial decisions and actions. 
These subjective and less rational elements interact with the planned rational actions to 
sometimes drive the change process recursively.
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Our choice of a contextualist approach in this thesis leads us to adopt a process theory 
based on a general assumption that organisations operate in an environment of multiple 
demands that interacts recursively with one another in influencing the change process 
(Van de Ven, 1992). With regards to choosing between the IT implementation process 
models reviewed above, we would adopt the systems interactionism model which gives 
due cognisance to the interaction of both environmental influences and organisational 
actions in the change process. Applying the view of organisational actions as essentially 
influenced by the resources owned or controlled by the firm as well as institutional rules 
and expectations, IT and organisational change process in this thesis will, therefore, focus 
on the interaction between organisational resources and wider societal cultural and 
political expectations at different levels of analysis. Table 3.1 defines our layers of 
interest in IT and organisational change process in Nigerian banks.
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Table 3: IT and organisational change: a conceptual framework
Theoretical concepts Factors o f interest
CONTENT
Nature of change
IT and organisational change
•  Decisions and actions involved in change
•  Planned/emergent/improvised change?
PROCESS
Interactions of events that takes place to 
explain the process of change
•  Interactions o f different rational, political, resource-related and cultural forces 
on change
CONTEXT
Internal/external 
factors for change
Inner- Organisational resource context
• Culture of organisation
• History and prior commitment
• Standard operating procedures
•  Resources and management capabilities
•  Firm’s technological, complementary, financial and locational assets
Outer -  Institutional rules and regulations
•  Inter-organisational context
• Influence of dominant organisations
• Professional norms and standards
• National economic, political and social context
•  Wider societal expectations
•  Government regulations and laws
•  Global/international context
• Broad (global) normative prescriptions about the 'appropriate' ways o f utilising 
technology in banks
3.6 Summary
In this chapter we introduced the framework for presenting data about IT and organisational 
change. The framework - based on Pettigrew’s contextualist model - focuses on the content 
of change which in this study includes the intended plans to effect transformation of banks, 
the various patterns of interpretations and actions, and lastly the realised or implemented 
change. The second component focused on the contexts of change, which have been 
identified as the inner context of the organisation and the wider context of socially accepted 
rules and procedures. The process of change is informed by a process theory based on the 
assumption that organisations operate in an environment of multiple factors that interacts 
recursively with one another to influence change process. In effect, this means that 
organisational change process is neither purely rational nor linear; change is socially and 
historically mediated just as it is rationally motivated. The intended plans of management
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are influenced by both organisational resources and institutional pressures, in the form of 
social and cultural expectations from the immediate national environment as well as from 
the wider international (global) context. Therefore, organisational resources including the 
history and tradition of doing things within the organisation coupled with societal and 
cultural expectations at the national and international level influence the change process. In 
subsequent chapters we put the framework into operation. In chapter 4 we examine the 
wider context and describe the rules and procedures governing the activities of banking both 
from an international perspective and from within the Nigerian banking industry.
88
Chapter 4 
The wider context of changes in banking
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is devoted to describing the wider context within which changes in Nigerian 
banks are taking place. The Nigerian economy was deregulated in 1986 with the 
introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and the liberalisation of the 
banking industry began shortly after. In section 4.2 we will examine the international 
banking industry to describe the changes that have taken place and the role of IT in these 
changes.
4.2 Technology and changes in banking: an international perspective
In the 1980s, it became commonplace to speak of changes in the environment of banks 
particularly changes in banking regulations, competitive behaviour, banking technology 
and more recently the globalisation of finance. The environment of banking organisations 
has changed dramatically with new structures to existing banks and a much broader scope 
of financial services/products being increasingly developed. Entirely new forms of banks 
are being developed as well as a proliferation of non-financial service organisations now 
competing with banks in their traditional domain. In addition to all these, customer 
expectations of banks have also changed quite significantly.
The body of our review focuses mainly on several of these major trends that have been 
observed in the transformation of the banking industry and we examine how a 
contemporary perspective like the new institutional theory could be used to understand 
such transformation and the determinants of these major changes. What are the 
consequences of these changes, and within the contemporary discourse of an increasing 
integration of financial service, what are the global consequences of some of these
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changes in a developing country context like Nigeria? First, we will examine the 
regulatory, structural and technological changes that have taken place within the 
environment of banks before describing specific changes in banking.
4.2.1 Changes in the environment of banks
4.2.1.1 Regulatory Changes
Regulation of banks has traditionally been targeted towards maintaining the integrity of 
the system. Due to the systemic nature of banking, one major crisis in a bank has the 
tendency of reverberating around the entire industry and could potentially damage 
customer confidence - which is the main ingredient on which banks survive. Prior to the 
deregulation drive of the 1980s, banking can be regarded as a highly conservative and 
stable industry. This stability was ensured through formal and informal barriers to 
competition. Formal barriers include the use of regulatory controls such as the New Deal 
reforms and the Glass-Steagall Act in the USA (Rogers, 1993).
The New Deal reform in the USA, for instance, ensured that each segment of the 
financial service industry performed a distinct and strictly limited function. Such 
distinction of functions was also prevalent within the German industry before 
deregulation. However, market segmentation was achieved through informal barriers, 
resulting from the distinct market focus of financial service providers. In Germany, prior 
to deregulation, banks have their own set of target customers and markets to maintain a 
relatively stable and orderly industry (Keltner, 1994). Similarly, the UK banking industry 
was one of order and stability, prior to deregulation, through the segmentation of markets 
and the type of services that banks could provide. According to Storey (1994), the UK 
banking sector, pre-deregulation, was “one of order, predictability, hierarchy and 
bureaucracy” (pg. 2).
Deregulation came about as part of a wider set of reforms, which was aimed at reducing 
government involvement in economic activities and allowing market forces to prevail. 
This became the prevailing wisdom in the 1980s thereby seeing successive national 
governments deregulating their economies and liberalising their financial systems. This
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collective drive towards deregulation and liberalisation has been seen as one of the main 
ingredients toward the increasing integration and globalisation of economic activities and 
of financial service in particular (O'Brien, 1992).
In national markets, deregulation within the banking industry has resulted both in an 
expansion and diversification in the service delivery mechanisms of existing banks and it 
has also led to a proliferation of entirely new organisations carrying out banking 
activities. In France, the Debre reforms of the mid-1960s led to an abolition of 
restrictions on branch banking as well as on interest rate ceilings on loans (Frazer and 
Vittas,1982).
In the UK, the root of deregulation can be traced to the 1971 Competition and Credit 
Control (CCC) document issued by the Bank of England. This documentation ended 
ceiling rates on the limit banks can borrow and also abolished the uniform rates of 
interests to borrowers and lenders (Howells and Hine, 1993). Closely related to this is the 
law, which allowed building societies to increase their activities and operate in hitherto 
forbidden territories. Banks responded by introducing new products and opening new 
branches. Also in the UK, the monopoly of the major clearing banks was removed 
through the enlargement of the membership of the payments system to include other 
banking institutions such as the building societies and other retail banks (Carrington et. 
al, 1997). The opening up of the securities market (‘The Big Bang’) to allow participation 
of commercial and foreign banks was also another major regulatory reform in the UK.
In the USA, deregulation involved the abolition of the Glass-Steagall Act which 
restricted the range of products banks could offer to their customers (Reinicke, 1995). 
Regulation Q was also lifted thereby making it possible for commercial banks and 
Savings and Loans institutions to offer a broader range of interest-rate returns on their 
current (“checking”) and deposit accounts. Similarly, the U.S. government eased the 
limitations on interstate banking - through the St-Germain Act -  first, by allowing banks 
in distress to be acquired by out-of-state banks and secondly through the subsequent
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removal of restrictions on inter-state banking by the various state governments (Reinicke,
1995).
Deregulation, therefore, led to an increased level of competition where hitherto stable 
patterns of demand could no longer be taken for granted. As a result, banks started 
competing with non-banking providers of financial service/products in their traditional 
markets and they (banks) consequently responded by expanding their business operations 
into other non-banking industry such as insurance and investment products. This resulting 
decompartmentalisation thereby led to banks increasingly finding new and better ways to 
serve customers and to compensate for lost business in their traditional domain.
4.2.1.2 Market structure changes
Market-related changes reflect a shift in the nature of services and products that bank 
customers now demand. Traditionally, banks’ expansion or growth has tended to come 
from the continued expansion of standard products to people who were outside of the 
banking system. However, with deregulation, the focus on quantitative expansion has 
been replaced by a more qualitative approach of providing higher quality and investment- 
type products in order to expand or achieve higher returns. The demand for higher quality 
products such as stocks, bonds and money-market instruments has therefore resulted in 
customers demanding a higher level of service from their banks (Keltner, 1994).
According to an OECD study, the nature of financial instruments that have replaced the 
traditional banking products vary between countries (OECD, 1992). In France, 
consumers took full advantage of the privatisation drive to increase their stock holdings 
and as such company shares has taken the lion’s share of private investment capital. In 
Britain, consumers redirected their investment capital towards life insurance and in Italy 
consumers invested more in short-term securities and bonds. The situation was also 
different in Germany, where the bulk of private investment was redirected to the purchase 
of government and private bonds as opposed to company shares. In the USA, the bulk of 
private investment was directed to money-market mutual funds and the purchase of 
insurance products (Economist, 1993; Keltner, 1994; OECD, 1992)
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In addition to private consumer demand, there have also been major changes in the 
investment attitude of large corporate customers. This trend, known generally as 
disintermediation, has led to a shift in focus by large (corporate) customers, from bank 
loans to other sources of finance to meet their credit needs (Rogers, 1993). Gart (1992) 
defines disintermediation as the process whereby big institutional organisations, aided by 
powerful analytical software, on-line corporate databases and powerful networks, can by­
pass banks and raise funds directly in the form of commercial paper from the money 
markets. This increasing disintermediation has led to a reduction in the amount of bank 
loans as a percentage of total corporate debt.
The trend of removing personal assets from traditional means such as cash, bank deposits 
and current accounts, as well as the disintermediation trend has resulted in a number of 
changes to how banks interact with their customers. First, the basis of competition is 
increasingly being shifted from the number and location of branches to a focus on 
telephone and computer-mediated interaction with customers. Secondly, there is a 
corresponding shift in the role of remaining branches from transaction processing to one 
devoted to sales, marketing and financial advice. This has led to a change in the structure 
of bank branches. New forms of branches are being developed, based on technology, 
such that we now have both staffed and unstaffed branches like the multimedia kiosk 
(Gosling, 1996). Thirdly, the loss of corporate customers has led banks in some countries 
(i.e. Germany) to increase their attention to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
and to form a closer relationship with these sets of customers in order to compensate for 
the loss of corporate customers (Gosling, 1996; Svare, 1989).
The market for banking services has also shifted from an emphasis on national/domestic 
markets to an increasing emphasis on global markets. Although the specific impact of 
globalisation on banks has been stronger on wholesale banks as compared to retail banks, 
studies have shown that the retail banking sector is not entirely left out (Frazer and Vittas, 
1982; O'Brien, 1992). One of the impacts of globalisation on retail banks is in the 
increasing number of foreign banks that now compete with local banks in their domestic 
markets. These foreign banks compete for resources, in the form of customer deposits, in
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local markets and they also compete in the local labour markets for competent and 
qualified professionals.
4.2.1.3 Technological changes
The use of IT in banks has moved on from being a means of automating banking 
activities to being of strategic value to the industry (Essinger, 1992; Gandy and 
Chapman, 1996). IT is now used in dealing directly with customers, in decision-making 
and in offering newer services and products to customers. An explanation commonly 
offered for the increasing importance of IT in banks is that the financial service industry, 
being a highly information-intensive industry, requires IT to support the processing of 
speedy, qualitative and up-to-date information (Broadbent and Weill, 1993; O’Brien, 
1992; Gart, 1992). Technological change in the environment of banks reflect 
developments and advancements made in the field of information and communications 
technology (ICTs) generally. As table 4.1 shows, this has evolved through three 
generations of developments from the days of the big mainframe machines, through to 
the development of minicomputers and powerful personal computers and finally to the 
days of client/server systems. As these developments occur in technology so was there a 
corresponding change in banking applications.
Early role of IT in banking includes the automation of cheque clearing. In the USA, 
according to O’Brien (1968; 1992), the first stage of banking automation was considered 
years of experimentation which involved banks focusing on and gaining experience in the 
use of Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR). During this phase of automation, 
mainframes were used to transfer current accounts in the branches from paper-based to 
(batch-processing) electronic formats. The paper-based systems involve updating current 
accounts manually at the close of business every day. This limited the length of time 
banks were able to open for business and the labour-intensive task of updating and 
balancing branch ledger had implications for productivity and accuracy. As a result when 
batch-processing systems were introduced, the main motivation was to reduce clerical 
handling cost and the resulting increase in productivity was a welcome relief for banks.
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The second and third generation of technology improved banks’ access to customers’ 
accounts for balance enquiries, for access to accounts in other branches and it also 
improved customer access and control over their accounts. Online access to customer 
accounts improved the quality of service to customers by speeding up access to 
information and by giving customers greater freedom over their accounts. Through the 
use of ATMs and phone banking, bank customers are able to do away with the need to 
queue up in bank branches and are thus able to process their own transactions or 
enquiries. Although bringing customers on-line is expected to be beneficial to customers 
and banks through the elimination of paper and labour and also by improving customer 
service, it is argued, however, that the increased access will ultimately transfer control of 
key business systems from banks to customers (Carrington, et. al., 1997). Consequently, 
banks’ ability to make free use of customers’ deposit will diminish with consequences for 
banks’ profitability.
Table 4 : Evolution of banking technology and applications
Architecture
Developments
Processing Methodology Application Developments
1st generation 1960s Batch processing faster cheque handling 
automated, more accurate accounting 
cheque netting 
lower back office costs
2“  generation 1970s - 80s real-time and on-line ATMs
credit and debit cards 
authorisation process 
telephone banking
corporate electronic cash management
3rd generation 1990s Client/server public access 
networks
co-operative computing 
customer information systems 
micro marketing techniques 
customer orientated front offices 
centralised back offices 
home-based banking
Source: Adapted from Gandy and Chapman (1996)
4.2.2 New Inter-organisational patterns
Precisely what is the nature of banks’ response to these environmental changes? In this 
section we provide a description of some of the changes that have taken place in banking. 
These changes have been classified into two main categories: new inter-organisational
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patterns, and new intra-organisational patterns. Changes in inter-organisational patterns and 
structures involve a review of changes in banks’ relation with external agencies such as 
customers, retailers and the IT industry. There have been changes to how banks deliver 
services to customers and in how they relate with retailers. Due to the increased importance 
of IT in the development of the industry, the relationship between banks and IT suppliers 
have also changed. Given these new patterns of relations, banks have established new 
structures to manage the new relationships.
4.2.2.1 New delivery mechanisms: less focus on bank branches
Changes in delivery mechanism involves the use of IT to provide direct delivery of 
services to customers, which in turn has led to a reduction in the number of branches in 
operation. Traditionally, the bank branch has been the main avenue for interacting with 
customers. Bank branches usually form the major component of a bank's strategy and banks 
compete based on the number of branches they have. A high presence in a particular area 
means that a bank will have a better advantage of attracting customers (and their deposits) 
than its competitors. Banks therefore tend to have a vast network of branches to maintain 
their competitive edge and to provide convenience for customers. This situation is however 
changing.
Given the increasing use of IT and the development of new banking products and 
services, there is less focus on branch banking as the main source of delivering services 
to customers. The Banking Administration Institute (BAI) in USA predicted that the 
proportion of transactions conducted by branches would fall from 40% in 1993 to below 
20% by the year 200016. However, branch networks are still regarded as banks’ major 
source of differentiation from the encroaching non-banking participants (Gosling, 
1996:24). Howcroft and Lavis (1987) believe that branches will still be useful as a 
measure of differentiation and to maintain customer loyalty and relationships. Examples 
of banking technology that have made significant impact in changing the delivery 
mechanisms are ATMs and phone banking.
16 In the UK, Barclays, Lloyds TSB and NatWest recently announced the closure o f 172,400 and 60 
branches respectively. See, “MPs join battle to save branches” (The Guardian, April 1 2000)
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ATMs were developed in the 1970s to provide an alternative to cashiers’ work and as an 
addition to existing branch services. By the mid-1980s, it became a focus of banks’ 
increasing emphasis on convenience in the provision of services to customers. Banks 
started using ATMs to link up with customers for the provision of routine transactions, 
loan and deposits services, account balance enquiries and for payment of credit card bills 
on a 24-hour basis (Dos Santos and Pfeiffers, 1995). ATMs are now regarded as an 
essential part of banking infrastructure to the extent that it is argued that any bank 
wishing to compete in the environment of the 1990s must offer customers more services 
through ATMs (Essinger, 1993). This means that the use of ATMs has become taken-for- 
granted within the banking industry. However, questions have been raised with regards to 
ATM adoption by banks. Howcroft and Lavis (1987) regards them as a means of 
replacing branch staff and a study of ATM adoption in the USA also suggest that despite 
banks’ rush to install ATMs, there is no clear-cut evidence as to whether such investment 
actually produce adequate returns (Steiner and Teixeira 1988)17.
Phone banking is a relatively new concept in banking. It involves in its simplest form, a 
phone reply service, with a Personal Identification (PIN) number that allows customers to 
check their balances or to issue stop notices on cheques. There are other more 
comprehensive approaches such as First Direct Bank in the UK which is an example of a 
'virtual bank’ based entirely on telephone transactions (Gosling, 1996). It provides the 
full range of service that traditional brick and mortar (branch-based) banks would offer. 
Direct phone service by banks is aided by the use of Computer Telephone Integration 
(CTI) which involves a comprehensive database on customers which the telephone 
operator can access quickly for up-to-date information. Benefits of such approach to 
banks are the savings expected from freeing up staffs’ time as customers do their basic 
data inputting (Gandy and Chapman, 1996). Secondly, it is cheaper to serve a customer 
whose only contact with the bank is through the telephone compared with branch 
network (Gosling, 1996). To customers, the benefit is convenience of doing business 
from home or the office and avoiding long delays in branches. One major limitation of an
17 Quoted in Bebbington et al (1991)
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electronic interface with customers is the sacrificing of personal relationship, which 
branch banking offers (Gandy and Chapman, 1996)18
4.2.2.2 Changes in bank-customer relationship
In addition to changing the way banks deliver their services to customers, technology is also 
changing the type and form of products that banks sell to their customers and it is also 
changing the view of who a customer is. Traditionally, a customer is one that approaches a 
bank for service, thereby giving an image of a stable, demand-driven industry. In 
contemporary times, however, the combination of regulatory, market and technological 
changes coupled with the introduction of new technology-based products and services as 
well as new delivery mechanisms based on technology, has meant that banks now do not 
wait for customers to come to them. Rather, banks pursue customers through aggressive 
marketing techniques and advertising, to suggest a transition from a demand-driven culture 
to a supply-oriented culture in terms of the bank-customer relationship (Kolari et al., 1986; 
Carrington et. al, 1997).
Studies carried out, mostly in Europe and America, have highlighted the contextual 
nature of banking and the need to align banking products and services to the needs of the 
local context (O’Brien, 1992; Frazer and Vittas, 1982; Bebbinton et al, 1991; Gandy and 
Chapman, 1996; OECD, 1989). These studies point to the lukewarm attitude of 
customers to new banking products when introduced and fails to meet their needs 
(Gosling, 1996). Other studies also point to the lack of fit between technology-related 
products and the socio-cultural environment of their introduction (Gosling, 1996); failure to 
conduct proper studies into what customers want (Bebbington et al, 1991) and the fact that 
some technology-based products may actually be solutions looking for problems to solve 
(Carrington et. al, 1997).
18 The first bank in the UK to introduce phone banking was the Royal Bank o f Scotland in 1985 
(Bebbington et al, 1991).
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4.2.2.3 Changes in bank-retail industry relationship
The introduction of EFTPOS is at the core of changes in bank-retail industry relationship. 
As a funds transmission mechanism, EFTPOS links banks and retailers in the payment 
system and its implementation, in the UK for instance, revealed a major shift in banking 
from being a closed community to a more open industry - albeit reluctantly (Howells and 
Hine, 1993). The implementation of EFTPOS in the UK, according to Howells and Hine, 
came about after series of confrontation between bankers who regard the domain of 
money transmission as their exclusive domain and therefore, would not want to concede 
to the demands of the retail industry.
EFTPOS was developed on the knowledge and experience banks had already gained from 
the introduction of interbank EFTs and ATMs which came earlier (Howells and Hine, 
1993). The development of EFTPOS, just like most other banking innovations, was 
adjudged to be technologically driven (Bebbington et al, 1991; OECD, 1989). The OECD 
publication - Electronic Funds Transfer: Plastic Cards and the Consumer highlighted the 
dangers in technology-driven payment systems modernisation. According to the report, 
this may lead to a neglect of the interest of consumers and may lead to developing 
technological products which consumers are not willing to accept. This same point was 
further highlighted by Bebbington et al, (1991) that “there is a danger that in a market 
driven or shaped by a technological imperative the customer and his needs take second 
place” (pg. 237)
In the study, the authors found out that despite the increasing trend towards electronic 
payment systems, traditional patterns of payment still flourish; people still prefer to use 
cheques for the extra couple of days of grace it grants before payment is finally settled 
and people still use cash for its anonymity and impersonality. Another effect of a 
technology-driven payment systems modernisation is the fear that EFTs may lead to a 
banking system which caters for the middle/upper class consumers thereby neglecting 
people in the lower classes. To prevent this, member countries of the OECD introduced 
the concept of 'basic banking’, which is an obligation for banks to provide a minimum set 
of services to all customers.
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4.2.2.4 Changes in bank -  IT industry relationship
A two-way relationship is posited by Gandy and Chapman (1996) where bankers see 
technology as a vital element in the development of their industry and IT providers on 
their part see banking - and financial services in general - as an important market for their 
products. This means that the needs of the banking industry were viewed, by IT 
providers, as a driving force in new IT innovations. The effect is an increased level of 
relationship between banks and IT suppliers. This increased relationship is also bome out 
of the fact that IT spend in UK and U.S. banks, for instance, have consistently been high. 
In 1994, the total IT spend of UK banks was $5.9 billion while in the USA, IT spend was 
estimated at $16.3 billion in 1994 and expected to rise to 19.8 billion by 1997 (Gandy and 
Chapman, 1996). This sort of IT expenditure is seen as an indicator of the increasing 
level of relationship between the two industries. Smart Card technology is an example of 
a new banking product that has made some impact in this respect.
The electronic purse is an example of a smart card, and it involves inserting computer 
chips into plastic cards for computation. This is quite different from traditional plastic 
cards with magnetic strip where computations are made on a central computer and is 
activated by swiping the cards through a device. The electronic purse is designed as an 
alternative to carrying cash. It involves storing money values in the microchips to the 
value that is available in the holder’s account. This can then be used for purchases in 
outlets that accept them. The popularity of this innovation has been more in countries 
where social circumstances such as high levels of crime and the risk of carrying cash 
have made it popular (Gosling, 1996).
In the UK, the system was tried out with the Mondex card, but with less success. This led 
Essinger (1992), to raise the concern about the lack of proper investigations into whether 
customers actually want technology-related payment methods. Howells and Hine (1993), 
also raised a similar question of whether customers would not prefer the use of cheques 
with the guaranteed safety window of 2-3 days before transactions are fully completed. 
This point to the fact that there may exist some barriers (institutional inertia) which 
prevents technologies from being readily accepted. Gart (1992) pointed out that in
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countries where smart cards have been adopted, consumers did not depend heavily on 
credit and debit cards for their payments. Gosling (1996) also raised the point that smart 
cards have not met with the expected enthusiasm because of the heavy dependence of 
customers on other methods of payments such as cash or credit/debit cards.
4.2.3 New internal patterns
Changes in the internal structures of banks include the focus on marketing activities in line 
with the change from a demand-driven industry to a supply-oriented industry. In addition to 
structural changes, banks have also witnessed cultural and management changes relating to 
how the training and recruitment of staff is carried out.
4.2.3.1 Increased focus on marketing
In line with the focus on attracting more customers, banks have increasingly adopted 
retailing and marketing concepts. Banks now make use of extensive marketing techniques 
such as advertisements and sales promotions. This increased focus on marketing has been 
brought about partly by the need to sell new products to customers who may otherwise be 
skeptical and to help customers overcome their inertia. Because cheque-based 
transactions carry the advantage of delay payment and cash on the other hand has the 
advantage of being impersonal, customers may not feel too inclined to switch to the new 
EFT technology. The introduction of new Electronic Funds Transfer (EFTs) was thought 
by Kirkman (1987) to warrant a large-scale marketing of the new technology to 
consumers who were very comfortable with the long-established systems of carrying cash 
or writing cheques.
Banks have also introduced television advertising to provide a distinct image for 
themselves. Their marketing strategy has changed from mass marketing to a niche 
approach to serving customers. This type of strategy, to reflect the increasing 
segmentation of bank products, is called micro-marketing (Gandy and Chapman, 1996). 
Micro marketing has been made possible by advancements in technology such as in 
databases and networks which makes information about each customer and their 
spending habits more easy to track and has been necessitated by increased competition
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brought about by new entrants such as Virgin Direct in the UK that targets only a 
segment of the market.
4.2.3.2 Cultural Changes
The study by Keltner and Finegold (1996) on human resource management in U.S. banks 
presented the view of banks using human resource policies as a means of generating cost 
savings where banks have started employing more part-time workers and are contracting 
out some services like investment services to outside independent consultants. This has 
helped banks to save on training costs for employees.
The recruitment, training and remuneration of bank staff were traditionally directed 
towards maintaining a 'financially secure and trustworthy workforce’ which will reflect 
the fiduciary role of banks (Smith and Weild, 1987). Bank staffs generally rise through 
the ranks with employment from an apprenticeship stage through to a general 
management position. Training was done in-house with staff undergoing several years of 
training in different types of banking functions such as lending, personnel and operations. 
According to Smith and Weild (1987) the 'ethos of banking apprenticeship was 
traditionally paternal-autocratic': bank staff were expected to conform to the norms of the 
organisation.
The method of training was such that staff were trained to be able to handle a number of 
tasks within the bank branch. This kind of flexibility was considered beneficial if the 
branch was to operate efficiently. However, with the introduction of technology and the 
initial focus on automating branch accounting systems, there was a gradual shift from a 
generalist to a more specialised training (Smith and Weild, 1987). In line with this shift, 
the hub and satellite branch structure, offering different and specialist type of services 
gradually replaced the traditional branch structure. This structure consists of dividing 
bank activities into different specialist functions which are then carried out separately in 
different branches.
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4.2.33 Other Professional Changes
Banking as a profession has indeed witnessed considerable changes in the recent past. 
The make-up of staff and recruitment procedures have also changed significantly, in line 
with the overall changes which the industry has witnessed. Banks now have a number of 
new departments added to their structure. Consequently, the demography of bank staff 
has changed to include professional managers such as marketing managers and IT 
managers. These professional managers with different mindsets, carry with them a 
different set of norms, values and expectations concerning the way organisations function 
which may be in conflict with traditional ethos of conformity with banking rules 
(Howells and Hine, 1993).
Historically, banks have been subject to a broad array of professional ideology in line 
with the tradition-based philosophy of banks. Banking is perceived to be a relatively 
exclusive society. The general normative structure of banks has therefore always 
supported its fiduciary role and the need to be seen as a profession with standards that 
have to be maintained collectively; thereby giving the picture of a very cautious, inward- 
looking and highly risk-averse industry (Howells and Hine, 1993). Consequently, 
recruitment and training have been largely tailored to support these norms of banking. 
However, recent developments may be leading to suggestions that some of these 
traditional ethos may be gradually giving way. Banks are now more concerned about 
issues of costs and efficiency and in the value-generating concerns of their customers. 
Branches are no longer just regarded as an overhead in the bank’s costs but banks are 
now interested in which branch generate more profits.
4.2.4 Discussion of changes in the institutional contexts o f banks 
In discussion, changes witnessed by banks can be characterised as a shift from an 
oligopolistic market with stable growth pattern to that of a highly competitive market. 
Delivery mechanisms have shifted from a focus on branch networks to newer forms of 
delivery systems which rely to a lesser degree on brick and mortar branches. Services 
offered by banks are changing from a heterogeneous package of services to the provision 
of segmented services. Traditional role of collecting deposits, which are then channelled
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into areas of need, is also rapidly being undermined. Finally, recruitment and training 
which for a long time had been internally driven and oriented towards serving the needs 
of the branch networks is changing to one that is increasingly targeted at the specialised 
needs of the organisation.
In addition, these changes can be classified as both exogenous and endogenous. 
Externally, we can identify developments within the wider environments such as in the 
case of deregulation and liberalisation where existing laws, which prevented certain 
banks from providing services and/or setting up branches in some locations (i.e. Glass- 
Steagall Act in USA), were repealed. Also, we identified advancements in technology 
and the favourable cost-price ratios of such technologies as another important external 
factor for the changes witnessed in banking. Such technological advances, coupled with 
the increasing deregulation of financial services, is leading to an increasing integration of 
financial services worldwide and is further diminishing the importance of geographic 
location in financial activities (O’Brien, 1992; Hoogvelt, 1994). Institutional borrowers 
are now able to source for funds anywhere deemed favourable, and directly from 
potential investors. This has diminished the importance of banks as the major providers 
of investment capital (Gart, 1992).
Other types of changes are those between banks and other institutions such as retailing 
companies who are now visibly active in providing services previously regarded the 
exclusive domain of banks. There have also developed contradictions with the most basic 
of social behaviour where customers now demand higher quality service and faster 
response to their demands and queries. Customers in most countries are increasingly 
favouring payments based on the use of plastic cards. Internally, the activities of banks 
also embody some form of endogenous impetus for change. As the number of people 
using banking services increase, so does the need to process these accounts more 
efficiently. As more people operate cheque accounts, there will be an increased desire to 
invest in technologies that will make the task of processing cheques faster and more 
efficient.
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From these discussions, we can deduce that the banking industry of the 1990s is 
characterised by an increased level of competition, increased level of uncertainty and an 
increasing network of exchange both within and outside of the industry. All these have 
led to the transformation of a once conservative, slow moving and cautious industry into 
a dynamic one, which has responded by being more proactive and aggressive. It 
represents an exit from an organising principle based on caution, conservatism and 
tradition to that of an aggressive, dynamic and more open industry. To sustain this new 
image, the industry has responded accordingly with a set of new rules and procedures 
which have seen banking expanded to incorporate the new procedures into their 
structures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). As a result, banks now adopt retailing concepts and 
an increasing emphasis on strategic planning (Essinger, 1993; Channon, 1988); marketing 
strategies (Combs and Graham-Boume, 1995; McGoldrick and Greenland, 1992) and 
aligning IT/IS strategies with banking strategies (Baets, 1996; Broadbent and Weill, 
1993; Gandy and Chapman, 1996). In addition, banks now have full-fledged IT/IS 
departments, automation planning and research and development departments19 (Howells 
and Hine, 1993). Increasingly banks are redesigning their business processes and are 
investing in BPR projects with a view to operating more efficiently and refocusing the 
organisation (Maull and Childe, 1994; Willcocks and Currie, 1997)
In the competitive environment of the 1990s, the use of technologies by banks has come 
to be taken for granted (Essinger, 1992:13). The implication of this could be seen in the 
huge amount of resources that banks are now prepared to invest in IT (Gandy and 
Chapman, 1996). It could also be seen in light of the argument that technology is driving 
applications within the industry instead of the other way round (see for instance Essinger, 
1992):
“Within the [financial service] industry the technology has usually come first, and then the 
application has been designed to fit with the technology” (pg. 19).
19 According to the Bank o f America study (McKenney et. al., 1997), IT department (or Systems and 
Engineering Research, as they were then known) was a feature o f banks’ structure in the early years on IT 
use in banks. However, the intensity with which the industry as a whole has embraced the idea is quite 
phenomenal now. Then, not all banks have their own in-house IT teams but now for a bank not to have one 
could be seen as a sign o f being a ‘laggard’.
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This taken-for-granted assumption about the use of technology in banks could mean a 
focus only on technology as the appropriate strategy on which to compete. This could 
lead to banking services becoming detached from the need of banks’ customers and the 
wider context in which banks operate. This may be especially true of banks in DCs who 
are just introducing these technologies as a response to wider environmental demands of 
deregulation and increasing globalisation of socio-economic activities. A taken-for- 
granted attitude to technology implementation may restrict the ability of organisations in 
DCs to question the wisdom of transferring organisational forms and techniques in 
addition to transferring technology.
The taken-for-granted use of IT in banks also highlights some of the problems DCs are 
facing in selecting amongst the numerous technologies now available. Due to the 
proliferation of these products and technologies, bank management are faced with the 
enormous task of selecting and exploiting these new technologies in such a way that 
would afford them the chance of competing successfully in a fast moving and 
increasingly integrated environment. The decision on how best to use technology to 
restructure and introduce effective changes in banking practices is not an easy process. 
Most new or additional technologies in the ‘west’ are based on a mature base (Listfield et 
al, 1994; Howells et al, 1993) and this becomes a problem for banks in DCs just being 
exposed to the technologies and therefore lack the wealth of experience which banks in 
the 'west’ have. Invariably, this would demand a much deeper understanding of the local 
context and an appropriate approach to implementing technology and technology based 
management techniques.
Finally, a taken for granted assumption about the importance of technology could mean a 
focus only on technology as the appropriate strategy on which to compete. This could 
lead banking services and products becoming detached from the needs of banks' 
customers and the wider context in which banks operate (Gandy and Chapman, 1996). 
With regards to banking in DCs, such a highly teleological view of IT use may 
sometimes lead to a mechanistic transfer of technology and technology-based products 
and services from developed to developing countries - which may not be ideal for the
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local context. Such products and services may make a bank look global and modem but 
may not meet the needs of the local customer and the local context. Therefore, if the 
introduction of IT in Nigerian banking system is to make any meaningful impact, it must 
provide services and products which are relevant to the needs of the customers and to the 
local context. Gandy and Chapman (1996) puts this quite succinctly:
For technology to have a beneficial impact, it must not only relate to the needs of the organisation 
that employs it, it must also achieve a fit with the socio-economic and strategic (wider) context of 
such organisation (pg. 9).
The need to contextualise technology-related banking products and services is not an 
exclusive problem of DCs. As studies such as (Bebbington et. al, 1992; Gosling, 1996) 
have indicated, similar problems exist in developed countries. However, the context of IT 
implementation in DCs is much different than in developed countries given the lack of 
resources and infrastructural and technological capabilities (Madon, 1992; Odedra, 1990) 
which these countries have to contend with. It follows therefore, that the use of IT needs 
to be adapted to the priorities and contextual characteristics of the local context (Madon,
1992).
In the next section, we will examine, as part of the wider context of change in Nigerian 
banks, the Nigerian banking environment with a view to describing the institutional rules 
within which banks operate and factors which may influence the changes taking place in 
these banks.
4.3 The Nigerian banking industry
In this section, we describe the Nigerian banking scene to examine the national context of 
changes taking place in banks. Such a description of the Nigerian banking context will 
aim to demonstrate how global practices are articulated through the reformation of the 
Nigerian banking system. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the nature of 
globalisation from within the particular framework of the Nigerian banking system.
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4,3.1 Historical evolution o f the Nigerian banking industry
For the purpose of this study, we have classified phases in the evolution of the banking 
industry in Nigeria into four stages namely: the era of free banking (Period up to 1959); 
the era of banking legislation (1959 - 1970); the era of indigenisation (1972- 1986) and 
the era of deregulation (1986 - Present)20. During the first era, banking activities in 
Nigeria were carried out predominantly by foreign banks. There was the African Banking 
Corporation which was opened in 1892, the Colonial Bank and the Barclays Bank which 
in 1917 absorbed the Colonial Bank. However, these foreign banks were found to be 
discriminatory against Nigerian indigenes in giving out credits. As a result of these 
discriminatory practices, coupled with the nationalistic fervour of the late 1950s, a large 
number of indigenous banks emerged to cater for the needs of local businesses. However, 
the majority of these banks did not last very long. One of the main reasons given for their 
collapse was the lack of a deep asset base.
The second phase in the history of banking in Nigeria witnessed the beginning of banking 
regulation. Prior to this period, there was hardly any form of regulation within the 
industry and in 1959, when the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) was set up, government 
could henceforth monitor and control the activities of the industry. From this period 
onwards government, through the federal ministry of finance and subsequently the CBN, 
introduced a number of laws aimed at injecting some stability into the system - a lesson 
learnt from the turmoil of the immediate period mentioned above.
The third phase is the era of indigenisation. The oil boom of the early 1970s brought 
quite a large number of foreign operators into the Nigerian banking system. A number of 
these banks were owned and controlled by non-indigenes and concern about profit 
repatriation led the government to embark on a wholesale attempt at indigenisation. With 
the National Enterprise Promotion Decree (also known as indigenisation decree) of 1972,
20 Others (Adekanye, 1990) have chosen to restrict this classification to two main periods: the immediate 
post-independence years up till the eve o f deregulation (1960 - 1985) and the deregulation era up till the 
present time. The main difference between the two perspectives is the focus o f analysis. While Adekanye 
was interested mainly in the developments within the regulatory environment, the intention here is to set 
the context o f banking in Nigeria by tracing the historical evolution o f the industry.
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government acquired 40% of equity participation (which was later increased to 60% in 
1977) in these companies with the sole aim of putting executive control in the hands of 
Nigerians. This was seen as a way to minimise the problem of profit repatriation. This 
period therefore witnessed increased government intervention in the banking industry, 
which continued until the deregulation of the industry began in July 1986.
The introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986 began the 
process of deregulating the Nigerian economy and led to the liberalisation of the banking 
industry. Nigeria’s main foreign exchange earner is oil. Estimates put it that between 80- 
90% of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings is derived from the sale of crude oil (EIU,
1993). In the early 1970s there was an oil boom, which meant an increase in earnings for 
the country. This led to government embarking on very ambitious development projects 
in which a number of industries were set up. However, these industries were highly 
dependent on import and hence on foreign exchange. The oil glut of the early 1980s 
hampered government’s dash for growth because export volume reduced considerably, 
thereby cutting the country’s foreign earnings by as much as 60% (EIU, 1993).
Government resorted to borrowing from abroad to continue some of their development 
objectives. However, this increased borrowing, coupled with the continued decline in 
export sales, seriously increased Nigeria’s external debt burden and weakened the ability 
to raise further loan. Thus, government turned inwards for further loans and started 
borrowing from banks. A further collapse in oil prices in 1986 meant that the economic 
situation in the country worsened, consequently increasing the need for reforms. In July 
1986, the government of the day introduced the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP), which led to the liberalisation of the banking industry. Prior to liberalisation, the 
banking industry had been largely oligopolistic with three major commercial banks 
dominating the scene. These three banks -  First Bank, United Bank for Africa and Union 
Bank - referred to as the “big three” had their origins in the colonial era and had strong 
ties with foreign partners (Lewis and Stein, 1997)
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The link between the industry and government pre-SAP had been a very strong one. 
Then government controlled about 80% of assets in commercial banks and 45% in 
merchant banks21. It was therefore felt that deregulating the system and liberalising the 
process of bank licensing would, in principle, reduce government influence and introduce 
competition and innovation, which was lacking. Financial reform in Nigeria started with 
the relaxation of entry procedures in the financial service sector, which saw the number 
of banks more than doubled from 42 in 1986 to 117 by the end of 1995. The next stage of 
reform was the loosening of regulatory instruments in 1987. Prior to this, government had 
(through the Finance Ministry and CBN) used direct controls on credit allocation and 
interest rates (Falegan, 1987). However, with the relaxation of controls, banks were given 
more freedom to determine interest rates for lending and saving according to the demands 
of the ‘market’, and an inter-bank foreign exchange market was established. This further 
accentuated the rush into the industry, as banks were now able to deal in trade finance 
and foreign exchange transactions.
The major effect of SAP on the Nigerian banking sector was in liberalising the process of 
setting up new banks. Liberalisation was considered essential for promoting ‘competition, 
innovation and efficiency’ (Ebhodaghe, 1991). The first major change after liberalisation 
was the explosion within the banking system. Since liberalisation, the number of 
commercial banks increased and more than doubled from 30 in 1986 to 66 in December 
1995, while the number of merchant banks increased from 12 to 51 between 1985 and 
1995 (CBN, Annual Reports, 1995). Accompanying this increase in the number of banks 
is a profusion of supplementary organisations such as finance, mortgage and brokerage 
houses. This increase in the number of banking outlets, however, did not produce the much- 
expected financial deepening and economic upturn (Utomi, 1996; Lewis and Stein, 1997). 
Instead, following on the heels of the phenomenal increase in the number of banks, is the 
problem of financial distress22 and the consequent credibility crisis which the system
21 Assets within the banking sector before liberalisation was dominated by commercial banks who owned 
more than 60% of the assets, thereby outnumbering merchant banks by a ratio o f more than two to one 
(Lewis and Stein, 1997).
22 Financial distress is defined as a situation in which a financial institution is unable to fulfill its 
obligations to its customers, its owners and the economy due to weaknesses in its financial, operational and 
managerial capabilities which in effect renders it illiquid or insolvent (CBN Briefs, 1996 Series). In 1989, 8
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suffered in the immediate post-liberalisation era. As a result of this crisis, government 
closed down more than 60 banks (both old and new) as they were adjudged to be in a 
state of distress. A large number of customers lost their deposits and vowed never to use 
banks again23 - as such the system suffered a major credibility crisis.
In an effort to restore some credibility into the system, banks have introduced 
programmes of reforms and implement new IT systems and IT-based products and 
services. In the next section, we will examine how the banking industry is changing and 
the nature of these changes. First, we provide a general overview of the financial service 
industry as a prelude to describing changes in the banking industry.
4.3.2 Structure of the Financial Service Industry
The Nigerian Financial system is made up of the capital market, the money market and 
specialised institutions. The capital markets consist of the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which is the regulatory authority 
for the capital market, issuing houses and stock broking firms. Within the money market, 
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(NDIC) are the two regulatory/supervisory authorities. Merchant banks, commercial 
banks, discount houses and community banks are the other institutions within the money 
market. Examples of specialised institutions are the Nigerian Industrial Development 
Bank (NIDB); the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI) and the Urban 
Development Bank (UDB). The financial system also includes insurance companies, 
bureau-de-change and Primary Mortgage Institutions (PMIs) to mention a few.
The focus of study here is the money market and within that we have chosen commercial 
banks. The reasons for our choice relate to the fact that commercial banks are arguably 
the major players and users of IT within the industry. Discount houses are relatively new 
developments (post liberalisation) and although community banks have been in existence 
for much longer their use of IT is not extensive and deep enough for the sort of issues we
banks were adjudged distressed and were subsequently closed down. The total number of banks closed down 
increased dramatically to 63 by January 1998 (CBN Annual Reports, 1998).
23 See, “Echoes o f recapitalisation in the banking sector” (The Guardian, April 24 1997)
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wish to study in this research. Commercial banks in Nigeria have variously been referred 
to as ‘first’ or ‘old’ generation banks for those banks that have been in operation before 
liberalisation and ‘second’ or ‘new’ generation banks24 for those that are the direct 
product of the liberalisation process.
4.3.3 New Directions: IT and Organisational Change in Nigerian Banks
In the following sections, we are going to describe changes within the environment of 
banks in Nigeria. This discussion will serve as background to providing a description of the 
context within which bank restructuring is taking place and to provide a picture of the 
institutional context (institutions and rules) with which to describe and analyse the two case 
studies in chapter 5.
4.3.3.1 Influence of regulatory authorities
At the time of liberalisation, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) was the only 
regulatory/supervisory agency within the financial service industry. This has led some to 
argue that the CBN was grossly inadequate to handle the supervision of the impending 
explosion; therefore, the rapid deregulation of banking was said to outpace the institutional 
means to oversee and regulate the process (Lewis and Stein, 1997). The implication of this 
was that a lot of bogus and inefficient operators came into banking with serious 
consequences for bank customers who lost a great deal of money as a result of the less 
than competent and (often times) illegal activities of these bogus bankers25. It was only in 
1989 that the government set up a new body -  the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(NDIC) -  to share the burden of supervision/regulation with CBN. In addition, government 
promulgated a new decree26 with the aim of ‘sanitising’ the banking sector. The decree, 
which has been criticised as being 'draconian and punitive', was used by government to 
imprison many bankers adjudged to have a hand in the distress within the industry (Uche,
1996)
24 This classification has consequences for the analyses that will follow in this study and we shall be using 
these terms in referring to the banks in much o f our subsequent discussions.
25 For more discussion on the failure o f financial liberalisation in Nigeria see Lewis and Stein (1997) and 
Utomi (1996).
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Much of CBN’s interaction with the industry is based on regulation through the use of 
statutory controls. Instances of this that came across in the study are the directives issued 
to commercial banks to sort out and process their stock of currency before lodging them 
with CBN, failure of which carries a penalty of a surcharge27. This directive, which was 
first raised in 1995, met with some resistance from banks because they claim they do not, 
at the time, have the necessary equipment to sort out their currency notes. However, 
government proceeded with the decision and one year after the decision was made, CBN 
had penalised banks to the tune of one billion Naira for sorting banks’ currency notes28. A 
consequence of this, albeit indirect, is that it has strengthened the resolve of banks to 
improve on the payment systems in the country and to facilitate the introduction and 
widespread use of non-cash forms of payment. This particular demand was mentioned as 
one of the major factors that has strengthened the alliance of banks, formed to introduce 
the joint smart card scheme, to forge ahead with the project. Prior to this, it was actually 
not a common thing to see 'supposed’ competitors forging alliances and working 
together. Another major effect was the decision by government to introduce higher 
currency denominations so as to reduce the burden of carrying bulky notes in lower 
denominations29.
Another major directive that is influencing IT use and restructuring initiatives in banks is 
the Rural Banking Scheme, introduced by government in 1977. Through this scheme, 
government compelled all banks to increase their presence in rural areas by allocating to 
each bank a minimum number of branches they have to establish within a specified 
length of time in rural areas. This was initiated to encourage rural banking habits and also 
to mop up excess liquidity in the rural areas, with a view to bringing them into the 
mainstream financial framework of the country. In addition, the scheme was initiated to 
transform the agro-economic base of the rural areas through the provision of investment 
finance (Oiji, 1989). The Scheme was however abandoned after the industry was 
liberalised in 1989, as it was argued that such a policy of establishing branches in
26 Bank and Other Financial Institutions Decree 1991 (BOFID).
27 See, “CBN begins sanction on banks over currency processing” (ThisDay, April 8, 1997)
28 See, “The cost o f sorting dirty Naira notes” (Vanguard, August 12 1998)
29 See, “Bank chiefs praise CBN for introducing higher currencies” (Vanguard, July 1, 1999)
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“unprofitable” areas conflicts with the tenets of profitability and efficiency which 
government was preaching with the introduction of SAP. Despite the abrogation of the 
policy government, through the CBN, insisted that banks should not close any of the 
branches opened during the scheme. Banks, therefore, were compelled to continue 
operating these branches -  much to their disapproval.
Competition within the industry was recently heightened when government transferred 
the accounts of its agencies and other parastatal accounts with the CBN to commercial 
banks in March 199930. The accounts to be transferred are capital expenditure accounts, 
military and police accounts, domicilliary accounts as well as state government, 
ministries and parastatal accounts totalling about 80billion Naira worth of business for 
the banks31. As expected, this decision led to a big scramble on the part of commercial 
banks to win some of these accounts. It further accentuated the need by banks to improve 
their products and services and to focus more on marketing their products to customers, 
including the new ministries and parastatals.
Other regulatory reforms include the decompartmentalisation of the banking industry 
with the introduction of the “Universal Banking” scheme. Through this scheme, 
government hoped to encourage a level playing field within the industry by allowing 
merchant banks to operate in the domestic retail market. The easy access to cheap funds, 
which retail banks enjoy through private consumer accounts, had been a source of 
frustration for merchant banking institutions, who were forbidden to operate in this 
market. Consequently, merchant banks began putting pressure on government to break 
the barrier and remove the restriction which prevented them for participating in this 
“lucrative” sector. Thus, the lifting of the ban has further increased the level of 
competition as some merchant banks have since seized this opportunity and moved into 
the sector32, while others plan to join in the immediate future33.
30 See, “Transfer o f retail banking from CBN takes off in July” (The Guardian, April 18, 1997)
31 See, “Good news for borrowers: Government funds back to commercial banks” (Newswatch, May 17 
1999)
32 See, “Industrial, Fidelity, Fountain get CBN nod, convert to commercial banking” (Vanguard, May 31, 
1999)
33 See, “NIMBL may dump merchant banking” (The Guardian, April 26, 1999)
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4.3.3.2 Relationship with IT industry
IT vendors (both hardware and software vendors) and management consultants equally 
exert strong influence as the major source of technology and technical know-how within 
the industry. The reason for this is the dearth of knowledge in banking systems within the 
industry34 and the over-reliance of banks on vendors to keep them abreast of 
developments in technology; to impart knowledge of systems and for the general 
maintenance of systems. Six out of the eight banks studied use standard banking 
packages developed outside Nigeria and, therefore, rely on vendors or their subsidiary in 
Nigeria for maintenance and upgrades. This reliance on vendors has implications for 
learning within the organisations as most of the internal IT personnel act only as liaison 
between bank staff and foreign vendors to report faults. Aside the foreign imported 
products, the software scene in Nigeria is rapidly growing with a number of local 
developers and products. Examples of local developments are Branch Accounting and 
Information System (BRAINS) developed by the IT unit of United Bank for Africa 
(UBA) and P-Sale developed also by the in-house team of All States Trust Bank35.
Banks' choice of systems also depends largely on software/IT vendors, and management 
consultants. As a result of this, bank management are faced with a barrage of 
technologies with which to contend. Some of the excerpts from the interviews such as - 
“there’s a lot of confusion out there”; “there’s a general lack of direction from nowhere”; 
“knowledge of banking systems amongst managers is very poor, I will put at 2 to 3 on a 
scale of 10” - all point to the nature of the problems that exists within the industry. As 
such, banks rely a great deal on IT vendors and management consultants to inform them 
of what to do and how to do it.
4.3.3.3 Changing Bank -  Customer relationship
Customer service is another prominent feature of banking within the Nigerian banking 
sector. The increasing presence of the new generation banks, as well as the foreign banks 
has brought about a new approach to serving customers - completely different from what
34 On the literacy level o f banking systems within the industry, a CEO o f one o f the banks interviewed gave 
a rating o f between 2 and 3 from a scale o f 10.
35 See, Significance o f digital banking” (The Guardian, March 5, 1997)
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existed before. Prior to liberalisation and to the coming of these new banks, the culture of 
banking within the industry was described as “armchair banking”. Armchair banking in 
the sense that the level and quality of service delivery was regarded as poor; customers 
were at the mercy of banks and were forced to accept whatever level of service banks 
offered.
However, the new banks brought a completely different approach to serving customers 
and a more advanced level of computerisation - some of which later became the 
‘standard’ within the industry. Old generation banks’ customers, seeing what obtains in 
some of the new banks, started asking their banks for the same level and quality of 
service, which therefore meant that banks had to change. Different initiatives at 
improving customer service includes Union bank’s customer relations workshops for all 
branch staff and the establishment of dedicated counters in all branches to handle 
customer queries and the opening of new accounts36. Similarly, other banks have focused 
increasingly on presenting a friendly attitude to serving customers37 and making customer 
service the focus of their strategy38
4.3.3.4 Increased focus on IT and IT-based change programmes
The financial distress within the industry, in addition to others, led to an increasing focus 
on finding better and more efficient ways of providing services to customers and winning 
back their confidence. Nigerian banks are spending an increasing amount of resources on 
IT in order to improve their services (Woherem, 2000). Banks are now awarding multi­
million Naira worth of contracts in procuring banking applications software and the 
hardware on which to run them39. In addition to investing directly in IT, banks, with the 
assistance of IT and Management consultants, are now introducing IT-related change 
programmes such as Business Process Reengineering (BPR)40. A number of old generation 
banks embarked upon major reengineering initiatives41 with a view to improving operations
36 See, “Union Bank: A new mission to satisfy customers” (Vanguard, 15 February, 1999)
37 See, “ECOBANK: Courteous smile, and an inviting banking hall service” (Vanguard, 15 February, 1999)
38 See, “Savannah Bank: A traditional stand for customer service” (Vanguard, 15 February, 1999)
39 See, “NCR clinches 140 million Naira IT orders” (The Guardian March 10, 1999)
40 See, “Afribank boost services with IT” (The Guardian, June 10, 1999)
41 See, “Bank restructures, lays-off 900 workers” (The Guardian, June 6, 2000)
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and redesigning their branch processes for efficiency42. In January 1997, First Bank 
introduced the “First Bank Century II” project with the purpose of re-engineering its 
branches to meet the demands of the industry. The project was piloted in two branches 
(regarded as strategic) and merging them to become what they call “the dream branch”. 
After piloting in these two branches, the project was subsequently rolled out to other 
branches nation-wide43. Other restructuring exercises include the Savannah bank 
initiative44 christened “Renaissance” which, according to management, will help 
reposition the bank into a world class financial institution. The initiative involves a 50 
million Naira investment in IT and telecommunications as well as a 200 million Naira 
investment in ‘strategic staffing exercise’ aimed at rationalising existing workforce and 
“to create a well trained, motivated and professional manpower to support the goal of a 
first-class rating in service delivery”.
4.3.3.5 Introduction of smart-card products
An increasing number of technology-based banking products such as smart cards, home and 
Internet banking are being introduced into the sector45. New generation banks such as All 
States Trust Bank and Diamond bank have pioneered the introduction of card-based 
payment systems with cards such as the ‘ESCA’ and the ‘Diamond’ cards for All States 
Trust Bank and Diamond bank respectively. The ESCA card was the first to be launched in 
the country in December 1995 with the aim of reducing dependence on cash and its 
attendant problems. Some of the problems relate to the depreciation of the local currency 
(Naira) and the huge amounts carried around, even for the most basic transactions. Carrying 
this huge amount of money around is a major security risk for both customers and banks and 
specifically for banks it represents a huge cost in terms of handling cash. On a normal day, it 
is not uncommon for bank branches to handle and process cash up to 40 million Naira.
ESCA and other Smartcard products allow customers to charge their cards up to the amount 
of money available in their accounts, which can then be used to pay for goods in
42 See, “Re-engineering in banking sub-sector propels investment in stocks” (Vanguard, March 16 1999)
43 See, “First Bank Century II Project” (Business Times, March 23, 1998)
44 See, “Savannah Bank outlines restructuring (Vanguard, June 13, 2000)
45 See, Banks parade new products and strategies to keep afloat” (The Guardian July 5,1998)
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participating retail outlets and petrol stations. In addition, customers who travel around the 
country to transact business need only to carry the charged card with them as they can 
withdraw money from the card at any of All States branch. These products have received 
wide acceptance due to some of the problems related to handling cash and especially those 
related to security and risks of carrying large sums of money around. Old generation banks 
like UBA have also followed suit with UBA’s Easy Card and First bank with its First Bank 
Value card. In addition to card-based products, other financial products that have been 
brought in to the market in Nigeria are deposit-based products such UBA’s school savings 
schemes or Union Bank’s UNISAVE - aimed at encouraging savings culture in Nigeria and 
at the same time providing savers with the opportunity to obtain financial help from the 
bank46.
Another major development within the industry is the consortium of 26 banks established to 
operate a multi-bank smart card payment scheme with a view to further reducing the 
dependence on cash. This joint effort runs in parallel with individual schemes already 
underway in some banks and it is intended to help banks achieve the critical mass that is 
needed in order to change people’s orientation from cash transactions. In addition to 
providing a cashless wallet within the banking system, the scheme is also expected to 
facilitate and improve inter and intra-bank communication as well as developing an all­
industry standard in smart card implementation47. To facilitate the implementation, a joint- 
stock company called Smartcard Nigeria Pic was incorporated to work in conjunction with a 
UK-based smart card software company (Card Services International) to provide the 
software and with IBM to provide the hardware.
4.3.3.6 Inter-connectivity and money transfer
Increasingly banks are connecting their branches to achieve “networked banking”, where a 
customer of a branch can transact business in another branch different from where the 
account was held48. The aim is to have a situation where customers would be customers of 
the bank and not of a branch. This was seen as easing the problem of doing business across
46 See, “UBA to introduce new product” (The Guardian, April 2, 1999)
47 See, “VALUECARD: How 26 banks changed the face o f money mart” (Vanguard, June 21, 1999)
48 See “Technology comes into banking hall” (The Guardian, March 5, 1997)
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the country and the need to move huge sums of money around. The increasing 
interconnectivity is further complemented by an increasing focus on local and international 
money transfer schemes. Aided by the implementation of private networks, based on the 
Very Small Apperture Terminal (VSAT) technology, banks are able to take part in the 
money transfer business49. Quite a large number of banks are taking part in this business 
with numerous schemes and agreements signed with both local and foreign partners. UBA 
in 1999 introduced the UBAQuicash local money transfer alongside the Moneygram 
scheme, which is the international version50. Other such arrangements is First Bank’s joint 
venture with Western Union Financial Services International to transfer funds locally with 
the Domestic Western Union Money Transfer (DWUMT) and its international version of 
Western Union Money Transfer (WUMT)51. All States Bank has also recently launched its 
own version of money transfer with Vigo Remittance Service and Union Bank recently 
launched its local money transfer scheme called Stallion Express to operate alongside the 
international version with Vigo International money transfer52.
4.3.3.7 Focus on improving the professionalism of staff
These various changes have therefore meant that banks would need to improve on the 
quality and professionalism of their staff. For instance, appreciating the role of technology in 
banking would require staff who understand the technology in relation to how the bank 
operates, and to improve customer service would require staff who are able to nurture and 
sustain a good relationship with customers. In addition, manpower development within the 
banking industry has also been seen to be important to prevent a repeat of the crisis which 
the system suffered after liberalisation. To this end, banks have increasingly focused on 
developing the requisite manpower to sustain these changes and encourage further 
development of the industry53. To develop these skills, banks are introducing seminars and 
training schemes organised by foreign academics and banking professional54 with a view to
49 See, “Domestic money transfer: CBN approval stirs up stiff competition” (Vanguard, February 22, 1999)
50 See “UBA to introduce new product” (The Guardian, April 2, 1999)
51 See, “First bank’s domestic western union takes o f f ’ (Vanguard 21 June, 1999)
52 See, “Union bank introduces local money transfer” (The Guardian, March 30, 1999)
53 See, “Afribank tests 7,000 graduates for jobs” (The Guardian, June 29, 1999)
54 See, “First Bank holds seminar” (The Guardian, June 7, 1999)
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improving the professionalism of staff and preparing staff for the challenges ahead55. Banks 
are also laying off staff and recruiting new ones both locally and from abroad with a view to 
strengthening the stock of skilled and professional staff within their ranks56. Such major 
revamp of staff profile covers the entire rank and file of staff ranging from tellers to chief 
executives57.
4.3.4 Discussion: The (Re) Institutionalisation of the Nigerian banking industry
Relating these developments to the wider banking context, clearly there are similarities 
and differences between the Nigerian banking industry and the global banking context. 
Similar to the global context, the Nigerian banking industry, pre-deregulation, was a 
highly stable industry dominated by only a small number of big banks. However, after 
deregulation, the number of operating banks in the industry increased dramatically and 
the level of competition increased further with the increasing presence of foreign banks. 
Bank customers’ expectations also increased and customers started demanding for an 
improved quality of service from their banks. Similarly, in Nigeria the increased level of 
competition was accompanied by aggressive marketing techniques, especially from the 
new generation banks, which in their quest to win more customers, started giving high 
interest rates to customers. In addition, these new banks brought in a new dimension of 
technology-based service delivery and products. The older banks, in the face of heavy 
competition and dwindling resources, sought new and better ways to serve their 
customers, which led to an increase in the use of technology by these banks.
It can thus be said that Nigerian bankers are increasingly appreciating the central 
importance of technology in banking services. A number of institutions, both local and 
foreign, are found to be active in influencing the adoption of IT within the banking 
sector. This description of the national environment of banks in Nigeria suggests an 
increased level of investment in IT since liberalisation:
55 See, “Banks prepare workers for millennial challenge” (The Guardian, February 24, 1999)
56 See, “Union bank retires 27 top managers” (Vanguard, September 24, 1999)
57 See, “Banks shop for Chief Executives” (Post Express, May 28, 1999)
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“The basis of competing within the industry has since changed from just a focus on people and 
process to a more technology-based approach. Every bank in Nigeria today now knows that to 
survive the turbulence of the environment they have got to be able to provide on-line, real-time 
banking for their customers. In addition to this, the focus on people has also shifted from quantity to 
quality, in the form of dedicated, knowledgeable and empowered staff’.
(CEO of an old generation bank)
An increasing number of banks are computerising their operations and in addition are 
linking branches in a WAN to offer customers a unified banking system, whereby 
customers can go into any branch and transact business. In addition to this is an increase 
in the number and quality of financial services and products on offer. Products such as 
cheque guarantee cards and other plastic based payment systems, aimed to reduce the 
dependence on cash and its attendant problems, have been highly welcomed in the 
country. Banks are also taking advantage of the interconnectivity between their branches 
to offer various money transfer schemes to customers both nationally and internationally. 
To manage and sustain these developments, banks are increasingly focusing on staff 
development and training, with a view to introducing a more professional and competent 
set of staff. Seminars, local training schemes and overseas training were all identified as 
means through which banks are developing their staff to meet up to the challenges of the 
industry and to forge closer ties with their customers.
These various developments are being encouraged or supported by both local and 
international IT/management consultants. Consulting firms were found to be very active 
within the Nigerian business context in general, and the banking system in particular. It 
has become fashionable for banks to employ the services of consulting firms, as this 
would show customers that they (the banks) are serious, responsible and modem. 
Consultants are also a major source of knowledge about the change initiatives taking 
place within the industry. In addition to being a source of information, consultants have 
also been involved in the implementation of major change programmes. Similar to 
consultants, the activities of software vendors have also increased with the growth in IT 
investment. A substantial number of banking applications are developed outside the 
country by international IT vendors like International Computers Limited (ICL), Unisys, 
Temenos UK and International Computer Systems (ICS) UK. In supporting their
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applications, some vendors have a local presence in Nigeria while in other cases, banks 
contact the foreign offices of vendors who send in their representatives to maintain the 
software.
The choice of technology and technology-based products and services, therefore, depend 
to a large extent on the prescriptions of IT/software vendors, peer pressures, prescriptions 
of IT/management consultants and the dictates of the regulatory authorities. The net 
effect of this is that banks in Nigeria are highly dependent on a number of similar sources 
of support for their vital resources. This in turn breeds some measure of similarity which 
is quite evident from the computerisation efforts of banks and the various IT-based 
changes and products being developed within the industry. This has created what we can 
describe as a 'family resemblance' (Kiely, 1998) in the computerisation efforts of banks 
and evidently in the type of banking products being introduced58.
A number of banks in the country have begun developing Internet sites while others 
indicated a strong desire to do same, as they believe it will promote the image of their 
banks. However, the implication of this is that banks may end up spending huge sums of 
money and other resources on technologies that hardly meet the demands of their specific 
context and the needs of their customers. A recent survey conducted to find out what 
factors influence customers' choice of bank in Nigeria revealed that "modem office 
technology" came 7th (out of 10) after other factors such as security of deposits, quality 
of management and proximity of locations (Ogbechie 1996).
Thus, the institutional context of banks in Nigeria suggests an increased level of 
interaction between banks and regulatory authorities, retailers and supporting institutions 
such as IT/management consultants and IT vendors. In addition, banks are increasingly 
working with each other, with retailers and co-operating more with IT vendors and 
consultants both local and foreign59. Banks have also come to the realisation that one
58 See, “Financial Products and the Image o f Banks” (The Guardian, March 29, 1998)
59 See, “Smart card experts visit Nigeria” (Vanguard, June 23, 1999)
122
major problem within the Nigerian banking system that needs to be tackled is the over 
reliance on cash within the economy. According to the CEO of Smartcard Nigeria Pic:
“The electronic purse we are introducing now is only the first step on a thorough process 
modernisation of the technical and financial structures and practices in the country. The 
[Smartcard] project has been made possible because banks decided to co-operate in an 
unprecedented move of solidarity and commonsense”.
Consequently, inter-organisational structures of coalition are being developed with the 
setting up committees that include representatives from each bank. These committees 
meet regularly to define the scope and model of the smartcard project. This close 
relationship between banks is rather an uncharted territory within the banking sector.
From an institutional point of view therefore, the various developments could be regarded 
as a form of institutionalisation of the Nigerian banking sector. Viewed from within the 
globalisation discourse, it could also be seen as a form of de-institutionalisation and re­
institutionalisation (Jepperson, 1991) of the Nigerian banking system. De­
institutionalisation being an exit from an organising principle based on caution, 
conservatism and on tradition. Some of these traditions include the poor service delivery 
culture and the “armchair banking” which Nigerian banks were so commonly known for. 
However, some re-institutionalisation is taking place. Influenced by changes at the global 
level, the industry is now organised on new sets of principles based on service quality, 
timely and accurate information, increased co-operation and technology input. To sustain 
this new image, the industry has responded accordingly with a set of new rules and 
procedures that have seen banking in Nigeria incorporate new global procedures and 
practices into their structures. Banks in Nigeria now have vibrant marketing and 
advertising departments charged solely with the responsibility of building and sustaining 
relationships with customers. There is an increased investment in IT - leading to the 
introduction of the unified banking platform in most banks, new technology-based 
payment systems as well as an improved focus on manpower development to sustain 
these various initiatives.
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However, despite the incorporation of global practices, major differences still exist in the 
acceptance level of some of these practices within the Nigerian context. New technology- 
based products such as Electronic Home and Office-Based Systems (EHOBs), Magnetic 
Ink Character Recognition (MICR), Smart Cards and ATMs, are increasingly been 
implemented in the country. However, the level of acceptance of some of these 
technologies varies. While smart cards are increasingly being implemented, ATMs have 
been tried with very little success. Similarly, because the use of cash has come to be 
institutionalised within the payment systems of the country, despite the increasing use of 
plastic mode of payments, the Nigerian economy is still predominantly cash-based:
“The Nigerian economic environment is purely a cash system. It is not uncommon to see 
customers coming into the bank wanting to withdraw One million Naira in cash; perhaps to buy a 
car and the car dealer wanted cash. The customer has no choice but to collect the money and lock 
it in his car. This is very much unlike what we have in other economies whereby a withdrawal of 
such magnitude would generate a lot of controversy and a lot of eyebrows would be raised. This, 
in a way, is also a reflection of the confidence that people have in bank instruments such as 
cheques and bank drafts. Although we have laws guiding the issuance and use of these facilities, 
people still believe that these laws are not stringent enough and their enforcement is also very 
poor. People are therefore very reluctant to use or accept them; they will rather accept cash and 
prevent the headache of bad cheques and the argument that follows”.
(Senior Manager of a ‘new’ generation bank)
As a result, an innovation like smart card can become attractive - in an environment like 
Nigeria - in view of the attendant problems (risks, inconvenience and security) associated 
with the use of cash and as a result of the high rate of inflation. This high rate of inflation 
has consequently led to a decline in the value of the local currency and has therefore 
made it imperative for people to carry huge sums of money around to carry out even the 
most basic of transactions. These same reasons of security and risks have made the use of 
ATMs rather limited, due to the risks associated with the use of such machines, especially 
in the evenings and out-of-office hours. Also the high rate of inflation, coupled with the 
small currency denominations, have made ATMs a less attractive option for banks. In the 
words of an IT Director in a new generation bank:
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“Giving the importance and popularity of ATMs in the banking world, we discussed the idea of 
installing ATMs in all our branches nationwide but we had to shelve the original plan of installing 
outside ATMs given the security fears in the country and the problem of vandalism. So we 
decided that instead of having outside ATMs perhaps we should install them inside the banking 
halls for quick service to customers who do not really need to see a teller. But even this plan had 
to be reconsidered given the state of our economy and the inflationary pressures on our economy. 
In addition to this, the highest currency denomination in Nigeria is 50 Naira which, coupled with 
the inflation, makes it unworthy to install ATMs”60.
Also, the heavy reliance on cash, coupled with the poor telecommunications 
infrastructure, still makes branch banking quite popular within the country. According to 
a manager interviewed:
“Some of our customers required that we are close to them because to remain competitive you 
need to be close to the customer. This is because of the difficulty of travelling several miles to 
transact business. Given transportation problems and traffic situation, plus the added risk of 
carrying huge sums of money all over the place, you really need to be close to them. So the issue 
of proximity to customer is an important one for us”.
Unlike in the advanced economies where technology is replacing the need for geographic 
presence, in Nigeria, proximity to customers is still very much a part of the business 
strategy of banks. This shows the importance of the local environment in shaping the type 
of changes taking place in the industry and the argument that organisational forms are not 
equally adapted to all environments (Aldrich, 1979:17). Environmental selection favours 
the use of cash and smart cards in the Nigerian environment, at the expense of ATMs.
4.4 Summary
In sum, the deregulation of the economy and the subsequent liberalisation of the banking 
sector were new experiences that brought a great deal of anxiety both for industry 
operators and regulators in Nigeria. Bank management were confronted with a big hurdle 
to win back the trust of customers, who in the aftermath of a financial crisis in the 
immediate post-liberalisation era, became weary of the banking system. As a result, there 
have been several attempts by management to devise strategies to manage the ensuing
60 The government recently announced plans to introduced higher denominations o f 100, 200 and 500 
Naira, which banks hope would ease some o f the problems associated with the use o f ATMs.
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change and to try to institute some stability into the system. Management are increasingly 
focusing on changing the image of their banks, developing staff profile by bringing in a 
higher level of professionalism into the industry and improving the quality of service they 
offer to customers. A lot of energy is also going into computerising bank branches and 
winning back the confidence of customers. The increasing use of IT in Nigerian banks 
represents a huge change for management and with it, the additional responsibility of 
managing such change. Management are faced with a plethora of banking technology and 
products/services, majority of which have been brought into the country either by foreign 
banks now operating in the country or international IT vendors and management 
consultants who now work very closely with banks.
It is against this background that individual bank management instituted a number of 
“reorganisation” and “repositioning” initiatives aimed to gear up their respective banks in 
the face of an increasingly competitive environment. Such initiatives would demand that 
management possess the necessary expertise to implement these changes innovatively in 
order to have any meaningful impact on the local context. A highly teleological approach to 
technology implementation could mean a focus on technology as the appropriate strategy, 
and consequently, a neglect or inappropriate understanding of the local context and the 
needs of the local context. It could also mean an uncritical acceptance of models and 
techniques from different contexts in the quest to implement the ‘best technology’ and 
upgrade operations in order to stay competitive. While evidence from this chapter suggests 
that in response to the changes in the environment, banks are undertaking restructuring 
exercises, the exact nature and composition of such change initiatives in individual 
organisations and the factors driving them have not been adequately accounted for. It is to 
such task that the remainder of this thesis is devoted. In chapter 5, we examine the 
restructuring efforts of Wema bank Pic and UBA Pic respectively.
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Chapter 5
Empirical investigation into the implementation of 
information technology-based change programmes
5.1 Introduction
The case studies described in this chapter concerns the implementation of planned 
technology-based organisational change programme in two ‘old generation’ banks in 
Nigeria. The change initiatives are the culmination of earlier attempts by the banks to 
transform themselves from regional, government-owned banks, to banks with national 
outlook and to become major players within the industry. At the time of data collection, 
the programmes were well advanced in implementation and a substantial amount of 
human, physical and financial resources had been committed to the projects. They 
therefore provide us with illustrations of how Nigerian banks are changing in response to 
global pressures of deregulation and liberalisation, and how they are using technology in 
this change process.
5.2 Access to case study sites - a confessional tale
The difficulty of gaining access to case study sites and getting informants to co-operate 
has often been discussed in studies employing the case study strategy (Grant, 1996). In 
this research, similar situations were encountered, first during the initial fieldwork, and 
also during the second field trip. At first, informants were very reluctant in exposing their 
organisations, for fear of revealing “important strategic secrets” especially given the 
changes taking place within the banking industry and the political deadlock within the 
country61. This was further compounded by the fact that the researcher, though a 
Nigerian, does not live in the country and most of the access negotiations being
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undertaken were with low to middle-level bank officials. This problem was however 
eased, to some extent, by a personal introduction from one of the Deputy Governors (DG) 
of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) whose son was a former tutee of the researcher. 
Through the DG’s introduction, the researcher was able to gain access to the banks either 
through the Chairman or the Chief Executive Office (CEO). These higher level contacts 
no doubt eased subsequent access to banks.
After the initial problems with getting access, it was also discovered that informants were 
not used to doing case study interviews and thus committing substantial amount of time 
to a research whose benefit are not immediately apparent to them. In the two banks, and 
indeed in others sites visited during the pilot study, officials would rather have 
questionnaires that they can fill out in their own time and at their own pace. An important 
factor, which in our view may have influenced this reluctance, is the share scale of work 
involved in the restructuring exercises going on in the banks as well as the resulting high 
level of uncertainty, given the wide-ranging changes that are taking place within the 
banks.
At UBA, over half of the workforce had just been sacked as a result of the restructuring 
initiative. Consequently, staff were very careful of what they say and wary of ‘putting 
any foot wrong’. Several times during interviews for the case study, informants will 
request that the interviewer switch off the tape recorder before giving an answer to a 
question or discussing a particular issue. Therefore, interviews at this particular bank 
were short and interviewees’ responses were somewhat ‘guarded’; thus requiring a great 
deal of patience on the part of the researcher and more visits to the bank than to the other 
case study site. A total of 18 interviews, lasting between 45 minutes and an hour, were 
conducted in this case study site over the entire length of the field trip. Interviews with 
the consultants also did not fare any better. Initially, the consultants were reluctant to 
discuss their work and “reveal top business strategies” given that the reengineering 
initiatives, which the researcher was interested in, were “important competitive tools” for
61 See chapter one and the section on ‘data collection and analysis’ for more on the influence o f the political 
situation in the country during the fieldworks
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consultants within the Nigerian business environment. It took a personal introduction 
from an Executive Director in one of the case study banks (Wema Bank) and a similar 
introduction from a former tutee of the researcher, who works as a consultant with the 
consulting firm, before access was granted.
The experience of collecting data in Wema bank was mixed and alternates between initial 
reluctance and total co-operation. This co-operation did not come about easily. It took a 
lot of patience, and at one stage informants had to be instigated into discussing the 
implementation process when it was suggested by the researcher that the implementation 
had taken place without any input from bank staff; implying that bank staff were handed 
down plans and instructions which they blindly follow even when they do not agree with 
such plans or instructions. This provoked some reaction in the informants and it opened 
up a floodgate of stories of how and where they had to “correct” the consultants - and 
management - because they did not understand the way the bank or the branch operates. 
Over a two-month period 12 interviews, averaging about 2 hours each, were held at this 
case study bank.
5.3 Reorganisation through “Reengineering”: WEMA Bank Case Study
“Reengineering is part of the on-going implementation of Wema bank’s strategic plan that has 
transformed the bank into a major player in the banking industry. It is a bold attempt at creating a 
sample of future Wema branch (from Wema bank internal document2).”
The first case study described is Wema bank’s Branch Process Reengineering (BPR) 
programme. In presenting the case study, we first present the inner (organisational) 
context within which the restructuring programme took place before going on to examine 
how the inner and outer and contexts influenced, and are influenced, by the process of 
change (see table 5.1).
62 “Reengineering Overview”, Wema Bank BPR Team.
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5.3.1 Organisational context
5.3.1.1 Wema Bank Pic: historical context
As at December 1998, Wema Bank Pic had a capital base of 519 million Naira63, its total 
asset stood at 17 billion Naira, which made it the ninth largest bank in the country, with 
about 1,789 employees. Domestic commercial banking is one of the bank’s major 
business and its total local deposit base stood at 13 billion Naira or 4% of the market. In a 
1999 survey by a firm of financial analysts, the bank was given “A” rating to signify a 
‘sound financial standing and a strong capacity to meet its obligation’ (Agusto and Co., 
1998). However, the story of Wema Bank Pic is far from straightforward (See Table 5.3).
Wema Bank Pic. was formed in 1945 by a group of Nigerian private investors. It was 
among a number of banks that were established during this period as a direct response to 
allegations of anti-Nigerian activities levelled against colonial banks operating in the 
country. The bank was established under the name of Agbonmagbe Bank, with the sole 
aim of assisting indigenous business men and women who were discriminated against in 
the provision of credit facilities by expatriate banks (Adegbite, 1994). Since these heady 
days of pre-independent Nigeria, the bank has not only grown, but it has also firmly 
established itself as one of the key players in Nigeria’s financial market. As at December 
1999, Wema Bank was the only surviving indigenous bank in Nigeria and the only 
surviving member of its generation.
During its early years, the bank was beset with a number of problems which new banks 
of its generation faced - lack of a strong management and an inadequate capital base. In 
order to keep the bank afloat, it received a lot of support and grant from the government 
of the defunct Western region of Nigeria. This was to enable the bank to meet its 
obligation of providing credit facilities to local businessmen, and perhaps, as a kind of 
face-saving measure in view of the patriotic motive behind its establishment. In fact, the 
massive injection of public funds has been attributed as one of the main reasons why the 
bank survived the turbulent years of its infancy (Adegbite, 1994). A statement by the then
63 110 Naira = U.S. $1 (2000)
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Premier of the old Western Region64 clearly shows the intent of the government vis-a-vis 
the new indigenous banks:
“The government intends to pursue vigorously its policy of giving financial assistance to 
indigenous banks so that they be better able to provide credit facilities to Nigerian businessmen 
and women and others who have profitable projects on which to invest the funds”.
Government awarded the bank a grant of £200,000 through the Western Marketing 
Board, 40% of which was later converted to equity. Consequently, this made the 
government of the old western region the largest shareholder in the bank. In 1969, 
government bought over and took full control of the bank. By 1970, its name had 
changed to Wema to reflect the full extent of government involvement, as the name 
WEMA is an acronym for Western Marketing Association - which was a government- 
owned marketing association. This increased government involvement had two effects on 
the bank. First it strengthened its capital base as government injected more funds; and 
second, it increased patronage from the ordinary public, especially from the people of the 
western region, as they saw the increased government involvement with the bank as a 
confidence booster.
The western region of Nigeria as at this time was well known for its agricultural prowess 
and especially in the production of cocoa, which was sold abroad. This generated a 
considerable income for both the country, and the western region, a substantial part of 
which Wema bank benefited from, because several of the cocoa farmers patronised the 
bank. However, this was to put the tag of a regional bank on Wema as it became 
synonymous with cocoa farming and with the western government of Nigeria.
In 1990, the bank was privatised65 in response to the increased level of competition within 
the industry following the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
and the consequent liberalisation of the banking industry. With Privatisation, the 
ownership structure of the bank changed to 60% private ownership and 40% ownership 
by O’dua Investment Company, jointly owned by the governments of 5 western states of
64 Quoted in Adegbite (1994).
65 Wema bank was among the first set o f old generation banks in the country to go private.
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Nigeria. As stated in a company communique, the decision to go public was informed, 
amongst others, by the need to strengthen the capital base of the bank, to raise necessary 
funds for computerisation and for expansion and growth. Consequently, its branch 
network increased from about 25 before privatisation to 70 branches by 1994. According 
to the Chief Executive of the bank, this expansion was needed to increase its presence 
across the country and to “somewhat remove the stigma of being referred to as a regional 
bank”. As at December 1999, the bank had 75 branches and 5 area offices nation-wide. 
However, of the total 80 branches (including area offices), 68 (or 90%) are located in the 
Western part of the country, and 21 of its branches are located in ‘rural’ areas.
5.3.1.2 Organisation of ITfunction at Wema bank
Wema bank’s IT department came into being in 1987 with the establishment of the Data 
Processing (DP) unit; prior to this period the bank had been operating manually. At its 
inception, the DP unit was charged with the twin objective of computerising the 
operations of the bank and developing the bank’s computerisation strategy. The 
Information Technology (IT) Department is headed by a Principal Manager (PM) - a 
Computer Science and MBA graduate from the University of Lagos, who has also been 
working in the IT department since its inception in 1987. The PM reports directly to an 
Executive Director in charge of Operations and Information Systems. The IT department 
is made up of the Systems and Operations units. The systems unit - with a total of 18 staff 
- comprises the information systems team, the engineering team and the systems 
development team. The operations unit has 12 staff and it is made up of the operations 
and the administration team. The systems development team is involved in systems 
implementation, user liaison, training, and help desk. Engineering deals with networks 
and the maintenance of hardware at the Head Office.
Essentially, when the department was first established the bulk of the staff were mainly 
programmers and software developers with no hardware engineers. Given this lack of 
expertise in hardware maintenance and given the size of the branch network, the decision 
was reached then to outsource maintenance of hardware and equipment in all the 
branches and at the head office to an external vendor. However, with the increasing focus
on computerisation at the head office and the move to automating back office operations, 
it was decided to have an in-house hardware maintenance team that are able to respond 
quicker to the needs of the bank. Therefore in 1997, the engineering unit was set up to 
handle all the hardware and network-related problems that the bank might have. 
However, the maintenance of hardware and network problems at the branches still remain 
with the vendor as it was felt that the small and relatively inexperienced engineering 
department would not be able to handle hardware maintenance in all the 80 branches. 
Software maintenance, on the other hand, is handled internally both for the Head Office 
and the branches as the bulk of the staff within the department, historically have been 
programmers and software engineers.
The process of selecting and implementing new IT systems within the bank is designated 
to an IT steering committee headed by the MD/CEO. Monthly, the committee meets to 
review the bank’s IT plan and to appraise the long-term direction of the bank, with 
regards to IT. Any decision that has to be taken, that would change the strategic focus of 
the bank, is a collective effort of the steering committee. This committee is made up of all 
the Directors of the bank, the Head of IT, all sectional heads within the IT department 
and all other key operational staff in other departments. Occasionally, consultants are 
invited in to come and review IT plans, processes and procedures if there is a need for it 
and to make suggestions. Clearly, there has been a shift in the importance of IT to the 
bank: starting from being regarded as a support function - where strategy formulation was 
carried out by the Data Processing unit - to one of strategic importance involving all 
board-level directors and senior managers in the decision-making process.
5.3.1.3 Previous experience with computerisation
Wema bank’s first IT project involved the procurement of a banking application software 
called Customer Accounting Package (CAPs) in 1987. CAPs was installed at the Head 
Office and was running on a mini computer, in a batch mode. Essentially, this meant that 
branches would batch their vouchers at the end of every day to the central computing 
centre at the Head Office for processing and to generate reports for the next day’s 
business. This practice was carried on for 3 years until in 1989-90 when, in accordance
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with the wind of change blowing over the industry, the bank started installing CAPs in 
some of its branches. However, these systems were "single user systems" whereby only 
one person can run the system at any given point. In 1991, the system was changed to a 
“multi-user” environment, which was seen as essential to accommodate the increase in 
the amount of processing carried out in branches. It was also in response to the changing 
environment of computing within the industry as a result of the new IT systems being 
implemented by the new generation banks. Wema started using a new application 
software called Globus in 1995 as part of a major restructuring exercise contained in the 
2nd Strategic Plan. The software - developed by a UK software company called Temenos 
Systems UK - is marketed and supported in Nigeria by Inlaks Computers Ltd, a 
subsidiary of Unisys. By mid 1999, Globus had been installed in 12 branches with 
another 8 expected to be converted before the end of that year. The majority of branches 
still run CAPs while some branches do not have computer systems at all.
In conjunction with the installation of Globus, and as part of the branch reengineering 
exercise, the bank started linking up some of its branches in a wide area network (WAN) 
for the purpose of achieving on-line, real-time processing. By mid 1999, 8 of its branches 
had already been linked together. To achieve this connectivity, the bank uses Very Small 
Apperture Terminals (VSAT), radio links and telephone/dial-up links. In addition, a new 
policy of putting all new urban branches on the network from inception was put in place 
as part of the bank’s IT strategy.
Thus, the history of computerisation in the bank has witnessed a steady progression from 
batch-mode processing at the head office, on to single-user systems installed in selected 
branches. By the time competition started “hotting” up within the industry, the bank 
migrated to a multi-user environment which at the time was becoming the norm of 
computerisation within the industry as a result of the efforts of the new generation of 
banks. By the mid-1990s, the bank had to change its focus again. A new application 
package (Globus), used by a substantial number of banks66, and which at that time was 
regarded as one of the best in the industry, was procured for the bank. This was done
66 See, “Eleven banks join Globus group” (Vanguard, 29 March, 1999)
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simultaneously with linking up some of its branches in a WAN for the purpose of unified 
banking. Unified banking, in line with developments in the international context, was 
also was becoming the norm within the Nigerian banking system as new generation 
banks have it as standard to link up all their (comparatively smaller number of) branches. 
In addition, we see a corresponding upgrade in the status of the IT department from being 
a mere support unit to one with a board-level director at the helm. Also, IT policies 
moved from the domain of the IT department to involving all directors and operational 
heads.
5.3.1.4 Structure and culture o f branches at Wema bank
The structure of Wema bank branches before re-engineering reflects an organisation 
highly structured along functional lines, with the Branch Manager wielding tremendous 
power in the running of the branches. In addition, there was a lot of segregation of duties 
and roles were fragmented along functional lines (see Appendix II). For instance, cashiers 
in one department (i.e. Savings Department) are not allowed to attend to customers in 
other departments (such as current accounts) and are thus restricted to carry out 
transactions related only to their units. Similarly, in the area of opening new accounts, 
different members of staff handles different types of account and each is only restricted to 
their units. So, for instance, savings cashiers are allowed to open only savings accounts 
and current cashiers could open only current accounts.
The effects of these have been a highly cumbersome process of banking and a sub- 
optimal use of staff. A lot of time was wasted in carrying out basic transactions such as 
the checking of customer accounts. Stories were told of how there would be a long queue 
in the savings section with virtually no current account customers in sight. Because 
cashiers are not allowed to cross functions, cashiers sit idle in their cubicles while savings 
customers wait for several hours to carry out their businesses. Given the fact that these 
units operate separately, there were serious duplication of processes between the current 
and savings sections. The net result was an inefficient workflow and a highly sub-optimal 
job design, a highly burdened and disillusioned team of workers who worked in a rather 
strict environment. Cashiers, for instance, were put in cage-like structures where they had
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little interaction with other members of staff and with the customers. In addition, cashiers 
job was purely mundane with the implication that cashiers were not allowed to pay out 
any amount of money (even as little as 1 Naira) without seeking approval from a 
supervisor. All these add to the already cumbersome process of branch banking at Wema 
Bank plus the added stress of a poor delivery response time.
An implication of this was a poor bank-customer relationship, where staff had no desire 
in establishing any relationships with customers except for their personal gains. 
According to a manager in Organisation and Methods Unit (O&M), “similar to most 
other banks pre-liberalisation, the bank was run more like a government agency and not 
as a business entity”. The sort of relationship that existed between banks and customers 
was described as “armchair banking” because customers had very little choice. The 
average length of time for transacting business within the branch was between 2 - 3  
hours, even for simple transactions such as checking account balance or for cash 
withdrawal. Banking was regarded as a full day’s business with people depositing their 
cheques in the morning on their way to work and returning several hours later (probably 
during lunch breaks) to complete the process. This discouraged customers from keeping 
money in banks and it encouraged a practice known in local parlance as “man know 
man”. By this practice, a customer sees it as important to make friends with one of the 
branch staff to be able to get through the cumbersome process of banking - in return for 
some form of gratification. Customers who are unfortunate enough not to know anyone
f in  9
are thus made to suffer, as they are the ones who spend hours in the bank . A side effect 
of this practice is the lack of orderliness in bank branches and the absence of a queue 
culture. Given the fact that banking transactions are based on who a customer knows, 
there was therefore no reason, as far as customers are concerned, to queue up in order to 
be served.
67 An advert in the local press paints this picture quite clearly where a customer came to the bank with his 
folded chair because he knew it was going to be a long wait and all the seats in the branch would have been 
occupied.
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5.3,2 Planned change initiatives at Wema Bank Pic
5.3.2.1 The First Strategic Plan
For most of the 1980s, Wema bank continued to face a huge survival battle in spite of 
continued injection of funds by the western government. The bank did not record its first 
substantial profit until 1988, and it was not until 1989 that it was able to declare its first 
dividends. By this time, competition was becoming tougher within the industry following 
the deregulation of the economy and the liberalisation of the banking sector. As a direct 
response to this increased level of competition, the management of the bank sought to put 
some strategies in place in order for the bank to continue to be a key player within the 
industry.
To bring this to reality, the CEO at the time approached the management of the 
government-owned majority shareholding company -O’dua Investment Company 
Limited - in June 1988 to obtain their support in having a strategic plan for the bank. The 
benefits of having such a plan were listed by the CEO to the Board of the company as 
including:
(1) an opportunity for the bank to create an identity in the banking industry;
(2) improved ability to safeguard shareholder’s assets
(3) an opportunity to rejuvenate staff;
(4) an opportunity to win more customers; and
(5) an opportunity to develop specialised skills to handle sophisticated financial products.
In October 1988, the Board approved the appointment of a group of management 
consultants to handle this project. Work on the Plan started in May 1989 between the 
consultants and members of Wema Bank Pic and by the end of August 1989, the team 
came up with the bank’s first strategic plan. The Plan consisted of a Mission Statement, 
Goals and Objectives, and Strategies and Action Steps that would be taken in achieving 
the objectives. These strategies and actions were aimed to guide the bank through the first 
strategic plan - which was to run between 1990 and 1992.
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The cardinal features of the Strategic Plan were based on achieving substantial level of 
change in three key areas, namely: Geographic Spread; Business Focus and Image 
Management. In focusing on these areas, the aim was to carry out a total overhaul of the 
way the bank was managed, to change its operational focus, its human resource 
capabilities and organisational culture. According to the CEO in a company report:
“If Wema Bank’s decision to move from being a primarily government-controlled and regional 
bank to that with a national outlook and coverage is to be realised, then a fundamental change in 
management approach and organisational culture is needed to be accomplished”.
A shift in geographic coverage was to see the bank open new branches in areas other than 
the Western part of the country from which it originates and from which about 90% of its 
current branches are located. Changing the business focus entails building and sustaining 
a viable marketing culture, which would portray an image of an urban bank and would 
ultimately bring in new sets of customers. This focus on bringing new sets of customers 
is reflected in the desire to move more into the corporate market sector and in the 
introduction of tailored products and services to fit the needs of this market. Finally, the 
focus on image management would see an increase in private ownership of the bank to 
60%, to further remove the tag of a government-controlled bank and thus improve its 
corporate standing. The sum total of these initiatives was “to see Wema rank amongst the 
top five banking institutions in Nigeria in terms of key industry indicator of size, 
financial performance, improved quality of service and overall corporate image” 
(Adegbite, 1994).
5.3.2.2 The Second Strategic Plan
The 1st Strategic Plan lasted till the end of 1992 after which it was replaced with the 2nd 
Strategic Plan in 1993. Aiming to build on some of the gains of the first phase, the bank 
identified as being of crucial importance, the task of “significantly improving retail 
banking efficiency”. In other words, to focus on a comprehensive restructuring of its 
branch activities to achieve better service delivery to its customers. This central aim of 
achieving better service delivery was based on the “statement of strategic intent” 
contained in the Plan which emphasised:
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(1) Quality service using modem technology
(2) Process re-design for improved customer service
(3) Improved quality, speed and responsiveness of customer service
(4) Aesthetics and location of branches
By emphasising these areas, the bank hopes to achieve a significant transformation of its 
branch activities. Five key areas were identified:
I. People - To have in its branches, a high performing, highly motivated, highly 
skilled and customer-oriented, courteous and friendly professionals.
II. Processes - A streamlined, customer-driven processes with a high technology 
input. Also to achieve efficient and effective computer-based controls, coupled 
with a set of empowered customer-contact personnel. In other words, to empower 
those members of branches who are in direct contact with customers.
ID. Technology - To achieve a high level of branch automation and to implement 
state-of-the-art communication technologies.
IV. Infrastructure - To have an aesthetically appealing work environment (branches) 
with a professional and corporate outlook.
V. Branch Management - To have a forward-looking management at the branch level 
who are able to foster closer and lasting relationship with customers and who are 
able to market the bank and its products effectively.
By the time the second Strategic Plan was launched in 1993, competition within the 
industry had heightened with the increased explosion in the number of operating banks. 
Perhaps of more consequence is the financial (and credibility) crisis the system suffered 
in the early 1990s. As a result of this crisis, more than 60 banks (old and new) were 
closed down by government as they were adjudged to be financially insolvent. A large 
number of customers lost money in the liquidated banks and vowed never to use banks 
again. Surviving banks - of which Wema was one -  had to find better ways of keeping 
existing customers and attracting new ones. Competition was also heightened up with the 
influx of foreign banks and new local banks with a mixture of expatriate and local staff.
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Table 5 : DYNAMICS OF CONTEXT/PROCESS INTERACTION -  WEMA BANK Pic.
PRE-RESTRUCTURING CONTEXT INFLUENCE OF CONTEXT ON BANK’S RESTRUCTURING EXERCISE
INFLUENCE OF BANK’S RESTRUCTURING ON 
CONTEXT
Liberalisation o f the Nigerian banking industry, 
which increased the number of operating banks.
Privatisation of Wema bank in 1990 to signal the beginning 
o f the restructuring process -  from a regional bank to a 
national bank
Increased attempt by the old generation banks to privatise; 
subsequent adoption o f Strategic Planning Initiatives
Increased use o f IT within the banking industry which 
coincided with the influx o f new banks (some are 
local affiliates o f  multi-national banks) with more 
advanced technology
Management consultants appointed to draft the bank’s 
strategic plans and guide the implementation process. 
Wema bank focused on using modem technology and 
“implementing state-of-the-art telecommunications 
technology
Bank restructuring became synonymous with Strategic Plans 
drafted by management consultants
O
U
Financial crisis and the consequent loss o f confidence 
in the banking system by customers who lost a great 
deal o f money
Search for new ways to serve customers led to the adoption 
o f BPR as a survival strategy to “at least keep its 
customers” and win the confidence of new ones
New banks embraced BPR as old bank customers went back 
to their former banks after reengineering. Customer service 
became the norm within the industry
O
U
1
E
R
Government regulations to increase banking activities 
in rural areas under the Rural Banking Scheme (RBS)
Branches established under the RBS - regarded as 
‘political’ branches - will not be reengineered. Adoption o f 
a three-tiered BPR
CBN plans to change the RBS to allow banks to sell off 
some rural branches to community banks; multi-layered 
approach to reengineering became the ‘norm’ within the 
industry
T
E
R
Increased focus on quality customer service to 
remove the problem o f “Armchair banking”
Introduction o f customer relationship management as an 
integral part o f BPR
Focus on marketing and customer relationship leading to the 
separation o f marketing from other banking activities
Little or no authorisation at branch level for cashiers Empower cashiers to pay out money and use computer- 
based controls
Cashiers given authorisation limits and job title changed to 
“Tellers” to reflect new roles
I
N
N
E
R
A rowdy banking hall due to a lack o f orderliness 
and queue culture leading to a practice referred to 
locally as “man know man”
Plan to give equal treatment to all customers and remove 
the need for ‘internal help’ in branches
Most bank customers started queuing up in branches to get 
served I
N
N
E
R
The tradition o f promoting a ‘Wema Family’ which 
had been a part o f  the bank’s HR policies
BPR implementation did not result in any massive layoff o f  
staff
A cautious approach to BPR implementation and the 
rationalisation o f staff; only staff in the twilight o f their 
careers were made redundant
The new banks employed aggressive marketing techniques and enticed customers with a 
lot of ‘sweeteners’ such as higher interest rates on deposits. For a while, the tactic worked 
as the market share of the old generation banks dwindled. The new banks also brought 
with them completely different approach to serving customers and a more advanced level 
of computerisation to what existed previously. Some of these approaches to customer 
service and computerisation was to later become the ‘standard’ within the industry. 
Existing old bank customers, seeing what obtains in these new banks, started asking their 
banks for the same level and quality of service -  which therefore meant that banks like 
Wema had to change. According to the Corporate Affairs Manager:
“With deregulation and liberalisation, things began to change when new banks started springing up. 
Some people refer to the new banks as ‘yuppie’ banks because these banks came around with a lot of 
technology input and so the competition began. The older banks, of which Wema is one, had no 
choice but to sit down and start thinking about what we need to do at least to keep our customers”
It was therefore not surprising to find that the main focus of Wema bank’s 2nd strategic 
plan was to improve retail banking efficiency with a view to increasing, or at least 
maintaining, its share of the domestic retail market. It is also worth noting that by now 
the bank had started talking about “using modem technology” and “implementing state- 
of-the-art telecommunications technologies”. This is because the period of the 2nd 
strategic plan coincided with the period of increased IT input from new generation banks.
5 3 .2 3  The BPR initiative
The main thrust of the 2nd plan was a comprehensive restructuring of branch activities to 
achieve better service delivery to customers. Implementation of this plan focused mainly 
on a Branch Process Re-engineering (BPR) project, which was commenced in 1995. The 
bank, like many others in the industry, decided to embark on process reengineering as a 
“survival” strategy in the face of dwindling margins, increased competition and growing 
sophistication of customer demands. In the words of a senior manager:
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“When the new banks came in and people started seeing things being done differently, they realised 
that the world is rather different. Also, a lot of people that travelled out of the country came back 
with their own experiences and expectations of what banking should look like. When they saw what 
the new banks were offering, words started going round that a new dawn has arrived for branch 
banking in Nigeria. As a result, old banks were forced to sit up in order not to be left behind.”
The BPR project was hinged on three smaller interrelated projects which were: branch 
computerisation, inter-connectivity and networking of branches in a Wide Area Network 
(WAN) and branch process redesign. In branch computerisation, it was recommended 
that the bank should aim to make more effective use of IT in branch operations and to 
automate some of its head office functions. New banking application software called 
Globus was to be installed along with new and powerful PCs on which to run the 
software. To aid inter-branch transactions, it was also recommended that branches should 
be linked up in a wide area network (WAN) as this has become the standard within the 
industry. With regards to branch process design, the aim was to achieve “quantum leap 
improvements in quality, speed, efficiency and effectiveness of customer delivery”. To 
achieve this aim, it was recommended that major changes in branch operations, including 
a complete overhaul of staff profile, was to be undertaken. New sets of staff, mostly 
university graduates were to be employed to work in the reengineered branches.
The absence of a proper service culture in branches had led to a poor bank-customer 
relationship. This was attributed to the general culture of banking in Nigeria before 
deregulation. According to one branch manager interviewed:
“Prior to deregulation, the general thing within the banking industry here is what we call ‘armchair 
banking’ where bankers would sit down in their offices and expect customers to come around. Even 
when customers do, banks are not really bothered whether they really get service or not. There were 
few banks around and there was nothing like competition and so banks do what they like. If you 
compare what is happening in other countries- especially the advanced countries -  to the Nigerian 
situation, then we are not really practicing banking”.
Bank processes are regarded as cumbersome and a lot of time is spent transacting even the 
most basic banking function. The implication of this is that a lot of people were discouraged 
from using banking services and as such a substantial amount of cash lies outside of the 
banking system. Therefore to improve banking process, attention was focused mainly on 
three aspects of branch banking, namely to improve branch processes, to rearrange the 
organisation of branch management and to improve the infrastructures in branches.
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Processes were also characterised by inefficient workflow and unempowered personnel. 
Therefore it was decided to “empower” cashiers and give them some authorisation levels to 
allow cashiers to pay out cash (up to a level) without having to refer to a superior. This was 
aimed at reducing the long process of cashing cheques and cash transactions in general, 
when previously each cheque being cashed goes through almost four different authorisation 
levels. A new customer service point was to be established to take care of all non-cash 
transactions such as checking of accounts, which was previously done by cashiers.
To complement process changes in branches, it was also decided that branch infrastructures 
would be overhauled to complete the changes in branch banking. Previously cashiers were 
confined to sit in cage-like structures on their own with very little interactions with other 
staff and customers. To reflect the new focus on customer service, it was suggested that 
cages were removed and cashiers work in an open space with more interaction with 
customers and staff. This open platform was essentially seen as symbolising the new era of 
openness with which the bank wants to deal with its customers.
Finally, in addition to structural changes, changes in organisation and management of 
branches involve the changing of branch staff nomenclature and the reorganisation of roles 
and responsibilities. The roles and responsibilities of the two most senior personnel -  the 
Branch Manager and the Accountant -  were regarded as not been clearly defined. Therefore, 
a clear definition of duties in which the branch manager sheds most of the daily operations 
management duty to focus more on marketing-related duties was planned. The accountant 
will take on this responsibility and oversee the day-to-day management of branch 
operations. In addition, the title of the branch accountant would be changed to Branch 
Banking Operations Team Leader (BBOTL) to reflect their new role and cashiers’ title 
would be changed to Tellers to reflect their new status and widened responsibilities within 
the branch. These essentially were the changes management planned for restructuring Wema 
bank.
5.3.3 Implementing BPR: Decisions and actions taken to effect change
Once the plans had been laid out, institutional and resource-based factors influenced how
the plans were implemented. Some of these factors include the financial strength of the
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bank, the diversity of the bank’s branch network, which in turn had been influenced by 
government regulations in the form of the Rural Banking Scheme (RBS). As we observed 
in chapter 4, government -  through the RBS - had forced all banks to open a number of 
branches in rural areas, irrespective of whether such area was profitable to the bank or 
not. The implication of this was that the original plan of effectively utilising technology 
was downgraded to a pragmatic approach to reengineering and computerisation. 
According to the CEO:
“Although, we aim to invest in technology, we are not specifically aiming to lead the industry... 
We will be pragmatic as to the choice of technology and the extent of automation”.
In implementing the BPR initiative, the target of branch computerisation was to proceed 
with caution. Management appreciated that despite the importance of branches to its 
operations and despite the goal of “effectively utilising all branches and mobilising rural 
funds”; it could not computerise all of its branches. A resource-related factor given by 
management was the sheer cost of computerising the branches, the financial strength of the 
bank and the productivity of a branch. Given that it cost between 12 and 15 million Naira to 
implement the new banking software (Globus) in branches, the bank decided to introduce 
Globus only into those branches regarded as “strategic” in terms of volumes of transactions 
and contribution to the bank’s overall earnings. This means that a substantial number of 
branches - especially the ones regarded as “political branches” were excluded from the 
being computerised.
These “political” branches were those opened in compliance with government regulations 
under the RBS, that all banks should increase their presence in rural areas to encourage 
widespread banking. As a result, non-economic factors, from the bank’s point of view, 
informed the opening of these branches and they have been kept alive only because 
government would not permit their closure - even after the Rural Banking Scheme had 
been abolished.
Apart from government’s insistence on keeping the branches alive, close bank- 
community relations as well as inter-communal strife were also cited as reasons why the 
rural branches could not be closed down. Because the bank had been forced to open-up
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branches in rival communities due to the RBS, it became difficult to close or merge 
branches in these communities given the rivalry that exists between them. If the bank was 
to close down the branch in a community, the people of that community will resist going 
to the branch in the rival community. In the worst case scenario, it could lead to inter- 
communal clash as the community with a branch may perceive this as a sign of 
superiority - to the wrath of the other community. In other instances, the bank had 
enjoyed the hospitality of the people of the local community when starting business and 
thus forged a close bank-community ties which are not easily broken. According to the 
Corporate Affairs Manager:
“In one of our rural branches, the bank was offered a building free of charge by the community when 
we were about to open. Initially business was good and the bank enjoyed the good reception of the 
people. Now things are not so good but we still have to bear it, because when business was good they 
were good to us. These are the sort of situations that does not really allow you to take decisions as 
you would like to”.
Therefore, to avoid some of these problems, the bank had to keep the branches open and 
adopt “a careful and calculated approach to computerisation” and branch reengineering in 
general. The realisation was a three-tiered approach to reengineering where the BPR 
project addressed the diversity of branches in its network. The bank introduced new 
computer systems only in selected branches, and the level of restructuring that took place 
was based on the size of the branch, the volume of transaction, the types of customers and 
whether it was a rural or urban branch.
The actual process of implementation or “roll-out” (as it is referred to within the bank) 
started with the piloting of the project at two of the bank’s branches in Lagos followed by 
a period of phased-rollout to all the other branches. The two pilot sites were chosen for 
their size and for the volume of transactions conducted. In addition, management decided 
that it would be ideal to “try” this new idea in some branches before embarking on the 
implementation on a much larger scale. Another reason for piloting the project was the 
desire to try out the project in two different settings - computerised and manual - which 
typifies the diversity of branches within the bank’s branch network. Thus BPR was going
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to be introduced in a manual branch as well as in a computerised branch in line with the 
‘pragmatic approach’ of management.
Two sites - Otta and Dopemu branches - were chosen with Otta representing the manual 
branch and Dopemu representing the computerised branch as it was already using CAPs. 
Another important factor that informed the choice of Dopemu was that prior to the start 
of the project, a research study by a group of consultants had suggested that the branch 
had the highest volume of transactions of all bank branches in Lagos on a weekly basis. It 
was thus felt necessary to test the durability of the new procedures in a busy environment. 
Implementation at the pilot sites involved the team of management consultants taking a 
lead role in selecting new members of staff to man the branches and also in conducting 
training exercises for the new members of staff. Training focused on selling the idea of 
the project to the team and highlighting the benefits of restructuring existing procedures 
to both staff and customers.
After a period of about 6 months, the project was adjudged to have been successful at the 
pilot sites and as such could be “rolled-out” to other branches of the bank. The process of 
rolling out was to be conducted in phases with branches classified into zones to ease the 
burden of implementation. By now, it had been decided that the management consultants 
would no longer take the lead role in implementing the new procedures at the roll-out 
phase. Instead, a four-man implementation team - chosen from among members of staff 
who had undergone intensive training and worked under the new procedures at the pilot 
sites - was to take over from the management consultants and was expected to take the 
lead in the implementation process. Consequently, the role of the consultants was reduced 
to that of giving support to the implementation team to ensure that lessons learnt from the 
pilot sites were applied at the other sites. As the rollout progressed, the role of the 
consultants would be reduced further to a facilitative role and the implementation team 
was expected to be in full charge of the implementation (see Fig 1)
It was thus felt necessary to retain the services of the consultants to give the new 
implementation team some confidence in carrying out their tasks. According to
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management, the benefit of having an in-house team to take over from the consultants - 
besides cost reduction - was that it will help to speed up the process of assimilating the 
new culture o f work by members of staff. This decision was based on the assumption that 
because the implementation team handling the process were former branch staffs, they 
would be more informed about the workings of a bank branch.
Figure 2 : Wema Bank Pic. - Consultant involvement in implementation process
Involvem ent Level
Wema Team
take-over
understudy
^ ______________
facilitator
Consultants
Time
Source: Wema bank reengineering manual
The first phase of implementation involved a ‘period of roll-out with extensive 
assistance’. The rollout plan during this phase depended heavily on the dedicated 
implementation team which determined the extent of modification that was needed for 
the branch’s infrastructure, selected new staff and conducted training exercises for 
personnel on the new procedures. Finally, the team was expected to provide a “a hand- 
holding assistance” in the weeks following the conversion to the new procedures.
The next phase of the plan saw the implementation team acting only as facilitators, with 
branch officials such as bank managers and their assistants taking the lead role in the 
implementation process. At this stage, the expectation was that the new procedures would 
have been firmly entrenched in the system and that major issues associated with
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implementation would have been highlighted and ironed out. As a result, the branch 
manager and other officials would be in a much better position to take charge of 
procedures. Also to further help the branch manager before taking charge, a one-week 
seminar was held to introduce them to some of the basic ideas behind the project and the 
new work procedures. One of the main reasons for adopting this approach was the need 
to foster closer relationship between the manager and the rest of the staff who will be 
working together in the branch. The seminar was also expected to increase branch 
managers’ commitment, as they may view the project as their own and thus take it more 
seriously.
Implementation continued with the selection of staff to work in the newly restructured 
branches. Interviews were conducted to select entirely new teams to work in these 
branches. The thinking behind this was that restructuring a branch, and achieving the 
level of ‘rebirth’ needed, would entail a complete overhaul of personnel in each branch. 
Specifically, this was seen as needed to prevent a continuation of old practices where 
customers familiarise themselves with staff and give gratification, in order to speed up 
the process of getting service. In a restructured branch, this culture of ‘internal help’ was 
deemed unnecessary, as every customer will be served on time and with the quality of 
service that they deserve. Therefore, a complete set of new staff were selected from other 
branches within the network so as to symbolise what branch restructuring stood for, and 
to drive home the point that restructuring was indeed aimed at breaking away from the 
old ways of doing things. In the words of the O&M manager:
“We favour moving people when we want to convert because under the old dispensation nobody 
cares about service delivery, nobody really cares as to whether customers get served or not and so 
you discover that that system actually gives room for fraudulent and unprofessional practices on 
the part of staff. So we feel that if we allow such staff to remain within that branch at the early 
stage, it will go a long way to derailing the exercise. We want customers to go as they come in - 
first come; first served”.
Apart from symbolising change to Wema bank staff, this process of moving staff around 
was also felt necessary to change customers’ mindset and to make them break away from 
the past. This was the view of one of the branch managers interviewed:
147
“All of the staffers were moved around so that the sort of relationship that existed before whereby 
each staff had a customer would be removed. Failure to do this would have been anti- 
reengineering as those customers that have in-house assistance would continue to do so.”
This particular decision to move staff around was influenced by the bank’s long-standing 
tradition of promoting a family of staff. At the onset of the project, it was recommended 
that the bank would have to sack members of staff without a university degree, as they 
are perceived not qualified to work in the new environment of a restructured branch. 
However, management took the important decision not to layoff staff, but to adopt a 
system of rotating staff and moving them around the branches. In effect, this approach 
saw that reengineering at Wema Bank did not result in any massive layoff of staff as was 
the practice in other banks - which resulted in serious collision with the unions and in one 
case a total collapse of the BPR project in that particular bank. This approach to rotating 
staff between branches also provided management with the avenue to deal with staff who 
could not cope with reengineering and those that were finding it difficult to understand 
what the new concept of working involved. These members of staff were thus moved to 
branches that would not be reengineered or at times they were moved to area offices 
where they would not have to deal with customers.
After the selection process was the infrastructure modification stage where existing 
infrastructure were analysed with a view to determining what new infrastructure was 
needed and also to do an analysis of the layout structure and how conducive the 
environment was. This then led to a recommendation of the type of facilities that are 
needed. Usually, infrastructure modification involves the removal of the cages in which 
cashiers work, giving the building a face-lift, installing air conditioners and cash counting 
machines. The information technology department was invited in at this stage to 
recommend how the implementation of new or refurbished systems would be put in 
place. The IT team determined - based on the new work area that had been designed - the 
amount of computer terminals needed and the sort of system upgrading that was required 
for the new work procedure. According to the IT manager, the role of the IT team in the 
restructuring exercise is basically that of support:
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“The idea here is that if you want to reengineer a branch you must have the right kind of IT 
infrastructure in place. So whenever a branch is going to be reengineered we are informed and we 
need to review the operations to determine how IT would support the reengineered processes of 
the branch and put all the necessary machinery in motion”.
Training of new members of staff followed infrastructure modification. Training was 
given to staff in the new procedures that have been designed for the branch. The training 
period was usually within a week and it involved a series of sessions handled by the 
O&M team on the meaning and importance of re-engineering and team work. Efforts 
were made to carry staff along as a substantial amount of time was spent on explaining 
why the project was needed and what the bank stands to benefit from the project. In 
typical reengineering style, members of staff were told of what they stand to gain from 
giving their utmost co-operation to the project and the fact that everybody gains with 
reengineering. There was also a lot of emphasis on ‘teamwork’ and a substantial part of 
the training programme focused on “Teaming for Excellence”. In one of the training 
manuals, training sessions were actually described as a process of creating the “great” 
team required for process reengineering. Tellers were trained in the use of the new 
computer systems, their new duties under an empowered regime, demonstration of how 
the new system and authorisation levels work.
The final phase of implementation involved the introduction of the new banking 
application software - Globus- in branches identified as needing one. This phase was 
deliberately left to the last stage given the cost of implementing the software in branches, 
which was put at between 1 2 - 1 5  million Naira. It was therefore felt necessary that 
adequate plans would have been made to ensure that the branch was ready for the new 
software and that it was financially justifiable to implement the software. After 
introducing the new software, implementation process concluded with the conversion 
stage, where the new processes were put into practice. At this stage, the implementation 
team stayed in the branch for about a week to guide the conversion and to make sure that 
staff complied with the new procedures. After this period, the implementation team began 
to wind down their involvement within the branch and restricted their involvement to 
occasional visits, once or twice a week to ensure that staff continues to comply with the 
new ways of working.
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5.3.4 The results o f reengineering: Changes after BPR
Reengineering brought about a number of changes in terms of how the branches were 
managed, the physical layout of branches, and in banking processes. Other changes 
identified by members of staff involve relationships with customers and changes in 
customers’ attitude. With regards to processes, one of the major changes experienced 
involved the redesign of the work of cashiers. The first major change concerning cashiers 
involve an expansion of the scope of their duties. Prior to reengineering, cashiers’ jobs 
were highly segmented with different cashiers performing different functions. There were 
separate cashiers for opening of accounts, separate cashiers for paying out cash and 
separate cashiers received cash from customers. This fragmentation made the task of 
banking highly cumbersome. However, after reengineering, a new concept of “Universal 
Tellering” was introduced to signify that one teller can now perform all of the previously 
segregated functions. This means a teller can now accept deposits, pay out cash and open 
accounts - irrespective of whether it is current account or savings account.
In addition to the expansion of duties, cashiers were also given the go-ahead to pay out 
cash within a certain limit. Previously, cashiers had to obtain authorisation from a senior 
member of staff before any cash is paid out at all. This, however, slowed the process of 
cash withdrawal. The new procedure to increase cashiers cash pay-out limit was in line 
with the ‘empowerment’ initiative of reengineering and in line with management’s desire 
to adopt “efficient and effective computer-based controls” in the form of on-line approval 
based on new authorisation limits at reengineered branches. As a result, more ‘customer- 
facing’ staff (i.e.Tellers) were given more autonomy in carrying out their duties - 
especially in paying out cash to customers. With reengineering, Tellers could pay out as 
much as 5,000 Naira without getting authorisation. If the amount to be collected was in 
excess of 5,000 Naira, then Tellers are expected to refer to the Head of Tellers (whose 
authorisation limit is set at 25,000 Naira) for authorisation. If the amount in question was 
more than 25,000 Naira, then approval is sought from the Branch Banking Operations 
Team Leader (BBOTL) whose limit stands at 50,000 Naira. Any claim or transaction in 
excess of 50,000 Naira will go to the branch manager who has the highest authorisation 
limit within the branch. Authorisation limits were subsequently programmed into the
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banking application software and thus only allow staff to authorise the limits awarded to 
them.
In line with empowerment changes, there was also a symbolic change of title to signify a 
change of role, as cashiers’ jobs no longer concentrate on collecting and paying of cash; 
cashiers, after BPR, were now referred to as Tellers. According to one of the managers 
interviewed:
“Over the years, the title of cashier has become synonymous with counting of cash, and do not 
forget that it is a name that is as old as banking itself; therefore we needed a new name to go with 
the new job. We are now talking about empowered staff who have been given the opportunity to 
make decisions on their own -  at least up to a limit. So I think the change of name is important 
because it also shows them their job has changed.”
This change of title was also meant to symbolise a change in the calibre of people now 
involved in the job as more and more graduates and higher education certificate holders 
are now employed as tellers. In addition, tellers’ cubicles (or “cages” as they are referred 
to) have been replaced with a more open platform which has also facilitated 
communication amongst tellers and with customers.
In line with the increased focus on customer services, a separate customer service point 
was created to handle customer requests and the opening of new accounts and also to 
handle general customer requests. This reduced the length of time spent on customer 
enquiries - previously handled by cashiers in addition to some of their other duties. Still 
under customer services, the bank introduced new standard forms to replace the long 
established tradition of letter writing as a form of communication between customers and 
the bank. Thus, if customers wish to change their addresses, all they need to do is to fill 
out a standard form with their new addresses, as opposed to writing lengthy letters.
Another major change to the management of branches involve the role of the traditional 
bank accountant. Before restructuring, the task of the accountant was to assist the branch 
manager in operations. The branch manager was the overall head of operations and the 
accountant was the deputy or sub-head. However, after restructuring the accountants’ 
nomenclature changed to Branch Banking Operations Team Leader (BBOTL); the
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BBOTL or OTL became the overall head of operations. The OTL now co-ordinates the 
activities of three major departments, formerly under the direct control of the manager - 
the customer service department, the IT support group, and the tellers. This relates to a 
broadening of the OTL’s role, as opposed to the narrow view of the branch accountant. In 
addition, the OTL also liaise directly with customers and respond directly to customer 
requests. Prior to taking up their posts, OTLs attended a number of courses including a 
special OTL course focusing mainly on developing leadership skills and effective team 
working.
Changes in the branch manager’s job involves a more direct role in the marketing of bank 
products, winning more customer accounts (especially corporate and “high net-worth” 
accounts), as well as building and nurturing good bank-customer relationships. The 
branch manager, in effect, shed some of the traditional duties of head of administration 
and operations (to the OTL), to take on a new role of a marketing executive. In line with 
this change in duties, branch managers were given training sessions in marketing and 
relationship management techniques. A clear link between the new role of the branch 
manager and the changing context of banking in Nigeria could be established, as this 
statement from a bank manager shows:
“There is an increased focus on marketing and the manager has got to leam new marketing skills. 
This is because we previously played down the role of marketing as we always have customers, 
they always come; we did not have to look for them. But now, you have to search for customers. 
Therefore, you need the marketing skill to look for them and the relationship skills to keep them.”
Technology has indeed played a major role in most of the changes identified above. 
Because data is now captured at the start of the process (i.e. at the point of opening an 
account or at the teller point), staff can now have a better knowledge of customer account 
history and queries could be answered more correctly and quickly too. Technology also 
played a part in the process of “empowering” tellers because it makes customers account 
more visible and they are able to determine if there is enough balance in the customer’s 
account. On the other hand, the increased use of technology has raised the level of control 
placed on staff as authorisation levels were programmed into the banking software. This 
was deemed necessary given the problem of fraud that was becoming rampant within the
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industry68. It was thus felt that with technology, the issue of control could become much 
more robust. On the other hand, the implication of this is that ‘empowerment’ has 
resulted in more controls being put in place.
Culturally, the changes that took place borders on ‘de-familiarisation’ of service. This 
involves a re-orientation from the earlier practice where members of staff have their own 
customers that they serve regularly and promptly. According to one of the managers 
interviewed:
“Normally, a cashier would have some one, two or three customers that they serve regularly and 
so they become that cashier’s customers. Customers too are used to that because they see it as a 
way of getting round the problem of sitting in banks for hours. Thus, if they do not see the 
particular member of staff, they refuse to be served; they would rather wait for that staff because 
they believe this is the only way they can get service. At times, customers even come in to inform 
cashiers that they are coming in to the branch at a particular time just for the cashier to be 
available. So, you can see that the business was being run more like a family affair.”
In addition, some measure of orderliness have been introduced into the branches 
following reengineering and discouraging the habit of customers patronising staff. As a 
result, there is a new emphasis on customers queuing up in order to be served. When the 
system was first introduced, there was a lot of agitation from customers who were used to 
the old system. However, this changed with time as customers started getting comfortable 
with the new system, so much so that in the morning when branches are yet to open, 
customers line themselves outside the building and allocate numbers, in order to maintain 
the orderliness even when the branch is opened.
68 See, “Banks lost 2 billion Naira to electronic fraud” (Vanguard, June 21, 1999)
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Table 6 : Wema Bank Pic. - Summary of important dates/events
Year Events
1945 Wema bank was established under the name of Agbonmagbe Bank
1960 Bank was awarded a grant of £200,000 by the western state government to help stay afloat
1969 Western state government bought over and took full control of the bank
1970 Bank’s name changed to Wema -  an acronym for Western Marketing Association -  a government-owned marketing 
association
1987 Bank’s IT department was established; first IT project with the implementation o f CAPs at the bank’s head office
1988 CEO sought board’s approval to embark on strategic planning; board approved the appointment o f management 
consultants to draft strategic plans
1989 Bank’s 1“ Strategic Plan drafted to start the process o f “major organisational change in geographic spread, business 
focus and image management”
1990 Wema bank was privatised as part of the bank’s 1“ strategic plan
1993 2nd Strategic Plan launched to “significantly improve retail banking efficiency”. Main focus of the plan was the BPR 
project.
1995 Implementation of BPR started with a 6-month pilot in 2 branches. Bank started implementing Globus applications 
software and linking up branches for on-line real-time inter-branch connectivity
1999 8 branches linked up and Globus installed in 12 branches
Bank staff dress more formerly after reengineering, based on the belief that staff 
appearance matters a great deal to the new practice being encouraged. According to one 
of the OTLs interviewed:
“Changes here also include the dress code, because with this new culture everything is supposed 
to be open and neat. We have this belief in our bank, where we tell people that if customers see 
you neat and tidy, they would have no doubt that all their transactions with you will be neat and 
tidy.”
The implementation of BPR also led to the formation of a Quality Monitoring Team 
charged with the responsibility of ensuring the success of the reengineering initiative and
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a continued adherence to the new ways of working, engendered by the programme. The 
team employed both formal and informal tactics to get staff to adhere to the new ways of 
working. Formal methods include the use of performance targets and quality measures 
such as the length of time it takes a teller to serve a customer and reducing the length of 
queue in branches to an agreed minimum. Informal methods include an end-of-the-week 
social gathering between branch staff and the quality monitoring team called: Thank God 
It’s Friday (TGEF). The meeting is aimed to allow branch staff review their performance 
for the week and to highlight areas for improvements.
In sum, the new approach or culture of work represents physical, cultural and behavioural 
changes to old practices within the bank. The highly segregated and functional structure 
had been replaced with a less hierarchical structure focusing more on team-work and 
collaboration (see Appendix II).
5.4 Reorganisation through “Practical Restructuring”: UBA Case 
Study69
"Consistent with the need to evolve a coherent business strategy and respond to environmental changes, 
UBA Pic embarked on a comprehensive, realistic and practical restructuring exercise in 1995 which 
involved changes in structure, staffing, systems, skills profile and shared values (from UBA Pic Annual 
Report ’98) ”
In this section we describe the process of restructuring UBA pic. The section starts with a 
presentation of the inner (organisational) context within which the restructuring took 
place before going on to describe the interaction of the inner and outer contexts and the 
process of change (see table 5.2).
5.4.1 Organisational Context
5.4.1.1 Historical context o f UBA Pic
By December 1998, UBA Pic’s total asset was 79 billion Naira70, making it the third 
largest bank in the country with over 4000 employees. Domestic commercial banking is
69 See table 5.4 for summary o f case study
70 110 Naira = U.S. $1(2000)
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one of the bank’s major business and its total local deposit base was 38 billion Naira or 
11% of the market. In a 1998 survey by a firm of financial analysts, the bank was given 
“A” rating to signify a ‘sound financial standing and a strong capacity to meet its 
obligation’ (Agusto and Co., 1998). UBA Pic is ranked among the top 1000 most 
capitalised banks in the world by the Institutional Investors magazine.
UBA Pic. was established by a consortium of five international banks, which at that time 
took over the business of the former British and French Bank Limited in Nigeria. The 
British and French Bank, which had been operating in the country since 1949, was itself 
an offshoot of the Banque Nationale Pour Le Commerce et L’lndustrie (BNCI), Paris. 
The five international banks that founded UBA Pic were: The British and French Bank; 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro of Italy; Monte dei Paschi di Siena of Italy; Bankers Trust 
Company, New York, USA and Amsterdam Rotterdam Bank of Holland. Four of these 
five banks still retain their shareholdings ranging from between 2.5% to 25% ownership 
of the bank.
UBA Pic, as it is presently known, started business in October 1961. By its incorporation 
in 1961, it became the first bank among the international banks operating in Nigeria at the 
time to be registered under the Nigerian Legal system. In 1973, as part of an 
indigenisation initiative aimed at giving control of businesses to Nigerian citizens, the 
Nigerian government decided to acquire equity share in the capital of major international 
banks in Nigeria. It acquired 1,750,000 shares or 38% of the issued share capital in UBA, 
which increased over the years to 91,527,680 shares or 60% as at when the bank was 
privatised in 1994. With its 60% majority shareholding, government took full control of 
the management of the bank. In its new role as the owner of the bank, government 
became responsible for appointing a substantial number of the bank's directors and 
executives. This affected the decision-making capability of these directors, as they were 
subject to government demands and were constantly threatened with board reshuffles. It 
also led to a number of politically motivated decisions such as loans and advances given 
out to family members and government ‘cronies’. However, with deregulation gathering
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momentum, government sold its majority shareholding in 1993 to signify the start of a 
Pic status for UBA.
5.4.1.2 Previous experience with computerisation
Computerisation in UBA started in 1973 with the appointment of a firm of IT consultants 
to define the bank's IT plan and infrastructure. The main focus of the plan then was to 
computerise routine accounting processes in the branches and to provide the Head Office 
with access to centralised data. The first major IT project of the bank was in 1976 with 
the installation of a centralised Accounting package called B1 Accounting System. The 
system operated on an IBM mainframe system kept at the computer centre within the 
Head Office in Lagos. Daily transactions from the branches were fed into the system to 
generate reports showing their accounts position, which were subsequently dispatched to 
the branches in preparation for the next day's business. By the end of 1985, in an effort to 
improve data capturing activities at the branch level, the bank installed the B1 
Accounting System in seven of its branches in Lagos. By mid-1986, over 15 branches in 
Lagos had been equipped with an IBM mini computer and the B1 Accounting package to 
significantly improve data capture in branches. However, the processing of this data was 
still carried out at the Head Office in Lagos. With the deregulation and liberalisation of 
the banking industry in 1986, and the increase in the number of branches away from the 
Head Office in Lagos, the speed of data processing was becoming a major concern for the 
bank which they had to resolve fairly quickly. The resolution of this problem therefore 
formed the major focus of the bank's second phase of computerisation.
The second phase of computerisation started with the development of an IT masterplan. 
This masterplan was aimed at achieving the company’s goal of ‘providing quality service 
to customers and to be amongst the first in the county to introduce new banking and 
technology related products’. The main feature of computerisation, based on the 
recommendations, was the implementation of the MicroBoss Accounting System to serve 
the needs of independent branch processing and especially in the upcountry branches 
farther away from the Head Office in Lagos. The system has the full functionality of the 
BI Accounting System, but unlike the BI, it is PC-based. It also has a major advantage
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over the BI Accounting system in that branches are fully independent in processing 
whereas on the previous system, data capture is done at the branches while processing is 
carried out centrally at the Head Office. Given the national telecommunications 
infrastructure, which was regarded as unreliable, the need to achieve independent 
processing by branches was seen as paramount. According to the IT manager:
“The key reason for choosing the decentralised system was the environment in Nigeria with 
problems such as poor telecommunications which made it imperative that we select the option we 
went for. As at that time, leased lines from government-owned Telecommunications Company 
was always packing up. So we were very concerned about how we carry data across as there were 
lots of communication restrictions in the economy. It will be foolhardy for a big bank like ours, 
with over 200 branches nationwide, to say we want to centralise.”
By the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, due to the continued increase in the number of 
banks operating in the country and especially the influence of the new generation banks 
who have brought in new IT standards for banks, UBA Pic started looking towards 
achieving branch interconnectivity. Branch interconnectivity had become the ‘norm’ of 
banking in Nigeria by now and so UBA wanted a system that would allow independent 
branch processing as well as some measure of connectivity between the branches. 
Although MicroBoss allowed for independent branch processing it did not adequately 
support branch connectivity.
The decision to adopt a decentralised platform informed the bank's choice of developing 
their applications software in-house. Having decided to decentralise, the next step was to 
search for an applications software in the market that would support decentralised 
processing and would allow for on-line real-time processing as well. The bank's search 
for a suitable software with a track record of adequate after-sales support yielded no 
result. It was at this stage that the decision was reached to put the many computer science 
graduates in the bank to work. A new applications software was procured, which, 
although did not meet all of the bank's requirements, was felt useful enough to be 
customised. A decision was reached to have the bank’s IT team work in collaboration 
with the developers on how to improve and upgrade its features. After several 
customisations to the software, it was decided that the system was close enough to what 
the bank required. So in May 1993, the new system was rolled out, first to two of its
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branches in Lagos to see if and what problems existed, before eventually rolling them out 
in large numbers to other branches. This banking package is called Branch Accounting 
and Information Systems (BRAINS).
The development of BRAINS was an achievement for the bank and especially the IT 
team as they saw it as a sign of maturity of the IT department. It also increased the role of 
the IT team within the bank and inevitably increased the department's workload. Given 
their role as the ‘developers’ of the system, it became inevitable that all faults would be 
addressed to the IT team to be resolved. In addition, there was an increase in user 
requests for enhancements as well as requests to add new features to the system, which 
no doubt increased the workload of the IT team. In addition, operations procedure within 
the bank also suffered because requests coming in for enhancements were not uniform 
across the bank's branch network. Different branches started making requests according 
to their demands and expectations of how their branches should operate. As a result, 
banking operations procedure within the bank became dissimilar. This point was put 
forward quite clearly by the IT manager:
"Because you are in the system you find it difficult to force the procedure on the system, so things 
keep changing and you have people wanting you to change things every now again because they 
know it is in your hands and you can do it as the IT team. So it makes it difficult to have a strict 
procedure to follow, but maybe if you have a package it forces you to operate in a particular kind 
of way and when people start asking for funny things then you can tell them sorry this is what the 
procedure is and so you have to comply with its features."
This decision to implement BRAINS marked the beginning of the third phase of 
computerisation at UBA Pic. in 1993. The focus of computerisation then was on the 
development of on-line real-time systems with the aim to provide up-to-date information 
to customer, staff and management. By the end of 1994, BRAINS had been implemented 
in all Lagos branches and in some urban branches in other parts of the country. In 
addition, the bank had also invested in a number of management information systems 
such as the General Ledger: Millenium (GL:M) system implemented at the Head Office 
finance section that accepts accounting transactions directly from other systems such as 
BRAINS and Payroll system and consolidates them for management reporting. BRAINS
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thus allowed for independent processing in branches and at the same time supported 
connectivity amongst the branches and with selected Head Office applications. Branches 
were able to link up with other branches and with the Head Office to access information 
and carry out inter-branch transactions processing.
By August 1999, computerisation at UBA had entered a new phase. The bank had 
replaced most of the mainframes and minis with new open, non-proprietary servers and 
workstations in majority of its branches. BRAINS was upgraded and new features 
incorporated in line with user demands and changes in the wider environment. Over 100 
branches have BRAINS running on their system with about 70 of these branches linked 
in a WAN via the VS AT technology. In line with the restructuring initiatives of the bank, 
computerisation efforts in UBA Pic. is moving to a new level with the decision to 
implement SAP/R3 which is as enterprise wide integrated system.
5.4.1.3 Structure and Culture o f bank branches
With regards to branch sizes, UBA Pic. is the third largest bank in Nigeria with 210 
branches in its network. The bank established its first branch in May 1949 and for the 
first few years after this, most of it branches were established in or around Lagos (i.e. the 
western part of Nigeria). However, by the mid-1950s, the bank started to establish 
branches in the northern and eastern parts of the country. All of the branches established 
during this period were sited in areas of high business activities such as Kano, Kaduna, 
Port Harcourt and Lagos. It would therefore appear that the initial strategy that informed 
branch network expansion was the need to establish a presence in the major business and 
commercial centres in the country, such that by 1976 all of its 32 branches were sited in 
urban centres. However, this was to change when, in 1977 the federal government, 
through the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), introduced the Rural Banking Scheme 
(RBS) which encouraged banks to increase their presence in rural areas. Thus UBA, 
which hitherto had no rural branches, was forced to open more rural branches than new 
urban branches when government allocated specific numbers of branches to be opened 
within a specified period. During the first phase of the scheme between 1977 and 1980, 
government allocated 27 rural branches, which the bank opened. During the second phase
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between 1980 and 1984, the bank was able to open all the 32 branches allocated to it and 
by the end of the third phase in 1989, UBA opened another 28 rural branches allocated by 
the government. Thus, between 1977 and 1989 UBA had opened a total of 87 rural 
branches allocated to it through the RBS. Given government’s opposition to banks’ 
request to close these rural branches, all the rural branches opened during this period are 
still in operation and represents around 42% of its branch network.
Apart from the rural branches, two other types of branches can be identified within the 
bank’s branch network. In the first group, are about 60 branches which are regarded as 
strategic branches and which colloquially are referred to within the bank as the 1st tier 
branches. These consists of corporate branches targeted at corporate customers like the 
big multinational oil companies and other branches in areas of high economic activities 
and industrial estates targeted at the Nigerian business class and “high-value” customers. 
In the second category of branches are the 2nd tier branches which consists of around 63 
branches aimed at mobilising savings and some of which serve as controlling branches 
for rural branches. Rural branches are regarded as 3rd tier or political branches. UBA also 
has a branch in New York, a representative office in London, and an offshore branch in 
the Cayman Island.
Culture of majority of branches before reorganisation reflects the general culture of 
banking within the Nigerian system before liberalisation. In addition, years of 
government influence -  through its ownership of the bank, has meant that a substantial 
number of board level directors were government appointees who were there to facilitate 
government’s access to the bank and to do government’s bidding. This particular link 
between government and top-level management was further translated to the branch 
level, where directors felt it important to appoint their own staff who would also do their 
bidding. The implication of this was a highly undisciplined branch set up where people 
were not motivated to work and did not see a need to - given their link to the top 
management of the bank. In the words of a senior manager:
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“If you look at UBA before privatisation, it was more of a government bank and you do not see it as 
a business entity, really. You see people come in and go as they like, people spending a lot of time 
talking, sleeping and loitering about. It was like working in a government ministry, not a business 
enterprise. You look at the personnel and you see that they are not being properly utilised, you see 
crowded offices and generally people are not just motivated.”
This lazy attitude of staff to work was attributed clearly to government influence and 
more specifically to the calibre of management at this time. Another senior manager 
interviewed concluded that:
“When you give ideas or suggestions, you discover that it takes forever before your ideas and 
suggestions can see the light of the day. It seems the distance between management and staff was so 
long and far away. Also, our directors then, were more or less political appointments and theirs was 
to satisfy the people that sent them. There were lots of constraints in getting decisions to be taken.”
The overall effect of this on branch operations was the poor enforcement of controls and 
standards. Wide differences existed in how the branches operate because of a lack of 
control and the general feeling of apathy that existed in the bank. In the 1970s, an 
operations manual was drafted to guide the activities of branches and to enforce some 
control on branch processes, but this manual was never enforced given the highly 
political atmosphere of the bank and the lacklustre performance of both staff and 
management. According to the head of BPR team:
“If you happen to find any branch where transaction is similar to any other one, it is only by chance. 
So, each branch was like an island to itself and booked (carry out) transactions based on whatever 
they thought was right because the procedures and the controls were in people’s heads and were not 
documented.”
Technology has played a central role in shaping the culture of branches and in the 
evolution of branch culture. Before privatisation, the bank was mostly operating a 
centralised batch processing system with an IBM mainframe as its main processors. 
Branches fed in daily reports and decisions were mainly taken at the back office. The 
front office staff (i.e. cashiers) were regarded as low-end staff and were mainly there to 
channel requests to the back office, where officers would use the computer reports 
generated to make decisions. The implication here was that cashiers were not allowed to 
pay out any amount of money without seeking approval from their immediate boss.
The bank has also introduced unified banking systems into some of its major “strategic” 
branches. This is an on-line, real time system that allows customers of the bank to
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transact business from other UBA branches other than their branch all over the country. 
This system is based on a combination of private satellite telecommunications systems 
and leased lines from the Nigerian Telecommunications Ltd (NITEL). One of such 
private systems is called Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) and the other is based 
on Microwave links. VS AT satellite earth station is a private communication platform 
that allows for the transmission and reception of voice and data signals over satellite and 
it is used to connect the Head Office in Lagos with other regional offices nationwide. 
Microwave links are used to connect branches within each region. In Nigeria, due to the 
unreliability of the public telephone system, the company felt it was important to use 
these private service providers to be able to achieve the desired result of an uninterrupted 
service delivery to its customers.
5.4.2 Restructuring UBA: Launching the change initiative
Perhaps, the greatest impetus for the restructuring of UBA Pic was the liberalisation of 
the banking industry and the subsequent increase in the number of banks operating in the 
country. The liberalisation process itself was because of the deregulation of the Nigerian 
economy with the purpose of reducing government influence in directing the economic 
affairs of the country. It was in the midst of this that government decided to reduce their 
stakes in banks and UBA was among the first set of banks, in which the federal 
government had majority shareholdings, to be privatised. UBA was privatised in 1993 
and thus signalled the start of operations as a Pic.
The Pic status was to see a major reshuffle at the top, as the new private owners sought to 
rid the bank of government influence by removing a substantial number of directors and 
managers. The restructuring exercise began with the appointment of a new Chairman and 
a new CEO. The new chairman, a Harvard Business School graduate, had worked in the 
USA for a number of years before coming to Nigeria. On assumption of office, he set the 
wheel of change in motion to tackle what he described as "the old management's style 
and unwillingness to get attuned to modem management strategies". His first task was to 
sack over 60 top managers of the bank and to replace them with a new set of young, but 
experienced professionals. In addition, four new directors were elected to the board to
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Table 7 : DYNAMICS OF CONTEXT/PROCESS INTERACTION -  UBA Pic.
PRE-RESTRUCTURING CONTEXT INFLUENCE OF CONTEXT ON BANK’S RESTRUCTURING EXERCISE
INFLUENCE OF BANK’S RESTRUCTURING ON 
CONTEXT
Liberalisation of the Nigerian banking industry, 
which increased the number of operating banks.
UBA was privatised in 1994 to signal the beginning of the 
restructuring process
More old generation banks were privatised and also adopted 
Strategic Planning Initiatives
Increased use o f IT/management consultants within 
the banking industry
Choice of consulting firm to carry out a major diagnostics 
o f the bank leading to the drafting o f the bank’s strategic 
plans
More banks drafted Strategic Plans, which became 
synonymous with organisational restructuring
0
U
The financial crisis and the coming of the new 
generation banks
Focus on providing first class service to customers by 
improving branch operations and redesigning branch 
processes
More banks, including the new ones, embraced BPR as old 
bank customers went back to their former banks after 
reengineering. Customer service became the norm within the 
industry
O
U
T
E
R
Government regulations to increase banking activities 
in rural areas under the Rural Banking Scheme (RBS)
Branches established under the RBS - regarded as 
‘political’ branches - will not be computerised. Adoption of 
a two-level approach to achieving connectivity
Increased pressure on CBN to change the RBS and to allow 
banks to sell off some rural branches to community banks 
and other interested buyers
1
E
R
Increased focus on quality customer service to 
remove the tag o f “Armchair banking”
Introduction of customer relationship management as an 
integral part of redesigning branch processes.
Improved focus on marketing and customer relationship 
leading to the separation o f marketing from other activities. 
Marketing-related activities were taken to the head office
Little or no authorisation at branch level for cashiers Empower cashiers to pay out money and use computer- 
based controls
Cashiers given authorisation limits and job title changed to 
“Tellers” to reflect new roles
I
Lack of a standard practice in UBA branches Drafting o f the OPC manual to ensure better 
standardisation and co-ordination
Increasing number o f banks invested in documenting their 
branch processes I
N
N
E
A rowdy banking hall due to a lack of orderliness 
and queue culture leading to a practice referred to 
locally as “man know man”
Plans to remove “internal help” and to give equal 
treatment to all customers
Most bank customers started queuing up in branches to get 
served
N
N
E
K The highly political environment o f UBA due to the 
heavy involvement o f government in the appointment 
o f directors and branch staff
Massive retrenchment of staff, including board-level 
directors. Graduate recruits employed as contract staff and 
experienced professionals also recruited from abroad
An increasing number of banks started employing graduates 
to the post o f Tellers as contract staff
R
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replace some of the previous directors who were retired. This change of top-level 
management was to have an impact on the future direction of the bank and the change 
process which the bank embarked upon.
Soon after privatisation, major reorganisation effort started in 1994 with the appointment 
of a major consulting firm (the consultants employed by Wema bank in the previous 
case) to carry out a major diagnostics of the bank and to make recommendations on how 
to reposition the bank for the new banking environment in Nigeria, post-liberalisation. 
The consultants carried out a SWOT analysis of UBA and came out with a number of 
recommendations which formed the mainstay of a Strategic Plan put together by the 
consultants. According to one of the Managers, the main aim of this strategic plan was to 
“combine the traditional strength of a big bank - some of which are its customer reach 
and the availability of cheap deposits - with the efficiency and the service delivery of a 
new generation bank”. Essentially, the Strategic Plan looked at every conceivable aspect 
of the bank including Branch Network Development, Human Resources Development, 
Business/Marketing strategy, Operations Procedure Development and Computerisation.
In computerisation, the bank sought to invest in modem state-of-the-art technology and 
aims to put technology right at the heart of its restructuring exercise. In a company report, 
this pivotal role of technology was stated clearly as “providing first class service to our 
customers delivered by well trained and highly motivated people aided by the best 
technology”. In reality, the bank aims to have over half of its branch network on a WAN 
using the VSAT technology and also to have the banking software BRAINS installed in 
over 100 of its branches, mostly in urban areas.
A direct consequence of liberalisation was the explosion in the number of operating 
banks within the country. A substantial number of the new banks are subsidiaries of 
foreign banks and some are local banks with a mixture of expatriate and local 
management.
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A major consequence of the explosion in the number of banks is the increase in 
fraudulent activities and a surge in the employment of inexperienced and bogus 
operators, mainly interested in making quick gains. By the early 1990s, the banking 
system suffered a major financial crisis and a lot of customers lost money as a result of 
the actions of these individuals. The immediate impact on banks was that majority of 
customers withdrew their money from banks and vowed never to use banks again. 
Majority of the banks that went under were the new generation banks and for UBA and 
other old generation banks, this served as an opportunity to combine their strength, in 
terms of the reputation they had built up over the years, with the new technology input 
and focus on customer service brought in by the new banks.
This focus on customer service by the new banks was in reaction to the existing culture of 
a poor bank-customer relationship, which had existed before liberalisation. Given the 
small number of banks in operation then, and the near oligopolistic nature of the industry, 
customers had very little choice, were at the mercy of banks, and were forced to accept 
whatever level and type of service banks offered. However, with the coming of the new 
banks, a different approach to serving customers and a more advanced level of 
computerisation was introduced into the system and some of these later became the 
‘standard’ within the industry. Old generation banks customers, influenced by some of 
these developments, started demanding the same level and quality of service, which 
consequently meant that the ‘old’ banks had to change.
For UBA, it was an opportunity to improve branch operations, because branches are the 
main outlets to improve customer service. Branch network development was to be 
approached from three fronts. The first relates to the branches established under the rural 
banking scheme and the need to reduce the number of such branches, either by closing 
them down (when government permits) or selling them off to community banks. The 
second approach involved a further expansion of the network of corporate branches to 
cover a wider range of customers. The bank’s business/marketing strategy in this respect 
focuses on identifying potential market which needs to be penetrated. Three major
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markets had been identified, which are the corporate sector to cater for customers in the 
energy sector and the MNCs, commercial sector and consumer sector to cater for the 
SMEs consisting mainly of local (Nigerian) businesses and retail customers respectively. 
Previously, much of the bank’s focus had been on developing an all-purpose network of 
branches which catered for the financial needs of both the retail market segment and the 
corporate sector. However, the new focus on corporate banking service was as a result of 
the bank’s realisation that its ‘blue chip’ clients deserve tailored services and customised 
attention, which could only be rendered through the development of the relationship 
banking approach.
The third aspect of branch development involved looking into how branches carry out 
their transactions, with a view to redesigning processes and to separate documentation of 
transactions from the actual transaction itself. Operations such as credit processing, 
treasury matters, cash deposits and withdrawal, and also procedures for opening new 
accounts all were identified to be redesigned in line with the new focus on providing 
"efficient and faster service to customers". In addition, the plan also included the 
introduction of performance management criteria with a view to having a “meritocratic” 
organisation in place of what existed previously. In line with this, staff were to be 
appraised at regular intervals and targets were to be set from the Head Office down to the 
branches, which the branch managers will in turn pass down to the various team leaders 
within the branch.
The redesign of branch processes served as an impetus for the establishment of a 
Business Process Reengineering (BPR) team in 1997 to oversee its implementation. 
According to the Manager of the unit -  an MBA graduate from Wharton - "the BPR team 
was constituted to look at operations process across the bank and to redesign them for 
efficiency based upon best practices." The BPR team was responsible for the Public 
Relations campaign which preceded the restructuring by stating out what the 
restructuring was about, what the bank intended to achieve and generally stating out the 
business case for embarking on the project. In effect, this was meant to soften the ground
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and prepare staff for the impending change. Simultaneously, members of the BPR team 
were being trained on reengineering techniques and were reading materials on BPR.
At the branch level, there were a number of politically motivated appointments, where 
top-level directors and managers who were appointed by government, felt the need to 
appoint their own ‘men’ to branches to facilitate access to branches, and satisfy 
government demands with as little disruption as possible. This particular practice was 
further reinforced by the enormous power given to branch managers especially in the area 
of lending and investments. Within the branches, branch managers were regarded as the 
‘king of the turf. This over-concentration of power ensured that the branch manager and 
branch operations were within a touching distance of top management and directors who 
in turn were mostly responsible to the government. This practice of political 
appointments was to cascade down a step lower as branch mangers also ensure that they 
have loyal staff working with them by appointing their own ‘cronies’ to work in the 
branch.
A major implication was the general air of apathy that existed within branches before 
privatisation and the subsequent restructuring exercise. Because staff had powerful 
“office fathers” watching over them, a substantial number of staff were not motivated to 
work. It was this general air of despondency that motivated the new management’s 
attitude to staff during the restructuring exercise. One of the recommendations in the 
strategic plan was that UBA would have to overhaul its stock of employees to 
substantially improve the quality of staff. Therefore, the bank would have to recruit new 
staff who are able to carry the bank through the new competitive environment and 
personnel who are able to exhibit the sort of skills needed for maintaining good 
relationship with customers. In addition to recruiting new staff, a substantial amount of 
resources was going to be spent on staff training.
5.4.3 Implementing change: decisions and actions taken to effect change
Implementation of the plan started in 1995 after the consultants disengaged leaving 
members of staff of the bank to carry out the implementation. The implementation
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process kicked off, with different projects aimed at each segment of the Strategic Plan, all 
taking place at once. At the start of the project, implementation covered branch 
development, business/marketing strategy, operations procedure and human resource 
development. To oversee the implementation of the different strands of the Plan, the bank 
constituted several change management groups or divisions which were given the task of 
handling the different aspects of the plan. The first unit formed was the Strategic 
Management group, charged with the task of overseeing branch network development 
and designing the bank’s business and marketing strategy. The SM group, headed by an 
AGM who graduated from Harvard with an MBA, is made up of 6 full-time members of 
staff with qualifications ranging from a Ph.D. in Economics to a B.Sc. in Accounting and 
Finance. The unit was designated with the task of ensuring that the bank stays on track in 
terms of its Strategic Plan and in carrying out series of studies and research into potential 
markets for the bank and also to carry out research into potential locations where the 
bank can establish branches. The Strategic Management group also carries out 
competitive analysis of the banking industry and also carry out economic research by 
analysing and interpreting the macro-economic environment and forecasting future 
economic trends.
Implementation of the project ran into a hitch after only some few months, as the bank
was trying to implement all the different projects at once. It was realised that the scale of 
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the project was too big and was not really working out. As a result of trying to do 
everything all at once, the bank lost ground with series of staff strikes. Staff who did not 
understand what was going on and those that felt aggrieved, due to the pace of change, 
decided to cause as much disruption as possible for the bank. As a result of these strike 
actions, two important decisions (as far as the restructuring was concerned) were made: 
first was to split the project up into its constituent parts and implement them on a project 
basis and the second was to cut down on the total number of staff.
Due to the slow pace of change, the bank decided to split the project up and implement 
them in stages. Rather than attempting to implement the changes all at once, the bank 
started the implementation process with branch network development by concentrating,
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at first in 1996 with the corporate banking sector before moving on to the commercial 
banking sector in 1997 and consumer banking in 1998. Branch operations redesign 
started with the documentation of existing branch processes and the imposition of 
controls. According to the head of the SM unit: "It is good to talk about radical change (at 
least that is what we have on paper) but the implementation will force you to consider 
less radical options”.
Problems with the unions also presented management with an opportunity to cut down on 
the number of staff. It was evident at the onset of the project that the restructuring was 
going to result in the massive layoff of workers, in view of the need to inject a new air of 
seriousness into the bank. By May 1997, when the discussions with Union about the fate 
of employees was going nowhere, management decided to ignore Union and ‘wield the 
big stick’ by sacking about 4000 employees (representing half of its total workforce) - in 
line with the need to inject new 'blood' into the system. Given the general air of 
despondency, and Union’s reluctance to play along, management felt compelled to take 
this action as one of the Directors puts it:
"We spent the whole of 1996 battling the union and there were series of strikes as staff were 
aggrieved at the pace and scope of change because they could not absorb it all. While all of these 
was going on, management realised that not all of these people will be required to carry us into 
the new millennium and so on the 23rd May 1997, management fired almost half of the 
workforce. Before this, management had been trying to carry everyone along but it just got to a 
stage when we realised that we could not carry every one along and we had to make that drastic 
decision"
Undoubtedly, this massive retrenchment created a lot of ill feeling within the bank as a 
number of experienced staff were laid off and even those that survived the purge felt 
unsecured as to what would happen to them next. Management felt this was totally 
necessary given the recruitment policy adopted in the past when the bank was still 
government owned. Quite a substantial number of appointments (especially at the 
management level) were regarded as political appointments, where government cronies 
were appointment to the board. The new management therefore felt the need to purge the 
system of these employees and appoint new staff based on qualifications and banking 
experience to carry the bank through its new dispensation. This gave management the
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opportunity to employ graduates and banking professionals -  several of whom had either 
studied or worked abroad - to see the bank through the restructuring exercise, and 
beyond.
Towards the end of 1997, the restructuring effort of UBA was to take yet another turn. In 
October, a new Executive Director (ED) in charge of Operations was recruited to move 
the restructuring programme further forward. The new ED, who was in charge of bank 
operations and IT, had worked for a major American bank for over 25 years in several 
other countries as well as in Nigeria. This bank was regarded within the Nigerian banking 
system as the role model of how banking should be practiced. With the coming of the 
new ED, the direction of the change programme shifted considerably. Based on previous 
experience, he brought in a different focus to the restructuring exercise and particularly in 
restructuring branch operations and the role of IT. Essentially, he redefined restructuring 
at UBA and his new idea of restructuring was to concentrate on three issues, namely: 
standardisation, centralisation and computerisation.
With centralisation, the intention was to take out of the branches, procedures that were not 
necessarily done at the branches so that they can focus more on transactions that are 
customer-focused as opposed to back office type processing. According to the new ED, 
certain things clog up the branches and create a lot of work and one of this was cash 
counting. What he did was to set up a centralised cash management centre where all the bulk 
cash that are brought to the branches are transported and counted; that took a lot of the chaos 
out of the branches. The other thing he did under centralisation was that investment type 
products, which tends to be a little bit complicated in booking was moved to the treasury 
department at the head office. By doing this, branches only became a conduit for investment 
requests while the actual booking was done at the head office.
Another important element of centralisation was redesigning the inter-branch 
communication system. A lot of transactions that relate to different branches gets 
communicated through an inter-branch mailing system that was highly prone to fraud. 
Physical documents transferred between branches were being misplaced and manhandled.
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So, he sought to eliminate this problem by computerising inter-branch communication with 
the introduction of SAP/R3 which is an enterprise-wide system to facilitate the 
communication of documents from paper-based to electronic in order to reduce fraud and 
manhandling of documents. The introduction of SAP/R3 was central to the computerisation 
arm of the new ED’s change strategy. Implementation of the system was slated to take place 
in stages starting with the introduction of the back office module of the system in line with 
the centralisation initiative.
The third focus of standardisation came about because every branch in UBA processed 
transactions differently. According to one of the managers interviewed:
"If you happen to find any branch where transaction is similar to any other one, it is only by chance. 
Each branch was like an island to itself and booked transactions based on whatever they thought was 
right because the procedures and the controls were in people’s heads and were not documented".
This meant that the initial plan to redesign business processes was changed as it was felt by 
the new ED that the problem was not actually with the old processes. The real problem was 
that processes were not properly documented and, as a result, staff were not aware of them. 
Consequently, the new ED sought to update the existing process manuals and put new 
controls in place to ensure that procedures were standardised. These procedures and controls 
were documented in what was called the Operations Policy and Control (OPC) manual. 
Essentially, this manual was a policy and control document that covered all areas of the 
bank’s operations, focusing essentially on the minimum control that must be in place. In 
doing this, the new ED aimed to ensure uniformity in practices bank-wide. According a 
manager in the BPR team:
“Despite the fact that most procedures were general, we found out that there were major 
differences in practice. So, the idea was that if we document our procedures, then we can all do it 
the same way because we all have the same reference point.”
The OPC manual was also meant to aid customer service because copies were made 
available in the bank library and in all branches. Any member of staff interested in any 
unit or operation within the branch can pick up the manual and read through to see if 
things are being done correctly. For processes that have interfaces, it was deemed useful
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because it makes more explicit the trail of processes, making them more visible for staff 
to be able to respond to customer request and possibly predict how long it would take to 
complete a process, thereby giving customers accurate information. In addition, the 
manual was meant to aid in the training of new staff and serve as a reference material. 
According to the manager “it does not really matter how much of on-the-job training you 
give, new staff still need to have a reference document that they can go and access for 
information”.
Training staff on the new OPC manual involved weekend training sessions followed by a 
series of case study-based tests for all branch staff, from branch managers to tellers. For the 
two categories of staff in the branch - the managers and the operators - the training schedule 
was split into two. The first aspect, which relates to the general management of a branch, 
was targeted at managers and it entails that they know everything that relates to branch 
management. This implies that they learn and know everything in the manual to ensure that 
they do their jobs according to the procedures of the manual. Managers were tested in the 
new procedures to ensure that they read the manual and not just put them aside. For the 
operators, training focused mainly on the part of branch operations where they function i.e. 
Cash and Tellers, Funds Transfer, Customer Service and Operations Management. 
According to the BPR manager:
"To ensure that the manual is used and not turned into an encyclopaedia that stays on the shelf, we 
decided to examine them on aspects of their job as contained in the manual and they have to pass the 
test. If they fail, they have to retake them until they pass."
The training sessions and the tests, at first, did not go down well with branch managers who 
felt that it was totally unnecessary. As a result, it was backed up with pressure from the top 
management to ensure compliance and thirdly it was to serve as a weeding out process for 
branch managers (BM). The implementation, training and testing on the OPC manual was 
meant to serve as a selection tool in line with the plan of having a meritocratic organisation:
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"There was a lot of resistance initially with the branch managers complaining. So the ED told them 
that if you cannot do the test, then you are not fit to be a branch manager. The first time around most 
of them failed the test and they got a letter from the ED saying they have to do the test again and 
obtain the necessaiy 65%. Second time around most of them failed again and they were given a third 
chance at which point most of them passed and those that failed were moved elsewhere. Ultimately 
as part of the weeding out process there will be a part of the people right at the bottom, not just the 
BM but across the entire bank, who would not have a job anymore. But this would be after a very 
long haul because people, especially those from the branches, are coming from a disadvantaged 
position having been there all these while with little or no training over the years”.
Implementation of the OPC manual was also meant to aid the standardisation initiative of 
the new ED and to put some structure into the branches. As part of the initial BPR study 
of branch processes, it was decided that there was no clear-cut structure in bank branches 
and staff were doing things in an adhoc manner. The OPC manual therefore, was aimed 
to give a clear structure that can be replicated across branches. Different units within the 
branch would be better informed of their functions as it was clearly stated and clearly 
defined in the manual.
5.4.4 Changes after restructuring
The restructuring exercise at UBA led to a number of changes in branch banking. There 
were both structural and functional changes as well as cultural changes. One major 
structural change was the separation of functional areas and the creation of new areas of 
operation (See Appendix III for branch organisational chart). Branch operations were 
split up into two main divisions: operations and marketing. Operations consist of four 
main business areas namely, Funds Transfer; Cash & Teller; Administration and 
Logistics and finally Customer Service. All credit related operations were moved to the 
Head Office under the new Marketing Division that was redesigned to cover three 
distinct business areas of Consumer Credit, Commercial Credit and the Corporate Credit 
Groups. The corporate credit group deals with the provision of investment capital to large 
corporations including the multi-nationals corporations and the energy sector, while the 
commercial group focuses on the ‘middle market segment’ of the Nigerian economy. 
These include the SMEs, as well as other small businesses within the ‘informal’ sector. 
Finally, consumer credit deals with the provision of loans, ranging from personal loans, 
car loans, and mortgages to the personal customers.
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Centralisation of credit processes resulted in some changes to the banking application 
software. Unlike previously when all credit decisions were made at the branch level, with 
the new arrangements, branch staff could initiate credit processes but are not allowed to 
make the final decision as to whether the credit will be granted or not. According to a 
senior manager, this decision was taken in order to curb fraudulent activities in the 
branch where credit decisions were often made not based purely on business criteria, and 
also to reduce some of the “powers” of the branch managers, who central management 
perceived as becoming too powerful. As a result, a link was established between the Head 
Office and the branches to allow the officers to access the branch system for the details of 
the credit arrangement and in turn enter their decisions, which the branch staff could then 
relay to the prospective customer. This served as a measure of control on the credit 
decision process where the approval and disbursement of funds were separated with one 
acting as a check on the other.
In line with the new focus on quality service to its customers, a new customer service 
point was established to attend specifically to customer requests such as the opening of 
new customer accounts, account balance requests and other requests such as cheque book 
and passbook requisition. This new department was established, amongst others, to 
respond quickly to customer request. According to a Senior Manager:
“Customer service is the main essence of all our operations. UBA Pic is totally committed to 
customer service, adding value to our client’s business as well as building an enduring 
partnership. Every part of the organisation is geared towards delivering a first class service to our 
customers”.
Because of introducing the new banking software BRAINS, branches are able to provide 
real-time information both to customers and staff. With the implementation of BRAINS, 
customers are able to check their accounts more frequently and an up-to-date picture can 
be given at the end of each business day. This has benefited customers more in the sense 
that they can receive their statements faster, and staff are also able to access and process 
information more quickly and can make quicker decisions in areas that affect customers.
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Other changes include the length of time it takes to cash a cheque. Prior to the 
restructuring and the installation of the applications software, it takes anything up to 8 
hours to cash a cheque and most customers leave their cheques with the teller to come 
back hours after to complete the transaction. However, with the restructuring and the 
implementation of the new system, customers are able to cash their cheques within 
minutes as opposed to the hours they were used to. The new system was able to help in 
this respect through the reduction of the authorisation time between tellers and head 
tellers. Previously, when tellers need authorisation, they would call the attention of head 
cashier who would call physically at tellers’ counter to authorise the payment and verify 
customers’ signatures. However, with the new system, head tellers do not go to the 
tellers’ counters, but call up transactions from their own system, verify the signature and 
authorise the payment. Once the transaction is approved, it will appear on tellers’ 
terminals and they can then proceed to pay customers.
These further led to some behavioural changes, as customers who come to the branch to 
ask for the branch manager or other branch staff with the hope of seeking their 
‘assistance’, were subsequently told to queue up and get service normally with any of the 
cashiers. Similarly, the culture of orderliness has been inculcated as customers now see it 
as important to queue up in branches in order to get served.
Changes to the staffing of branches involve the change of cashiers’ title to that of tellers 
to specify a wider and empowered role for the cashiers. Cashiers are no longer just in 
charge of collecting and paying out cash but more involved in giving advice to 
customers. In addition, the bank now use graduates as tellers, and the bank is among the 
growing number of banks that use contract staff as tellers. Although the use of such 
graduates has improved the profile of tellers, however, the fact that they are contract staff 
has raised some questions and practical issues of ‘trust’ given that these sets of staff have 
a supposed “tenuous” link with the bank. Similarly, the wholesale sacking of 4000 staff 
in 1997 and the introduction of the OPC manual and test has stirred up remaining 
members of staff. The downside of this, perhaps, is the claim by some staff that they have 
been working consistently for up to 3 years without taking any leave for fear of losing
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their jobs. The drafting of the OPC manual, the documentation of branch operations and 
the segregation of duties has resulted in a highly functional branch network in which 
clearly delineated set of functions are specified in the manual. Staff are not expected to 
cross functions and could only work within teams as opposed to working across teams.
Table 8: UBA Pic. - Summary of important dates/events
| Year Events
1961
UBA Pic was registered under the Nigerian legal system by consortium o f 5 international banks that took over the 
business of the former British and French Bank Ltd.
1973 Bank was taken over by the Nigerian government as part o f the indigenisation programme
1973 Start o f computerisation with the appointment of a firm of IT consultants to define bank’s IT plan and infrastructure
1976 Bank’s first major IT project with the installation of the B1 Accounting System at the Head Office in Lagos
1985 Installation o f the B1 Accounting System in 7 branches in Lagos
1989 Installation o f the MicroBoss Accounting System to allow for independent branch processing
1993 The installation o f a ‘home-grown’ software package -  BRAINS -  in 2 “strategic” sites (branches); BRAINS 
allowed for better decentralisation & branch processing
1994 UBA was privatised in line with wider changes in the industry
1994 BRAINS installed in all Lagos branches and some “important” branches outside Lagos; branches are linked to 
achieve inter-connectivity
1994 Bank appointed consulting firm to carry out “major diagnostics of the bank” and make recommendations on how to 
“reposition the bank in the face of changing business environment”
1995 New chairman -  a Harvard Business School graduate -  appointed to spearhead the “repositioning” initiative
1995 Implementation of “repositioning” initiative started
1996 Extensive discussion with banking union over the “pace and scope” o f change
1997 4000 staff sacked as part o f the “repositioning” exercise and inconclusive discussion with union
1997 As part o f the “repositioning” initiative, operations and IT departments merged and a new Executive Director (ED) 
was appointed to head the new department. New ED changed the focus o f the “repositioning” exercise
1998 BRAINS installed in 60 branches with 40 of them linked by VSAT
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Since reorganisation, the bank has also introduced a number of technology-based products 
and services such as the UBA Easycard, which is a cheque guarantee card aimed at reducing 
the dependence on cash; the UBA Valucard, which is an electronic purse based on 
smartcard technology, targeted at reducing the burden and risk of carrying cash around for 
transactions. According to a director of the bank, smartcard-based products are well overdue 
for the Nigeria market given the over reliance on cash with its attendant problems:
“Nigeria is developed, in relative terms, to most other African countries and there is too much cash 
circulating within the economy. It not uncommon in Nigeria to see private individuals conducting 
cash transactions that run into millions. Therefore there is a need for electronic and card-based 
banking products such as Easy card”.
Other services include MoneyGram international funds transfer that allows for the 
transfer of money from any part of the world to Nigeria; and also the UBA Save for 
school initiative. Through this scheme, the bank offers educational financial assistance to 
savings account customers who are able to meet certain qualifying conditions. Customers 
are encouraged to keep a certain amount in their account for a period of time, after which 
they are nominated for a bursary award. Another new product that has recently been 
introduced is the Global Depository Receipt Programme which allows the bank to raise 
capital in the USA and European securities market through private offering to large 
institutional investors known as Qualified Institutional Buyers. Through this programme, 
the bank recently sold 30.7% of its equity (307.1m shares) to five foreign investors who 
have also taken up membership on the bank’s board71
5.5 Summary
This chapter has provided two case studies illustrating the implementation of technology 
and organisational change initiatives in two Nigerian banks. Both banks, in response to 
changes in the context of operation, responded by initiating major programmes of reform 
in which computerisation, branch development and reorganisation was a major 
component. Both banks employed the service of a major international consulting firm and 
were subsequently given similar recommendations. However, the implementation of
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these recommendations in both banks, as described in this chapter, resulted in significant 
differences within the various branches of each bank and also between the two banks. It 
is the analysis of such differences and what it implies for the transfer and implementation 
of global practices in local contexts that we consider in the next chapter.
71 See, “International investors take five seats on UBA Board” (Vanguard, 12 December, 1998)
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Chapter 6 
Analysis and Discussions
6.1 Introduction
From a contextualist perspective, why is the implementation of IT and organisational 
change programmes in the two banks found as it is? In this chapter, an attempt is made to 
provide answers to this question. In the sections to follow, we will attempt a synthesis of 
the conceptual models discussed in chapter 3 to lay the foundations for an analytical 
model of local adaptations to planned technology-based organisational change 
programmes. This model will serve as a framework for analysing planned organisational 
change initiatives in the two case studies presented in the previous chapter.
6.2. Local adaptations to global practices: an analytical framework
An important part of a contextualist model is how the inner and outer contexts influence, 
and are influenced by the process of change. Walsham (1993) regards this linkage as 
being of crucial importance in understanding how technology and organisational change 
are constrained by the context in which they are taking place and in turn how they 
maintain or alter the context. This linkage between the context and process of change has 
been a major concern of organisation and management researchers over the years. The 
important linkage between structure and action takes from the view that organisational 
actions are neither purely deterministic nor purely voluntaristic (Van de Ven, 1988). 
Pettigrew (1983) also talks of the importance of adopting a non-linear and rational 
approach to the study of organisational change. He suggested that to examine change, we 
need to examine the interaction of the rational and the non-rational, the social as well as 
the economic and the enabling and constraining forces of intra and inter-organisational 
contexts and to examine instances where a combination of both elements takes place.
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According to Mintzberg’s typology organisational change, especially realised or 
implemented change, can be conceived of as consisting of the deliberate and intended 
plans of management as well as the unintended plans and actions that unfold as change 
progresses. However, Mintzberg’s model has been criticised as making too big a leap 
from the intended to the realised and therefore paying less attention to the process by 
which the intended gets realised (Tsoukas, 1989). Such a focus on process is regarded as 
essentially important for organisational and managerial actions. In addition, Mintzberg’s 
strategy typology could not adequately account for the multi layers of contextual 
pressures and demands, which are found to influence IT and organisational change in 
contemporary times. To make up for these limitations, it may be appropriate to expand on 
Mintzberg’s model to be able to account for how and why change processes move from 
the intended or planned to the realised or implemented. Such an elaboration is achieved 
here by incorporating ideas and concepts from both institutional theory and the resource- 
based approach within the contextualist framework, to explain how global practices get 
adapted and implemented in a DC context (Fig. 6.1).
Figure 3 : Analytical Framework: Context/process interaction
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Origin: Planning for change
The process of change starts with an explicit decision by management to implement a 
programme of change. Such programmes are introduced into the organisation as planned 
change and they consist of blueprints or guidelines on which the change initiative will be 
based. They also involve the setting of goals and objectives to improve how the organisation 
functions. These goals and objectives entail a plan of how the organisation is going to 
respond to changes in its environment and exploit new opportunities engendered by such 
environmental changes (Porter, 1980). In addition, they may also involve the 
implementation of new IT to transform the organisation and design new business processes 
(Hammer and Champy, 1993). These constitute the planned change initiatives or 
programmes. In introducing these initiatives, management may employ the services of 
external agents such as consultants who would diagnose the organisation in relation to its 
environment and suggest possible new approaches to redesigning organisational processes.
As well as resulting from the rational efforts of management and consultants, planned 
change initiatives may also be in response to wider expectations of the appropriate ways of 
doing things. Sometimes, government mandate or regulations could also be the source of the 
plan to bring about changes in the organisation when decision-makers respond to or comply 
with these regulations. Planned change initiatives of management could also be taken in 
concert with other decision-makers within the community or environment within which the 
organisation operates. By being part of a wider community discourse, such plans may be in 
line with widely held beliefs and assumptions of how to do things within the wider 
community (Swanson and Ramillier, 1997). In contemporary times, the wider community of 
an organisation includes both its ambient society as well as the wider global context.
Global social and cultural pressures influence organisational actions in the form of 
normative prescriptions spelling out the appropriate ways of doing things. Tillquist 
(1996) refers to such prescriptions as “cultural models” that regulate the activities of 
organisations. From the globalisation perspective, Kaye and Little (1996) talks about 
“standards” which are regarded as the appropriate means of achieving 'inter-operability' 
among diverse organisations; standards can be regarded as a response to the globalisation
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process. Such standards can be used in highlighting technical infrastructure and 
requirements of organisations, and it could also relate to what constitute 'appropriate 
ways of doing business’.
These standards or cultural rules are spread by professional practice and within popular 
management discourse. According to Swanson and Ramillier (1997) as IS professionals, 
management consultants and other agents of change move across organisations they tend 
to spread their traditions of practice. These traditions, in turn, may impact on the change 
efforts of organisations and may also become taken-for-granted rules and prescriptions 
which govern the practice of organisational change and utilising IT, which all 
organisations must adhere to in order to survive.
Examples of these found in the literature about planned technology-based organisational 
change are: that planned technology-based change are management-led, top-down change 
which are designed in advance of the change initiative by top management and 
consultants (Levy and Murray, 1986; Ginsberg and Abrahamson, 1991). As a result, it is 
this design or plan that influences management’s ability to ‘make and implement timely, 
technically and economically sound, and organisationally acceptable decisions’ (Weick, 
1993). These decisions made by management then affect the effectiveness and successful 
implementation of the change initiative. Specifying the role of IT, it is suggested that IT 
takes a leading role in the change process where the technology can be deliberately 
employed to bring about substantial changes to an organisation.
At the more concrete level, planned technology-based change programmes like BPR also 
suggest radical redesign of business processes starting from a ‘clean slate’ or ‘greenfield 
site’ (Hammer and Champy, 1993). With IT and BPR, employees’ roles within the 
organisation can be widened and workers are “empowered” to take on more 
responsibilities, based on the power of IT which makes more and better information 
available (Hammer and Champy, 1993).
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In banking, the use of technology such as ATMs has come to be regarded as taken-for- 
granted such that any bank that wants to compete effectively in contemporary times, must 
invest heavily in IT and ATMs (Essinger, 1993). The increasing use of IT in banks has 
shifted the emphasis from branches as the primary means of delivering services to 
customers. This has led to the closure and/or merging of branches to make way for new 
methods of delivering banking services. There is a renewed focus on the use of new 
technology-based delivery mechanisms such as electronic kiosks, Internet banking and 
phone banking.
Influenced by some of these prescriptions management, with the aid of consultants, design 
the blueprint upon which the organisation’s change initiative will be based. It is this plan, 
which may be based on a formal change technique such as BPR or TQM, that will be the 
focus of the implementation stage.
Continuation: Implementing the plan
Once the plans are made, appropriate courses of actions will be decided upon to bring the 
plans to reality. However, because actions are not totally under the control of individuals 
(DeCocks, 1996; Weick, 1993), they are often influenced by their context. Therefore, the 
appropriate course of action decided by consultants and management may become subjected 
to influences from both within the organisation and the external environment. At the 
organisational level, management may need to evaluate the quality and amount of resources 
at its disposal and assess whether and to what extent existing resources will be sufficient to 
carry out the plan. If resources are available, management may go ahead with the plan as 
intended and if not, alternative or additional resources will be sought, perhaps using its 
reputation or financial leverage to obtain these additional resources. If the resources are 
unavailable, management may need to shelve part of the plan and how much of the intended 
plan will be implemented.
In addition to financial and reputational resources, other organisational factors which may 
influence the carrying out of the intended plans are the culture and tradition of doing 
things within the organisation. Certain ways of operating within the organisation may
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have been enshrined into the fabric of the organisation. Where new plans for organising 
are seen as contrary to this established pattern, management may be unwilling to change 
from the old ways which may have served them well. This institutional inertia (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1992) or cognitive sunk costs (Oliver, 1997) may therefore prevent the 
adoption of the new plans or perhaps may lead to a new configuration of the plan.
Other studies have also shown that organisations do not just compulsively conform to 
institutional demands; that in fact organisations are active in creating and defining 
institutional arrangements (Scheid-Cook, 1992). Through a process of enactment, 
organisational members interpret and create their own definition of environmental demands 
to suit their needs and in accordance with the history of the organisation, its resources and its 
culture. When organisations construe the environment, they create a context for actions 
which are aligned to the newly construed environment. Enactment process therefore 
examines the ways in which organisational members select, manipulate and/or ignore 
institutional arrangements (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978). This will have implications for the 
planned change initiatives, which may lead to modifying the original plan or adapting the 
plan to suit the demands of the organisational context.
From an institutional perspective, organisational change does not always entail a 
deliberate or conscious action; rather actions take place unconsciously as a result of 
widely-held views and taken-for-granted assumptions within the organisation. According 
to Zucker (1987), constitutive expectations in the form of norms of behaviour play a 
more active and important role in explaining change than the individual interests of 
organisational members. According to the author, “processes of organisational change are 
... based on preconscious understandings that organisational actors share, which is 
independent of their interests” (Zucker, 1987). From this perspective then, adaptations 
also occur when members of the organisation ceremoniously act to sustain certain taken- 
for-granted assumptions or realities within the organisation and the wider socio-cultural 
contexts. Therefore, the planned change as contained in the management or consultant 
blueprint may become modified and becomes the adapted change. This adapted change, 
in addition to consisting of calculative and planned decisions of defining the feasibility of
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implementing the planned change vis-a-vis organisational resources and practices, also 
involves the symbolic and unconscious actions of organisational members when they 
unquestioningly perpetuate long-established traditions of doing things within the 
organisation as well as widely-held beliefs emanating from the external environment.
Outcome: Realised implementation
Therefore, realised or implemented change emerges out of the deliberate decisions made 
within the organisation as well as outside of conscious and deliberate plans. The explanation 
of local adaptations to planned change will thus focus on decisions and actions taken to 
implement the plan and to make it workable in different contexts. In this respect, the 
outcome of the change exercise could not have been adequately explained by reference only 
to the guidelines of top management or change agents, but by concentrating on the streams 
of decisions and actions taken at different stages of the implementation process and at 
different levels within the organisation. It is argued that these streams of decisions and 
actions are both rational and symbolic. It is suggested therefore, that the above schema can 
be used to explain the dynamics of the two reported cases. Its application is demonstrated in 
the next section by initially discussing separately, and then comparing, the cases of Wema 
Bank Pic and UBA Pic.
6.3 Another look at Wema Bank: planned, adapted and implemented 
change
For Wema bank, the deliberate guidelines on which the process of change was based are to 
be found in the strategic plans which management - in conjunction with consultants -  
drafted in 1990 and 1993 respectively. These represent Wema bank’s response to changes in 
the environment within which they operate. Perhaps, the greatest impetus for change in 
Wema bank was the deregulation and liberalisation of the banking industry which paved the 
way for the privatisation of the bank in 1990. Privatisation brought a new focus of a 
corporate bank to remove the image of a government-controlled bank.
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Additionally, the liberalisation of the industry also brought in a whole new set of banks with 
different approaches to providing banking services in Nigeria. This new and improved 
provision of services became the norm or standard of service provision within the industry 
when customers of the old banks started asking for the same level of service. Therefore, 
management perceived that the structure of the industry as well as the norms of practice are 
changing, which therefore meant that the bank had to put some structures in place to 
respond to these changes in its environment. Clearly influenced by developments within the 
industry, the CEO at that time stated:
“In 1988, the need to plan for the future became a reality as it became increasingly obvious that 
planning at the corporate level has become a prerequisite for success as a result of the deregulation 
and increasing competitiveness of the Nigerian banking industry72”.
Wema bank’s response to changes in its environment was to institute some strategic plans 
which was to form the basis on which subsequent change initiatives were built. According to 
management, changes within the banking industry demanded that the bank transform itself 
completely and this transformation was to encompass all areas of the bank including its 
culture, management style, staff profile, service provision and in the use of information 
technology:
“If Wema Bank’s decision to move from being a primarily government-controlled and regional bank 
to that with a national outlook and coverage is to be realised, then a fundamental change in 
management approach and organisational culture is needed to be accomplished’73.
An international management consulting firm, in consultation with management, drafted the 
bank’s strategic plans. In drafting the plans, the consultants carried out major diagnostics of 
the bank and made a number of suggestions based on their understanding of the challenges 
facing Wema bank and the appropriate way(s) to respond to these challenges. The first 
strategic plan, which was drafted in 1990, formed the basis upon which subsequent plans to 
restructure were built, by providing a statement of management intent as to the direction of 
the bank for the first two years after privatisation.
72 See, Adegbite (1994)
73 See, Adegbite (1994)
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The cardinal features of the first strategic plan were based on achieving a substantial level 
of change in three key areas namely: Geographic Spread; Business Focus and Image 
Management. In 1993, the first plan was replaced by another strategic plan, which 
essentially was the blueprint for much of the restructuring that took place in the bank 
between 1995 and 1999. The major component of this plan was the Branch Process 
Reengineering initiative with the central aim of achieving better service delivery by 
“significantly improving retail banking efficiency”.
A closer look at the implementation of the BPR project between 1995 and 1999 revealed 
some interesting issues and events relating to organisational resources, institutional 
demands and IT-enabled reengineering. Evidence from the implementation process 
suggests adaptations to the BPR initiative. Members of the organisation, including the top 
management, the implementation team and branch management drew upon their own 
beliefs and understanding of what was feasible and desirable in implementing BPR, 
based upon the culture, history and resources of the organisation as well as the demands 
of the institutional environment.
The adaptation process led to different participants modifying the plans to suit their 
particular definition and context. In addition, instances of adaptation based on 
institutional inertia were demonstrated in the study. In discussing these adaptations, we 
identified different levels of the organisation at which different types of adaptation took 
place (Table 6.1). First, we identified adaptations at the corporate level when 
management redefined BPR to suit organisation’s resources and traditions of practice. 
Secondly, adaptations were identified at the branch level where the original plan from the 
top was redefined by branch management to suit how the branch operates and the nature 
of the branch’s customers. We will discuss each one in turn.
6.3.1 Management level adaptations: The three-tiered approach to restructuring
The first level of adaptation was the decision by management to adopt “a careful and 
calculated approach to computerisation and reengineering”. This involved a cautious 
approach to branch automation and investment in information technology. In practical
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terms, the bank’s pragmatic approach meant that the BPR project addressed the diversity 
of branches in its network. The bank introduced new computer systems only in selected 
branches, and the level of restructuring that took place was based on the size of the 
branch, the volume of transaction, the types of customers and whether it was a rural or 
urban branch. According to the CEO of the bank:
“Based on the effort, financial commitment and time required to roll-out these (new) procedures, 
it was decided that the inclusion of some branches in the roll-out plan would amount to a waste of 
resources, given the existing and likely future transaction volumes and business opportunities in 
these branches”
This entailed a redefinition of BPR, quite different from that envisaged. Consequently, it 
led to the total exclusion of the bank’s 21 rural branches and a three-tiered approach to 
restructuring the remaining 51 branches. These three layers of the BPR project are re­
engineering, re-designing and streamlining. The top end -  which was re-engineering -  
involved investing in state-of-the-art technology, new banking application software and 
network inter-connectivity in a small number of “strategic” branches, with “high-end” 
customers and which contributes the most to the bank’s earnings. The next tier of BPR 
consists of redesigned branches. This layer consists of the largest number of branches 
regarded as important to the bank’s earnings but not strategic enough to warrant investing 
in new technology. Branches in this category were restructured but did not have any new 
technology introduced. Rather, existing software and hardware were upgraded and then 
put back to use. The third category of BPR involved restructuring the operations of 
branches, but with no technology input. These are the streamlined branches. Existing 
manual systems were re-worked and changes made to the aesthetics of branches, but 
essentially data was still kept on card files and signatures are verified manually with the 
use of mandate cards.
This particular decision was influenced by both organisational and external factors. 
External influences that were found to be at play included the directive from the 
government that, despite the abolition of the Rural Banking Scheme, all branches opened 
under the scheme are to be kept opened. This meant that the bank had to keep all of its 21 
rural branches in operation despite the fact that some of them are not “economically
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viable”. A resource-related factor was the sheer cost of computerising the branches, the 
financial strength of the bank and the productivity of each branch. Given that it cost 
between 12 and 15 million Naira74 to implement the new banking software (Globus), the 
bank decided to introduce Globus only into those branches regarded as “strategic” in 
terms of volumes of transactions and contribution to the bank’s overall earnings. This 3- 
tiered approach to reengineering was to later become the norm or standard within the 
industry as subsequent change initiatives in other banks were modelled around this 
approach.
6.3.2 Management level adaptations: Rotating staff for reengineering 
A long-established tradition, in terms of human resource management, had led to what 
was known in the bank as the culture of a “Wema family”. Given this tradition, the bank 
realised it was going to be difficult to adopt the initial suggestion of sacking staff without 
university degrees. This was in view of the fact that over the years, Wema bank’s 
recruitment policy had been geared towards building a team or a ‘family’ of employees, 
not purely based on academic qualifications or other formal methods of recruitment. The 
culture of “Wema family” has thus led to a relatively stable workforce and a low 
employee turnover that has consequently led to an experienced team of professionals, 
some of whom had been in the services of the bank for more than 20 years. This 
experience and stability had, over the years, served the bank well and constituted a major 
source of strength for Wema. To sustain this culture, management therefore redefined the 
concept of BPR as stipulated by the consultants, based on their own construction of 
Wema ‘reality’ in terms of the bank’s recruitment policy. According to one of the 
Managers interviewed:
“If you look at the staff profile, you discover that even some of the Directors do not have a BSc. 
These people are vastly experienced in banking, they can tell you banking -and especially as it 
relates to the Nigerian environment - in and out, but they do not have a BSc. However, their 
experiences are extremely valuable and you cannot just wish them away”
This redefinition instead led to a system of rotating staff between branches and retraining 
staff for the new challenges of a reengineered organisation. The few redundancies that
74 110 Naira = U.S. $1(2000)
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occurred were made voluntarily and consisted mainly of staff in the twilight of their 
careers with the bank. Whereas, the consultants on their part defined Wema bank’s needs 
in terms of overhauling the entire staff profile, to management this conflicts with their 
long established policy of promoting a ‘family’ of staff.
6.3.3 Management level adaptations: Selecting the implementation team 
In selecting the implementation team, the original plan was to appoint a senior manager 
to head the implementation team so as to give the team the “necessary power and 
authority” to carry out the expected changes. However, based on management’s past 
experiences in dealing with the union and based on the experience of other banks’ 
confrontation with the union, a member of staff from the middle management cadre - 
who was still a member of the union - was appointed to head the BPR implementation 
team. The importance of this was that anytime the union tried to raise some concerns, 
management was quick to point out to them the involvement of their members in the 
project and the fact that one of their members actually headed the implementation team.
At a particular meeting between the Board and the Union, (union) members wanted to 
know why, despite the huge profit declared by the bank, only a small fraction went to 
staff pay rise. The MD/CEO directed union members to ask the head of the 
implementation team (who is also a member of the union) for an explanation and that he 
will explain to them (union members) that the bank had been spending money on BPR 
and investing in new technology. According to the team manager:
“The whole idea is that as a union member, what ever I say will be believed by the union leaders 
as they would not start thinking that I am working against the interest of the union”
According to the manager, this may not have been possible if the head of the 
implementation team had been a senior member of staff who is no longer a member of 
the union. In this particular example, management was able to use their capability and 
‘knowledge of the terrain’ to checkmate the union and to cover their backs. This was 
regarded as one of the factors responsible for the rather smooth implementation of the 
project at Wema - as most of the problems other banks had was with the union.
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6.3.4 Branch level adaptations: Accommodating *local culture and politics\
One of the important tenets of BPR at Wema was the desire to eradicate the practice 
known in local parlance as “man know man” and the idea that with reengineering, 
everybody gets treated equally. This equal treatment was meant to translate in practice 
that it was not necessary for customers to know anyone in the branch before conducting 
business, and all that was necessary was for customers to take their turn by queuing up 
until they get served. However, the reality of the situation is that given the culture of the 
Nigerian society, certain groups of people with leadership status within the society are 
not expected to queue up in bank branches. Therefore, there was a need to accommodate 
such people even within the reengineering initiative. According to one of the branch 
managers interviewed:
“Given the nature of our branch and the type of customers we have, we still try to accommodate 
some set of people, like for instance, the chairman of the local government council or the 
traditional head of this community. If such a person comes in to the bank we cannot ask him to 
queue. What we do is to send him up to the bulk room away from the main banking hall and from 
the glare of other customers; here he can get service quicker”.
In other branches of the bank (such as in corporate branches), this was not the practice 
and branch management did not see a need for this modification, given the type of 
customers they serve. In effect, this local form of accommodation led to a toning-down 
of the initial plan to serve every customer equally. Given the demands of its cultural 
setting, a branch of the bank had to find ways to accommodate some of these 
idiosyncrasies of its local context.
6.3.5 Branch level adaptations: Semi-automated authorisation
Another important expectation from implementing BPR was the adoption of an “efficient 
and effective computer-based controls” in the form of on-line approval based on new 
authorisation limits at reengineered branches. These new authorisation limits was in line 
with the ‘empowerment’ initiative of reengineering as more customer-facing staff (such 
as tellers) were given more autonomy in carrying out their duties - especially in paying 
out cash to customers. The new authorisation limits, which were programmed into the 
banking application software, allowed staff to authorise and pay out only those limits
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awarded to them and allowed by the system. In all branches, the Branch Manager has the 
highest authorisation limit of 50,000 Naira.
However, this translates to some form of restriction for branch managers who, based on 
the new reengineering initiatives, were expected to focus more on marketing-related 
activities and building strong and viable relationships with customers. This focus on 
marketing and customer relationship meant that branch managers operate more outside 
the branch and so a potential situation exist where the branch manager would be out on 
marketing duties and there would be cash withdrawal requests of over 50,000 Naira 
waiting to be approved. In a high inflationary economy such as Nigeria’s, cash 
withdrawals of over 50,000 Naira is a very common phenomenon.
To get round this problem in some branches, branch operations team leaders (BBOTLs) 
were allowed to pay out cash of 50,000 Naira and over. This practice was actually started 
in a particular busy branch, when the branch manager took the decision that his Branch 
Banking Operations Team Leader (BBOTL) should authorise payments of 50,000 Naira 
and above when he (Branch Manager) was not present in the branch. Although the 
software would not allow the BBOTL to authorise the transaction electronically, he can 
still give the go ahead and do a manual authorisation pending the arrival of the branch 
manager who will do the electronic authorisation on his return. According to this 
manager:
“When Globus (applications software) was first installed, it conflicted with reengineering service 
time because Globus was so designed that there must be 3-level authorisation with the manager 
having the highest level of 50,000 Naira. As you may know, in Nigeria of today 50,000 Naira is a 
small amount of money. So this is a constraint to service delivery because if I have to see every 
customer of 50,000 and above we would not go on time. So what was suggested - and was 
adopted - was that we need to get a strong and reliable BBOTL who will deputise for the manager 
when he is not around or he is busy with something else. By this we can terminate the service 
with the BBOTL and do our own system authorisation after the customer had been served. This is 
the only way we can blend the reengineering concept with Globus and achieve the required 
downtime”
In the branch manager’s view, the new authorisation limits present a constraint to service 
delivery because customers would have to wait for his approval - which may compromise
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the faster response time promised with reengineering. In effect, what we have is a 
mixture of both on-line (electronic) and manual authorisation as opposed to the all 
electronic authorisation envisaged at the onset of the project. Nigerian economic 
situations (i.e. high inflation, the heavy reliance on cash and the large number of over 
50,000 Naira withdrawals) influenced the manager’s decision and led to a need to adapt 
the original plan.
Table 9: Types of adaptations and influential factors -  Wema Bank Pic.
| Adaptations at the management level Resource and Institutional Influences
Three-tiered approach to reengineering
• Government regulations in the form o f the Rural 
Banking Scheme
• Size o f branch network
• Financial strength o f bank and cost o f  
computerisation
•  Wider societal expectations due to close ties 
with rural communities, inter-communal 
rivalries
Selection o f the implementation team • Management capabilities in the form o f their 
‘knowledge o f the terrain’ to check the unions
Rotation o f staff during reengineering • Bank’s recruitment policy
• Culture o f a “Wema family”
Adaptations at the branch level Resource and Institutional Influences
Accommodating local culture and politics
Use o f the bulk room to attend to ‘special’
customers
• Societal culture and expectations
• Power distance/respect for traditional rulers
BBOTL to authorise payment o f funds 
Electronic authorisation after payment 
Semi-automated authorisation procedure
• Nigerian economic environment
• High rate o f inflation
• Institutionalisation o f cash as a payment method
6.4 Summary
In sum, implementation of BPR at Wema bank had taken place through a number of 
modifications to the technique of BPR to fit the local context. Both the resources of the 
organisation as well as wider institutional rules and expectations influenced such 
adaptations. For instance, the pragmatic approach to computerisation meant that despite 
the importance of branches to the bank and the idea of “mobilising rural funds”, 
computerisation may not necessarily be the only answer as some of the rural banks will
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not be computerised. This led to the idea of a three-tier BPR. According to one of the 
managers, the management consultants came in with “a lot of Hammer and Champy in 
their head” but the realisation was that the Wema situation was different.
6.5 Another look at UBA Pic: planned, adapted and implemented 
change
Similar to Wema bank, the process of change had been influenced by both the inner 
resource context as well as the demands of the wider institutional context. Just as in Wema 
bank, a major driving force for change in UBA was the deregulation of the Nigerian 
economy and the consequent liberalisation of the banking industry, which led to the 
privatisation of the bank in 1994. Privatisation immediately brought about a change in 
management especially at the board level. Also with privatisation came an urgent desire by 
the new directors to rid the bank of “government cronies” who were then sitting on the 
board. This, it was hoped, would give the bank the new focus of a corporate bank thereby 
removing the tag of a government bank.
The liberalisation of the industry and the attendant increase in the number of operating 
banks - coupled with the new and emerging focus on customer service and improved 
technology use - forced UBA’s new management to embark on strategic planning. The aim 
of the strategic plan was to combine the strength of UBA - which being an old bank were its 
huge customer base and the availability of cheap and stable deposits - with the flexibility, 
responsiveness and quality service-delivery focus of a new generation bank.
The result of adopting the strategic plan was the bank’s “restructuring and repositioning”
exercise which commenced in 1995. Describing some of these challenges which had forced
the bank to embark on this exercise, the Chairman of the bank noted that:
“...the international and local contexts of banking business have been faced by such emerging 
challenges as the sustained attack on the market share of the big banks by leaner and younger 
players; ... [and] the growing sophistication of bank customers in an increasingly competitive 
environment75”
75 See, “UBA’s Belo-Osagie lists challenges o f banking” (Vanguard, 13 November, 1997)
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According to management, changes within the banking industry demanded that the bank 
transformed itself completely and this transformation was to encompass all areas of the 
bank. This was made clear by one of the directors:
“The board of UBA was convinced that the prevailing corporate culture, organisation structure, sheer 
size, and degree of efficiency of resource was needed to be significantly reviewed if the bank was to 
enter the 21st Century as a major player in the country.”
A change management team, consisting of key officers experienced in different aspects of 
the bank’s operations, were brought together to work with the management consultants. 
Their brief was to assess the bank in terms of its strengths and weaknesses and to come up 
with a vision of how the bank would progress in years to come, especially with changes in 
the banking environment. The team came up with a report which formed the nucleus of the 
bank’s strategic plan and on which much of the restructuring and repositioning was based. 
The cardinal features of the Strategic Plan were based on achieving substantial level of 
change in four main areas namely: Computerisation, Operations Process Re-engineering, 
Branch Development and Staff Training and Development.
Inspired by the recommendations of consultants, management perceived the task of 
restructuring UBA with utmost urgency based on their perception of the pace of 
developments within the industry. As such, it was decided that all the projects identified 
above would be carried out concurrently so that the bank would not lose ground to changes 
in its environment. Work commenced immediately on the implementation of the projects 
and project teams were formed to handle the different projects. The Strategic Management 
and Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) teams were formed to handle Branch network 
development and process reengineering and staff training respectively. The IT unit which 
was already in place was upgraded by bringing in new staff to take over the computerisation 
part of the plan. Much of the computerisation initiative centred on implementing the 
homegrown applications software in BRAINS at all the branches. However, by the time data 
was gathered on the status of the restructuring exercise in 1999, much of the original plan 
contained in the strategic plan had either been dropped or modified. The implemented
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change, at the time of collecting data, showed a series of modifications and adaptations at 
different levels of the organisation including the management and branch levels (Table 6.2).
Table 10: Types of adaptations and influential factors -  UBA Pic.
Adaptations at the management level Resource and Institutional Influences
Radical plan; incremental implementation •  Staff strength
• (Non) availability o f “capable” staff |
Two-tiered approach to inter-connectivity
• Government regulations - Influence on establishing 
new branches
• Size o f branch network and cost o f computerisation
Drafting OPC manual and redefining BPR
• Appointment o f a new Executive Director
•  Mimetic influences as the new ED tailored the 
restructuring programme based on past experience 
in an “exemplar” bank
Adaptations at the branch level Resource and Institutional Influences
Standardisation and the use o f bullion officers in 
certain branches
•  Size o f the branch
•  Volume o f cash transactions
Contract staff and authorisation levels •  Staff strength and experience
•  High volume o f cash withdrawals
Responding to communications breakdown •  Personal knowledge o f  customers
6.5.1 Management level adaptations: Radical plan; incremental implementation
By the middle of 1997, roughly about 18 months into the implementation of the strategic 
plan, the restructuring exercise took a turn. Management realised that the implementation 
was not going as smoothly as expected. Due to changes taking place in the bank, there were 
series of strikes by staff who were fearful of the impact of the restructuring on their jobs. 
The bank spent the whole of 1996 in negotiations with the union about the impending 
rationalisation of staff and in appeasing staff complaints about the pace of change taking 
place. In addition to these complaints, the bank realised that it did not have the required 
skills and staff to carry out the intended plans at the required pace. According to a manager 
in the Strategic Management unit:
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“In 1995, we started off with a grand design to change every area of the bank. However, in reality the 
implementation proved difficult; we realised we could not change everything all at once. We cannot 
change things overnight because people have a limited ability to absorb change and also because we 
are short of people to lead the change. Even the ones who are leading the change now have a limited 
ability to control things; there are only 24 hours in a day and 7 days in a week. People’s ability are 
limited even where they are 400% committed to the plan”
In effect, this led to management’s decision to reconsider implementing the restructuring 
exercise in stages. It was decided that all the projects could not be carried out all at once 
and that they would need to be implemented in phases. At the onset of the project, 
management, armed with the recommendations of the consultants and burning with 
eagerness to wipe the slate clean, decided the best way forward was to change everything 
all at once. However, the reality of the organisational context was that there were not 
adequate resources to carry out the project as intended. It was therefore decided, given 
the available resources, to redefine the scope of the change.
6,5.2 Management level adaptations: The two-tiered approach to inter-connectivity 
Similar to Wema bank, UBA’s computerisation strategy (especially branch networking) 
was influenced by both the characteristics of the bank -  in terms of the diversity of its 
branch network, as well as influences from the external environment in the form of the 
Rural Banking Scheme. Given the different types of branches in its network and the level 
of business activities that takes place in them, management decided that it was not going 
to be cost effective to connect all the branches. Instead, a two-way strategy was adopted 
in which ‘strategic branches’ were connected using the VS AT technology and all the 
other branches were connected via a hub system. With the hub system, a networked 
regional branch acts as a gateway to other branches within the region. The major reason 
for this choice of system was explained by the IT manager:
“Although it is desirable for the bank to have all its branches connected and to be able to access and 
to determine the financial situation or balance of every branch at a go and at the beginning of 
everyday, but there are constraints. These constraints are in the areas of resources - do you install 
expensive systems in marginal branches. Or do you first concentrate on key branches and then 
expand the scope for the others?”
The two main types of resources referred to are the financial strength of the bank and the 
bank’s customer reach in terms of its branch network. The bank’s branch network is the
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third largest in the industry with over 200 branches out of which 87 are rural branches. 
The cost of installing state-of-the-art technology and WAN into all these branches 
resulted in the adoption of a two-tier hub system to link up branches.
6.5.3 Management level adaptations: Drafting OPC manual and redefining BPR 
The OPC manual, which is an operations and policy manual drafted by the BPR team to 
guide branch operations and to serve as a standard reference point for all branches, was 
not part of the original restructuring initiative. It came about after a new Executive 
Director (ED) was employed in 1998 to take over the operations and IT units of the bank. 
Prior to this appointment, the restructuring programme was not going smoothly with 
problems from banking union and staff who had already been sacked. Also, staffs that 
were still in employment were worried about the impact of the restructuring on their jobs. 
Therefore, the appointment of the new ED was to give the restructuring programme a 
fresh approach.
When the new ED came in, he decided to change the focus of the bank’s restructuring 
exercise. Based on his experience as a manager in a top U.S. bank, he redefined some of 
the problems UBA was facing. According to him, one major problem that needed to be 
tackled quickly was the adhoc manner in which UBA branches operate; there was no 
standard format for branch operators to follow and so branches were able to operate in an 
uncoordinated manner. He therefore took the decision to standardise operations across all 
branches. The result of this standardisation policy was the OPC manual, drafted by the 
BPR team that was initially mandated to redesign branch process.
In drafting the manual, branch processes were documented and layers of control were added 
to ensure compliance. In doing this, the initial plan of redesigning branch processes, in line 
with the BPR initiative was dropped. Although the restructuring team kept the BPR title, the 
coming of OPC - aided by the appointment of a new ED - sounded the death knell for the 
BPR project as was originally envisaged. According to the BPR general manager:
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“The BPR team was constituted to look at operations process across the bank and to redesign 
them for efficiency based upon best practices. After the new ED came in, we did not change 
processes anymore. We just added additional layers of control to existing systems where they 
were necessary. We found out that most of the procedures and controls were already in place 
from the old operations manuals, which was last updated in the 1970s and so there was not 
anything significantly different from what we had except that the old one was hardly updated. 
Also, we found out that people did not have a copy of that document to guide them, so as a result 
we created the OPC manual and we said that people have to know how to use this manual and so 
we had to train people”.
This particular modification was as a result of the new ED’s definition of the UBA 
situation and his experience of what obtains in other ‘exemplar’ banks. According to his 
definition, it was paramount that processes were documented so that staff would know 
what their jobs entail and non-compliance can be easily identified and dealt with.
6.5.4 Branch level adaptations: Standardisation and the use o f bullion officers 
Along with the focus on standardisation was the decision by the new ED to centralise a 
number of branch processes, thereby removing certain operations that clog up the speedy 
delivery of service in branches. This move towards centralisation led to the decision to 
remove cash counting in Lagos from branches and to locate them in a central office. 
However, in some of the branches there were some modifications to the ‘rule’. Based on 
the size of the branch, some branches have bullion offices handled by a bullion officer 
who takes charge of the flow of cash within the branch. Depending on how busy the 
branch is, some branch managers decide whether to use the bullion office for cash 
counting as opposed to sending them to the central counting office. Therefore, the 
decision to use the central office for cash counting was moderated by individual 
managers to suit the condition of their branch.
6.5.5 Branch level adaptations: Contract staff and authorisation levels
Another form of modification discovered during the implementation was how the OPC 
manual was used, based on the peculiarities of a branch. The OPC manual stipulated the 
authorisation levels given to each level of branch staff and this authorisation level was 
expected to be replicated across the branches. However, in some branches, based on the 
high number of contract staff used as tellers, and based on the high volume of cash 
withdrawals, some branch managers decide to tailor authorisation levels to the experience
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of tellers and whether such tellers have a record of malpractice or not. In the words of one 
of the branch managers interviewed:
“It will be nice if we do not have to reduce authorisation levels, but we need to put responsible 
staff on the counter. Like now, majority of our tellers are contract staff, and you do not want to 
put that kind of responsibility to people whose interest in the bank are not deep-rooted.”
This implied that the original plan of empowering workers coincided with an increase in 
the level of supervision. Given the commitment of contract staff to the bank, management 
felt it was important to create a line of supervision and staff who can give authorisation.
The use of contract staff has also led, in some branches, to how the OPC manual was 
recited and used by staff. In a particular branch, a decision was reached by the branch 
manager that the manual would be recited at the start of business on a daily basis. The 
major reason given by the manager relates to the nature of the branch staff and the need 
to inculcate the habit in staff. According to the manager:
“In this branch, every morning before we open to the public, we revisit the OPC manual. Every 
section within the branch talks about the basics of their job as stipulated in the OPC manual. We 
took this decision because in this branch we have lots of contract staff, and so we need to remind 
them of the basics of their job constantly”
6.5.6 Branch level adaptations: responding to breakdown in communications
Differences were also noted in branches as to how they respond to sudden breakdown in 
telecommunications, which undoubtedly affects the conduct of the unified banking 
system promised customers. In some branches, arrangements were made, whenever there 
is a breakdown of telecommunications facilities, to make telephone calls to customers’ 
domicile branch to get updates on their accounts and to get approvals. If there are 
sufficient funds in the account, customers can get paid and the account is updated 
accordingly. In some branches, management set a limit to the amount of money they can 
pay out this way and in some others, the limit set and amount paid depended on who the 
customer is, and whether the customer is well known to staff, to determine how much is 
paid out. In the words of a branch manager:
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“At the end of the day, we should bear in mind that our main purpose is to serve the customer and 
not to be unnecessarily rigid so that we do not lose a good customer. So we allow staff to use 
their own judgement, experience and intuition in a potentially difficult situation”.
Despite the importance of telecommunications and interconnectivity in the global and 
Nigerian banking industries, the erratic nature of telecommunications in Nigeria has 
given rise to a form of local modification based on what branch management perceived as 
important to the operations of their branches.
6.6 Summary
In sum, the realised or implemented change concerning the restructuring exercise at UBA 
Pic consisted of the intended plan of repositioning the bank by increasing the level of IT 
use, redesigning branch processes and improving the calibre of staff employed by the 
bank. However, the implementation of this plan led to some form of modification, some 
by the management team and others at the branch level based on the demands of the bank 
and the characteristics of branches respectively.
6.7 Discussions: Local adaptations to global practices
In discussing the theoretical implications for the global-local interaction, we re-examine 
the question of how the interaction of local (organisational) interests and global practices 
can be addressed in contemporary times. Drawing from the resource-based and 
institutional theories we suggest that local organisational interests are expressed in an 
organisation’s resource-base, which includes its standard operating procedures, its 
physical assets, management capabilities, its history and culture as well as local societal 
culture and normative expectations. Global practices on the other hand, are expressed in 
the form of institutional norms and expectations of the appropriate ways to organise in 
the global context. It is argued that at the intersection of the global and local are streams 
of decisions and actions which are both rational and symbolic in nature.
In chapter 5, we provided two descriptions of planned technology and organisational 
change initiatives in Nigerian banks and in the previous section of this chapter we 
presented an analysis of the implementation of, and adaptations to, these change
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initiatives. These two together attempt to address the second issue set out in chapter one, 
which was to systematically explore the process of implementing IT and organisational 
change, focusing on the various forms of adaptations that takes place. In the following 
section, an attempt will be made to examine the third research issue, what are the 
characteristics of local adaptations identified in the previous section?. One of the central 
claims of this thesis has been that the adaptation of global practices in local contexts is a 
process situated in layers of rationality and symbolism. The role of organisational 
resources and institutional norms is important in shaping the implementation of global 
practices, thereby leading to these plans being modified to suit the local context of 
implementation.
6.7.1 IT and organisational change: Understanding the nature of local adaptations
In this section we will discuss - following the contextualist principles of content, context 
and process -  what local adaptations entail, influential factors that motivate adaptations, 
and the interplay of actions and decisions involved in the adaptations of global practices 
in local contexts.
6.7.1.1 The content o f adaptation: conceptual and operational adaptation
Local adaptations, defined in this study as the modification of global technology and 
organisational change programmes to suit the different levels of an organisational 
context, consists of both a conceptual adaptation and an operational adaptation. 
Conceptual adaptation suggests adaptation at the strategy-making level, usually at the top 
management level, when management redefine the basics of global practices or 
techniques in order to suit their organisation’s context. Examples of this in our study 
includes downplaying the strategic role that IT is expected to play in BPR programmes to 
a “pragmatic approach to computerisation” adopted in Wema bank. This pragmatic 
approach subsequently led to the three-tiered reengineering concepts of streamlining, 
redesigning and reengineering aimed to fit the diversity of branches within the bank’s 
network structure. Similarly in UBA, the radical nature of BPR techniques was 
downgraded to an incremental strategy when it became clear to management that the
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existing resources within the organisation could not sustain the radical expectations 
associated with reengineering.
Operational adaptation involves modifying the programme at the stage of 
implementation. Organisational participants, such as staff from the different branches of 
the two banks, tailored the technique because of the way the branch operates, the calibre 
of staff working in the branch and the nature of customers that usually patronise the 
branch. Examples of this found in the study include the increase in control and 
supervision of staff following the empowerment initiative of BPR. On one hand, with IT 
and empowerment, BPR was expected to give staff more responsibility and a free hand to 
carrying out some of their duties. However, given the use of contract staff in certain 
branches, some branch managers felt it was too risky to give these staff too much 
freedom. Also, traditional values and custom in the wider society, meant that the BPR 
initiative and the promise of the ‘clean slate’ could not be implemented as cultural 
expectations and societal politics had to be accommodated to make the technique work in 
some branches. This focus on wider institutional expectations brings us next to consider 
some of the motivating factors of local adaptations.
6.7.1.2 The context o f adaptation: Influence of resource and institutional factors 
Why is it possible for both banks to adopt different approaches in implementing change 
given the similarity of the project and advice given by consultants? An answer to this 
question lies in management’s perception and deployment of organisational resources in 
relation to the demands of the wider context. A second answer, based on the two studies, 
show the importance of institutional norms and ritual activities in influencing the change 
process. These two contexts (resource and institutional) influenced the change process by 
providing the “ammunition” for people to draw upon in interpreting and redefining the 
plan for change and also by providing ready solutions, where no conscious effort was 
needed to implement change. Employing concepts and ideas from the resource-based 
view and the institutional theory, we will examine both internal and external factors as 
well as rational and symbolic factors. This is consistent with Van de Yen and Poole’s
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(1988) and Pettigrew et. al’s (1992) guidelines for employing rational and non-rational 
ideas in explaining change.
In explaining technology and organisational change in both banks, we discovered 
instances where implemented or realised change appear to be the product of conscious 
and deliberate actions, and others, including those at the branch levels, are shown to 
deviate from the rational plans of top management and consultants. These deviations or 
modifications arise when organisational participants make conscious and unconscious 
effort to sustain existing systems of beliefs and practice within the branch. In other 
words, they act to perpetuate what appears to them as suitable to the workings of the 
branch.
In providing ready solutions for change, institutional rules, in the form of the Rural 
Banking Scheme (RBS), presented itself as solutions to the logistical and financial 
problem of computerising the large number of branches in both banks. Expectations from 
the social community had meant that some rural branches would be kept open, even if the 
RBS permitted their closure. Also, in both banks the resource base, in terms of the staff 
profile, presented solutions which management made use of in their decisions on staff 
rationalisation within the change process. At Wema bank, the culture of promoting a 
family of employees had led to a stable bank-employee relation and a stable and 
experienced team of professionals, which made management’s decision not to lay off 
staff that much easier.
The situation with UBA was slightly different. Given the highly political environment 
within which the bank operated before privatisation, the new management that took 
control after privatisation were eager to get rid of staff who they regarded as government 
stooges. Therefore, the bank’s staff profile, the series of staff strikes, and the long-drawn 
negotiations with union turned out to be solutions waiting to be implemented. It was clear 
from when the new management took control and the restructuring process began, that 
there was going to be some rationalisation of staff but the actual method was not clear
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initially, and so the series of strikes and union foot-dragging provided management with 
the solution to the problem.
Expanding the discussion on the role of the institutional context further, from a historical 
perspective we could also see how the history of the two banks and their origin 
influenced the change process. Wema bank Pic was founded by a group of Nigerian 
investors with the sole purpose of providing loans and credit facilities mainly to Nigerian 
businessmen and women who were discriminated against by the colonial banks. 
Throughout its adolescent years, the bank received support in the form of grants from the 
government of the western region from where around 80% of its customers are based and 
around 90% of its branches are located. In addition, as much as 75% of its staff are from 
the western part of Nigeria due to its historical ties with this region. Therefore throughout 
its history, the bank had a close attachment with the western part of Nigeria, which may 
have influenced the decision not to lay off staff. The emotional attachment or 
‘management of affection* exhibited by the Wema bank board reflects deeply in its 
history and culture, which can be traced back to its founding. This ‘management of 
affection’ therefore, could be seen as an attempt by management to sustain the age-long 
tradition or norms of practice within the bank.
UBA Pic on the other hand was a bank with an international outlook from the onset; 
when it was established, the bank was wholly owned by a consortium of foreign banks. In 
1977, when the Nigerian government introduced the Indigenisation Decree, government 
bought 60% controlling shares, which was later sold off when the bank was privatised in 
1994. However, despite the majority share ownership by Nigerian investors after 
privatisation, foreign shareholders hold as much as 40% shares in the company and 
continues to have an important influence in the running of the bank. Unlike Wema bank, 
UBA also has its branches spread more widely across the country and this widespread is 
reflected in its staff mix, which is more diverse than Wema bank. Therefore, the 
influence of foreign investors, the highly political climate and heavy government 
involvement before privatisation, and the wholesale change at the top after privatisation 
meant that there was little or no emotional attachment to staff which perhaps made the
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task of laying off staff, that much easier. It could also be seen as an attempt by the new 
board to sustain the long-term relationship the bank has with foreign investors and 
international shareholders which together own about 40% of the bank.
Another major difference between the two banks relates to the involvement of consultants 
in the implementation of the plans. Although they both employed the same consulting 
firm who carried out similar tasks of diagnosing the ‘strengths’ and ‘weaknesses’ of the 
banks, they differ in the extent to which consultants were involved in the implementation 
process. While Wema bank used consultants in the implementation process, at UBA, 
consultants were not involved with the implementation. An important factor here lies in 
the different sets of management capabilities and previous experience with technology 
and organisational change. The implementation team at UBA consists of a larger number 
of staff who have studied or worked abroad and have had more exposure to the debate on 
IT-enabled change programmes and the role of consultants. In addition, prior to the 
launch of the restructuring programme, UBA’s IT staff had been involved in the 
development and implementation of a largely home-grown applications software 
(BRAINS) which may have aided the learning process within the bank. According to a 
BPR manager in UBA who graduated with an MBA from Wharton Business School in 
the U.S.:
“Big consultants like ‘G’ Consulting does a one-site fix-all solution. What they sell to bank A is 
what they sell to bank B and bank C etc. They can give you basics but what you make of it 
depends on the organisation. Therefore, ‘G’ Consulting has not been involved in any of the 
implementation at UBA.”
Whereas in Wema bank, BPR was a new experience for management and staff and thus 
the decision was reached to test out the project in two pilot sites (branches) “to learn 
more about it” and “experience first-hand some of the effects of BPR on our branches”. 
The other decision taken at Wema was to involve the consultants in a “phase-out” 
approach which would see their involvement reduced gradually as the implementation 
team became comfortable with the implementation process.
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6.7.1.3 The process of adaptation: Interplay of rational and symbolic actions 
The third part of the discussion involves an adaptation process where organisational 
resources and local institutional practices are mobilised either intentionally through an 
enactment process or unintentionally through a symbolic process to modify global change 
techniques. Rationally, organisational members redefine the global cultural models or 
institutional rules embodied in global practices to fit the organisation’s inner context and 
the demands of the immediate outer context. Symbolically, organisational resources and 
local institutional practices are mobilised when organisational members, acting in the 
realm of the known, act to sustain organisational routines and traditions, as well as taken- 
for-granted assumptions about how to do things within the organisation or the wider 
societal context.
The redefinition and organisational rituals therefore specify the process of local 
adaptations to global IT-based practices when they are being implemented in local 
contexts. Global change programmes may become the object of adaptation when they are 
deemed desirable to adopt but not feasible to implement, perhaps due to a misalignment 
with the culture of the organisation or the established ways of doing things within the 
local context. In such cases, organisations may be unwilling to mechanistically 
implement global techniques due to the difficulty of altering life-long habits within the 
organisation or through the unconscious perpetuation of these age-long habits.
Applying this conceptualisation to the Nigerian case, bank management and consultants, 
due to the liberalisation of the Nigerian banking industry and influenced by the “success” 
stories of BPR in the ‘west’, found BPR and its promise of “quantum leap improvement” 
appealing. Thus, they proceeded to implement BPR to turn around the fortunes of their 
banks. Implementation of BPR in these banks started as a top-down rational approach of 
employing consultants to carry out a SWOT analysis of the bank and to design strategic 
plans which formed the basis of the reorganisation initiatives.
With deregulation and liberalisation, banks (especially the older ones) started to engage 
in strategic planning which was seen as the appropriate response to the changing
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environment. In line with the technology imperative of BPR and the taken-for-granted 
nature of IT to banking, these banks started with plans to introduce “state-of-the-art 
technologies” and “sophisticated technology-based products” into their operations. 
However, this sophisticated technology input was later downgraded to “a pragmatic and 
sensible approach to computerisation”. Similarly, in typical BPR fashion, staff were 
promised empowerment, where the monotonous jobs of cashiers will be improved, aided 
by the new technology, to give such “customer-facing staff’ more roles and 
responsibilities in carrying out their duties. However, at the stage of implementation, the 
situation became rather different. As opposed to the intentions of management stated in 
the planned change programme, management began to pay attention to the realities of the 
local context, some of which were at odds with the BPR cultural rules. In addition, the 
management of change became the job of not only the top management but also branch 
managers and other staff who needed to accommodate the demands of their context in the 
implementation process.
Thus, some of the rules and procedures of the change technique were considered not 
feasible to implement given the demands of the local context. In Wema bank, given the 
societal culture of a high power distance (Hofstede, 1980), it was decided that some 
customers will have to be treated differently from others. In addition, the economic 
situation of Nigeria and the attendant high rate of inflation meant that the proposed 
electronic authorisation and empowerment of staff would have to be moderated upon. 
Thus, empowerment was mixed with more controls and the all-electronic authorisation 
promised had to be combined with manual authorisation.
In UBA, the use of contract staff as cashiers presented similar problems in some branches 
where branch management decided to cut back on the approval level of cashiers because 
the commitment of these staff (as contract staff) may be questionable. Empowerment 
therefore, as envisaged by the organisational imperative of BPR (Tillquist, 1996), was 
deemed not feasible by such branch managers. At Wema bank, suggestions to sack staff 
and start from a “clean slate” was not feasible to implement because it contradicts the
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established ways of doing things within the organisation and the bank’s traditional link 
with a particular region of the country.
In addition to instances of rituals and symbolism, both banks were also rational and 
calculative in their implementation of technology and organisational change. Their 
approach to implementation was influenced by resources available like the financial 
strength of the bank, locational assets in terms of strategic branches and customer reach 
(size of branch network). Due to the high cost of restructuring branches and installing 
new IT systems, management decided to reengineer and implement new systems first in 
“strategic” branches. These branches contribute the most to the banks’ earnings, given the 
worth and the volume of business activities that takes place.
Although the decision to start implementation with strategic branches was motivated by 
resource related factors, the history of computerisation in both banks also reveals a 
further insight into the nature of the decision and adds a different dimension to it. 
Historically, the introduction of new IT systems in the two banks had always favoured 
selecting “important branches” to implement these systems given the expected return 
from the branches. When Wema bank started the implementation of the CAPs system in 
1989 and 1991, it started with some of its “important” branches. Similarly, when UBA 
started the implementation of the B1 Accounting Package, the MicroBoss Accounting 
System and BRAINS in 1985, 1989 and 1993 respectively, it started with some of its 
“strategic” branches in Lagos. Thus, a seemingly rational decision of selecting ‘cost- 
effective’ branches is also steeped deeply in established norms of practice within the 
banks. Therefore, the implementation and adaptations of global technology-based change 
programmes happened under the influence of both rational considerations and symbolic 
forces.
The important theoretical implication for management decision-making and actions is 
that symbolic or ritual actions are not necessarily dysfunctional. This study has further 
contributed to other growing body of work that has examined the implications of 
symbolic actions for organisational functioning. Johnson (1990) examined how strategic
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change can be galvanised through symbolic acts within the organisation. Similarly, 
Kamoche (1995) also examined how organisational reality can be socially constructed 
through a combination of ritual and language. Westphal and Zajac (1998) posited that 
symbolic corporate actions, in the form of long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) which 
symbolises congruence between CEO and shareholder interests, can engender significant 
positive stockholder reactions. In the two case study banks in this thesis, we have 
demonstrated how management and other bank staff, acting in the realm of known 
practices were able to successfully adapt and implement the change programmes to suit 
their context of operations.
6.7.2 IT transfer from within the local-global discourse
The analysis of case study findings also has some interesting implications for the transfer 
of IT and management techniques viewed from within the global-local discourse. These 
technologies and management techniques, developed in the ‘west’ and applied in 
countries around the world are becoming increasingly more universal as a result of the 
globalisation process. The broad implication for the local-global interaction is that such 
transfer does not necessarily imply homogeneity; the local is able to mediate global 
influences. Evidence from the case studies suggests that technology-based change and 
BPR, as features of the global institutional environment, were adapted at different 
organisational contexts. This process of adaptation arises when participants redefine the 
change programme based on available resources, professional expectations, history and 
tradition of doing things, and then act to tailor the techniques in order fit the 
organisation’s resource base. Adaptations also occur when participants act symbolically 
to perpetuate long established traditions within the organisation by operating within 
familiar territories.
A theoretical implication for the global-local debate is to reconsider the argument about 
homogeneity, cultural imperialism and cultural maturation. Similar to Hannerz’s view of 
‘homogeneity’ and a ‘maturation tendency’, this study has also demonstrated that the 
global-local interplay includes some measure of homogenisation as well as adaptation. 
However, unlike Hannerz, evidence from this study has indicated that implementation of
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global techniques does not imply cultural imperialism. Rather, what exists is some form 
of partial conformity when at the planning stage, organisations, aided by consultants’ 
advice and success stories of BPR, decided to adopt the technique. This partial 
conformity ensures that the banks achieve some measure of social legitimacy (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991) and signifies that the banks are in tune with developments in the 
industry.
Similar also to Hannerz, some form of maturation takes place where the local modifies 
the global. However, this modification as evidence from our study suggests, did not come 
after a long period of tinkering with the global as Hannerz argued. Rather, it came much 
sooner, when at the stage of implementing the technique questions were asked about the 
feasibility of their implementation. This distinction between homogeneity and 
homogenisation or partial conformity has implications for the study of the global-local 
interplay. It suggests that the implementation of global practices in local contexts 
alternate between conformity and adaptation modes. One or the other mode may well be 
dominant at specific stages of the organisational change process. In this study, some 
measure of conformity was discovered at the initiation stage when BPR, as a form of 
global technique, was recommended by consultants and was adopted by the banks. 
However, at the stage of implementation, series of modifications were made to the 
technique to the suit the culture and methods of operation at the implementation sites.
Within the technology transfer literature, current understanding suggests how societal and 
organisational cultures can limit the applicability of western management techniques in 
non-western contexts (Martisons and Westwood, 1997; Ein-Dor, et., al. 1993; Westwood, 
1995). However, these studies have only been interested in comparing western culture 
implied in MIS use with local culture. As important as these studies are, they do not 
provide a description and analysis of how organisations are able to modify western 
techniques to suit the context of use. This thesis has contributed in this respect through 
the application of resource and institutional views to demonstrate that the adaptation of 
global practices in local contexts involve a symbolic process of sustaining local norms
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and practices as well as a rational process of redefining global practices to suit the 
context of implementation.
6.7.3 Planning and implementing *global techniquesf: some practical considerations 
The idea that local adaptations to global change techniques entail a process of rational 
decision-making and symbolic practices has implications for how change practices are 
planned and implemented. At the stage of planning, it becomes important for 
management to align their strategies or plan to fit with the context of implementation. 
These strategies are not independent of the context in which they are implemented. While 
strategic plans are useful guidelines to make co-ordinated action, between the different 
branches or divisions of an organisation possible, however, some measure of flexibility 
needs to be incorporated into these plans to allow for local accommodation. This 
becomes more important in organisations such as banks with different branches operating 
in different environments. We witnessed this in the case studies where, despite the focus 
on standardisation and centralisation, different branches still operate differently in some 
instances. These deviations appear necessary to branch management as important for the 
smooth operation of the branch.
The practical implication of the lessons learnt from these case studies is that even rational 
decisions of management are made within a social context, which has to be taken into 
account. It would have been easy for the management of Wema bank to appoint a senior 
manager to head the BPR implementation team but such an appointment would have led 
to a series of confrontation with the banking union. This reveals an important lesson in 
the ethos or style of management in some of the banks in Nigeria. Management in these 
banks, especially the old generation banks, have been known to be very cautious and risk 
aversive, due in part to years of operating under military regimes in the country. Some of 
the problems related to this, which came to light during the pilot study and have been 
discussed elsewhere (Bada, 2000 a&b) and in chapter 4 of this thesis, are the often 
political and inconsistent policies, to which management responded by being cautious. 
During the financial crisis that took place in the immediate post-liberalisation era, 
majority of the liquidated banks were the ‘new’ generation banks with most of the old
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ones surviving. The old banks were able to survive because they played a ‘wait and see 
attitude’ to most of the developments that were taking place then.
The implication for the implementation of western management practices is that the 
social context, history and tradition of doing things within the local organisational 
context will have to be taken into consideration, as an unquestioned transfer of these 
practices may conflict with the culture of the organisation. Consultants and other agents 
of change need to be sensitive to the local ways of doing things. Implementation of BPR 
or indeed any other western management technique in any organisation should be seen as 
a unique task that will differ between contexts.
This leads to the understanding that agents of change should recognise and respect local 
values and practices when implementing change programmes. It would also require that 
consultants and other agents of change accept the limitations of teleological professional 
practices, thereby leading to a shift in orientation from global normative prescriptions or 
cultural models of change - as embodied in planned change techniques - to locally 
derived and locally relevant change models and practices. This means that consultants 
and other agents of change must be willing and prepared to accept a novel recombination 
of global practices to suit local needs and that such local versions of global techniques 
may not necessarily be dysfunctional.
It is suggested here therefore, that IT-based management techniques does not always 
possess ingrained qualities for success but that the implementation of such techniques 
would need careful consideration and some measure of flexibility to build in success 
qualities at the different levels of implementation. A related practical consideration is the 
level and type of resources and capabilities available within the organisation. Focusing on 
these at the stage of devising the plans will help understand the level of resources and 
capabilities available and building the necessary resource base able to implement and 
sustain the change initiative.
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Also at the level of practice, organisational change as rational and symbolic requires 
management paying attention to the intentions as stipulated in the plans as well as paying 
attention to different local interpretations and actions that evolve during the 
implementation of the plans (Weick, 1993). These interpretations and actions should not 
be seen as dysfunctional but contributing, in one way or another, to the overall 
functioning of the organisation.
6.8 Summary
In analysing the implementation of change in both banks, we discovered that the 
implementation of global techniques in local contexts took place partly planned and partly 
unplanned, leading to a gap between the planned change and what was eventually 
implemented. It may have been easy to dismiss this gap as another example of 
implementation failure. However, Mintzberg’s typology, which distinguished between 
intended and realised change helps us to reconsider the gap between the two, not as a sign of 
dysfimctionality, but as a creative opportunity for understanding what organisational change, 
and IT-related organisational change actually consists of, in specific organisational contexts.
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions
7.1 Introduction
The aim of the research has been to contribute to our understanding of the nature of local 
adaptations to global practices: how adaptations to global practices are achieved in DCs’ 
organisations and with what results. To this end, the thesis adopted a paradoxical stance 
in arguing that adaptations take place when organisations consciously modify global 
techniques in order to fit with their resource base and established patterns of practice. 
Adaptations also takes place ceremoniously when organisations modify the techniques 
because of the need to sustain long-established practices that may have become 
unquestioned as the appropriate way(s) of doing things. This chapter concludes the 
research effort with a review of how each chapter has contributed to the research 
objectives in the next section, discuss the research contributions and limitations in 
subsequent sections, including an overview of opportunities for further research.
7.2 Overview of the research
In chapter 1, the thesis examined the nature of the research problem. Organisations in 
DCs have been increasingly implementing IT and in addition adopting IT-based 
management techniques transferred from the ‘west’ as part of the globalisation process. 
Studies have questioned the mechanistic transfer of these techniques developed in a 
different context and suggested - based on cultural differences and other limiting factors - 
that implementing such techniques in a DC context requires some measure of 
modification. As important as these studies are, few have actually made an explicit effort 
to describe and reveal the nature of adaptations -  thus providing a systematic way of 
addressing the interaction of global practices (in the form of IT-enabled change 
programmes) and local interests. Three major perspectives on which the research stands
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namely, the globalisation discourse, technology transfer, and IT and organisational 
change were introduced.
Within the globalisation discourse, we focused on the global-local interaction debate and 
a review of the literature revealed different scenarios that have been painted, based on 
this interaction. One such scenario is the highly linear and deterministic view, which 
suggests that the local is increasingly been globalised and that the local is merely a 
recipient of culture from the global. At the other end is the interactive view which 
postulate that the interaction between the global and the local is mutual; the local 
influences the global just as much as the global influences the local. Following from this, 
we examined the literature on technology transfer focusing mainly on the set of literature 
that argues and questions the appropriateness of unquestioningly transferring technology 
and technology-based practices from the ‘west’ to DCs. The conclusion of these sets of 
literature was that the implementation of IT-based practices developed in the ‘west’ 
cannot be implemented mechanistically in DCs with the expectation of getting the same 
or similar results achieved in the ‘west’.
Also in chapter 1 we examined the literature on organisational change and IT-related 
organisational change models. A review of the literature on these topics demonstrated 
that organisational change and IT and organisational change models have evolved from 
early goal-based models to more subjective and dynamic models which considers change 
and the role of IT as interactive based on the interplay of a number of complex factors. 
Accommodating such complexity in the study of IT and organisational change thus 
require a research approach that allows for a multiplicity of factors and actors -  which 
then led us to adopt the contextualist framework and an interpretive research approach. 
As the aim of the research was to provide an understanding of ‘how’ and ‘why’ local 
adaptations take place, we chose the case study approach as our research strategy in order 
to provide a rich insight into the nature of local adaptations in DC context.
In chapter 2 we presented the theoretical perspectives for our study of IT and 
organisational change in Nigeria. Given the aim of addressing the global/local interaction
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we adopted an organisation-environment interaction perspective to the study of change. 
Such a perspective posits that organisations affect and are affected - to various extents - 
by the environment within which they operate. A central concern of this perspective is 
the issue of choice or determinism within the organisation-environment interaction. From 
a deterministic perspective, organisations are compelled to adapt and conform to 
environmental prescriptions, while from the choice perspective organisations have 
autonomy in deciding how they interact with the environment. Two theories -  resource- 
based approach and institutional theory -  were introduced to capture the views of the 
two perspectives. The resource-based view focus largely on how organisations can 
actively deploy their organisational endowments or resources to achieve a change 
programme while institutional theory posits that organisational actions are influenced 
largely by widely-held beliefs and assumptions which originate from the environment of 
organisations. The major contribution of chapter 2 is the adoption of the paradox 
approach to combine these two seemingly contrasting views and suggest that 
organisational action is both a rational process of actively deploying resources as well as 
a symbolic process of conforming to and sustaining widely-held beliefs and assumptions 
in the organisational context. This, in effect, was the driving theoretical framework of this 
research.
Building on the previous two chapters, chapter 3 introduced the initial conceptual 
framework for the study of IT and organisational change. This framework, based on 
Pettigrew’s contextualist approach discussed the content, context and process of change. 
Content of change refers to the streams of decisions and actions related to the change 
initiative. Following a review of organisational change models, it was suggested that the 
content of change include not just the planned change but also the emergent and realised 
change which may or may not be in line with the planned change. The context of change 
refers to the ‘Why’ of change and in line with Pettigrew’s model, we focused on the inner 
and outer contexts of change. The inner context consists of tangible and intangible 
organisational resources such as physical, financial and technological resources. Also the 
inner context includes the history of the organisation as well as established organisational 
patterns. The outer context includes changes and developments within the global banking
218
system and the Nigerian banking system in addition to economic and institutional (social 
and political) factors within this context. The chapter concludes with a review of change 
process models including the teleological, lifecycle, dialectical and evolutionary models 
and argued that a process model which views organisational change process as neither 
purely rational nor linear is best suited for this research. Such process models view 
organisational change as socially and historically mediated just as it is rationally 
motivated.
In chapters 4 and 5, the three parts of the framework were put into operation, first by 
looking at the outer context in chapter 4 and following this with two case studies 
describing the process of implementing global IT-based organisational change 
programmes in two Nigerian banks. More specifically, chapter 4 described the various 
changes that are taking place within the global banking system and the role of IT in these 
changes. The main aim of doing this was to explore whether, and to what extent, 
developments in the global systems were influencing changes within the Nigerian 
banking system. It was suggested that the use of IT in global banking has come to be 
taken-for- granted. As such, the implication for DCs organisations such as Nigerian banks 
could mean a restriction in the ability of these banks to question the wisdom of 
transferring IT and organisation change practices because of the overemphasis on 
technology. Such over concentration on technology could mean a focus only on 
technology as the appropriate strategy on which to compete. This could lead to banking 
services and products in Nigeria being detached from the needs of bank customers and 
the surrounding context in which the banks operate. This section thus concluded that 
given the contextual nature of banking, the transfer and implementation of global 
techniques and practices need to be contextualised or adapted to suit the local context of 
implementation.
Another major contribution of chapter 4 is the detailed account of changes and 
developments within the Nigerian banking industry since liberalisation in 1986. This 
detailed description served two purposes: to provide a comprehensive review of changes 
within the banking system, which until now, had been largely anecdotal, and secondly to
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serve as a reference point when describing the case studies in chapter 5. Such a 
description would serve to highlight influencing factors in the change efforts of 
individual banks and in turn how these efforts may have influenced the environment. The 
section started with a historical excursion into the evolution of the Nigerian banking 
industry from the period of colonial banking through to the period of heavy government 
involvement and finally the deregulation and subsequent liberalisation of the industry. A 
substantial part of this section then described the various changes that have taken place 
within the industry since liberalisation. This was done systematically by looking at 
changes within the industry and changes between the banking industry and other 
organisations such as the regulatory authorities, IT vendors and bank customers. These 
together, provided the institutional context of rules and norms of practice consistent with 
the views of the institutional theory.
In Chapter 5 we presented the two case study organisations implementing planned IT- 
based change programmes. These case studies revealed the complex dynamics 
surrounding the implementation of global IT and organisational change programmes in 
developing countries. The cases also provided rich insights into how these programmes 
were modified at the context of implementation and the factors found to be influential in 
these modifications. It was revealed in the case studies that despite the adoption of 
similar technique and the involvement of the same consulting firm, the implementation of 
the technique differed in the two banks and also between different branches of the same 
bank, depending on the idiosyncrasies of the branch. Modifications were identified at 
different levels of the banks including the company-wide management and branch 
management levels.
The case study findings were analysed in Chapter 6 using an extended version of the 
initial conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3. This analytical framework was 
derived through a synthesis of the conceptual models developed at the early stages of the 
research. Central to this framework is Mintzberg’s strategy typology which was adopted 
and extended to describe the process of change as planned, adapted and implemented 
change. Planned change refers to the intended plans or guidelines of management to
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adopt global IT-based programmes and adapted change refers to the process of adapting 
these programmes to suit the context of implementation. It is argued that such adaptation 
is both a conscious process of redefining the programme in order to fit the context of 
implementation as well as a symbolic process of moderating the technique because of 
long-established practices and rituals within the organisation. Realised change, then, is 
the implemented change which emerges out of the planned guidelines or blueprint of 
management as well as from the adapted change which takes place either consciously or 
symbolically through the unquestioned perpetuation of long-established traditions.
Using this schema to analyse the case study findings, the analysis and discussion in 
Chapter 6 was able to shed new light on the implementation of the change programmes in 
the two case studies. The importance of the resource and institutional contexts in 
influencing the change process was demonstrated. Further, it was argued that these two 
contexts influenced the change process in two ways: (1) by providing the “ammunition” 
for people to draw upon in interpreting and redefining the plan for change and (2) by 
providing ready-made solutions in which no conscious and deliberate actions were 
required. Thus, what appeared rational and calculative at first glance, becomes, on a 
closer inspection also symbolic and ceremonial. Based on the contextualist principles of 
content, context and process, we discussed the nature of local adaptations to global 
practices and both theoretical and practical implications of these conceptualisations were 
drawn.
7.3 Research Contributions
This section will consider the contributions of the research and its implications for future 
work. The section is divided into three parts addressing contributions to theory, 
methodology and practice. According to Walsham (1995), interpretive case studies make 
four major contributions to the body of knowledge: namely, the development of concepts, 
the generation of theory, the drawing of specific implications, and the contribution of rich 
insight in the subject matter. This research has contributed through the discussion of the 
attributes of adaptation and the introduction of concepts such as conceptual and 
operational adaptation. The research also contributed by drawing both theoretical and
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practical implications for implementing global IT-based techniques, and the two case 
studies have provided rich insights into the issue of adapting global practices.
7,3,1 Theoretical contributions
A major contribution worth mentioning here is the successful combination of two 
seemingly contrasting theories through the use of the paradox approach. Although IS is a 
multidisciplinary field and the use of different theoretical approaches has long been 
encouraged, few studies in this field have combined the resource-based view and 
institutional theory -  with their contrasting ideas - in one single study. Therefore, 
combining concepts and ideas from these two views contributes to the development of 
the IS field. Such combination through the paradox approach led to the suggestion that 
the implementation and adaptation of global IT-based practices in local contexts involves 
decisions and actions which are both rational and symbolic in nature. These decisions and 
actions, in the form of an enactment and ritual process specifies the desirability and 
feasibility of implementing global technology-based change programmes in DCs. Global 
techniques are deemed feasible if they fit in with existing organisational resources and 
local practices. This feasibility is determined either when organisational members 
consciously redefine the techniques in relation to organisational resources or when they 
unconsciously act to perpetuate established organisational practices. Global techniques 
are deemed not feasible when they are regarded as not congruent with existing 
organisational resources or in conflict with established local practices which have 
become unquestioned as the appropriate ways of doing things.
Another major theoretical contribution is the conceptualisation that adaptation of global 
IT-based practices in DCs involves a process of conceptual adaptation and an 
operational adaptation. Conceptual adaptation, which in the cases involve the 
modification of the basic assumptions of IT-enabled change programmes at the strategy- 
making level, ensures that these underlying assumptions fits in with available 
organisational resources and established ways of doing things within the organisation. On 
the other hand, operational adaptation, in the form of local modifications to the 
programmes at the point of implementation, ensures that the programme is workable and
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fits in with the needs and demands of the different contexts of implementation. This local 
modification highlights the important linkage between strategy and implementation and 
the problematic of studying strategy in isolation of the context of implementation. 
Previous studies, especially in DCs, have looked at IS strategy in isolation of the 
implementation context to conclude that identified gaps between strategy and 
implementation is a sign of implementation failure. In this research, we have been able to 
bring the two together to show that discrepancies between strategy and implementation 
may not always imply dysfunctionality.
An explicit theoretical contribution to the global-local interplay was to extend the debate 
about homogeneity or diversity. In this study, we have suggested that the interaction 
between local and global be viewed as a process involving some measure of conformity and 
adaptation. This suggests that instead of viewing the interaction as deterministic leading to 
cultural homogeneity, it should be viewed dynamically as a process resulting in some 
measure of homogenisation. This distinction between homogeneity and homogenisation has 
implications for the study of the global-local interplay. It suggests that the implementation 
of global practices in local contexts alternate between conformity and adaptation modes. 
One or the other mode may well be dominant at specific stages of the organisational change 
process. In this study, some instances of conformity were discovered at the initiation stage 
when the technique was recommended by consultants and adopted by the banks.
A final theoretical contribution is that this thesis has been able to present a discussion of 
globalisation and its implications from the perspective of Nigerian banks. This is in line with 
Kiely’s ‘actually-existing globalisation’ thesis, which stressed the importance of seeing 
globalisation as an occasion for concrete empirical investigation and argued that 
globalisation is experienced in different ways by different people in different parts of the 
world. As such, this thesis has described and discussed the experience of Nigerian banks in 
implementing IT and global IT-based management practices. Other studies can find 
inspiration from this work, either in terms of its content or the approach taken, to discuss the 
effects of globalisation on other industrial sectors (i.e. manufacturing) from within Nigeria 
and in other DCs.
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7.3,2 Methodological contributions
The main methodological contribution of the research has been the extension of Pettigrew’s 
contextualist approach, which has been criticised as lacking an adequate theoretical 
underpinning and a conceptual model for linking the external and internal contexts. In the 
thesis, we combined concepts and ideas from institutional theory and resource-based 
approach to study adaptations to planned technology-based change within the Nigerian 
banking industry. Such a combination provides the theoretical underpinning lacking in 
Pettigrew’s model and it allows for an examination of both symbolic and rational pressures 
that influence the process of implementing and adapting technology-based organisational 
change initiatives in a developing country context. Also by incorporating and elaborating 
Mintzberg’s strategy typology, the research was able to demonstrate - through the planned, 
adapted and implemented change concepts -  how external and internal factors are able to 
influence, and be influenced by, the change process.
Another methodological contribution for IS researchers relate to the adoption and use of 
concepts developed in other research areas. In this research, we have used two different 
theories to come up with the propositions that the adaptation of global practices in DCs is a 
rational process of actively deploying organisational resources to modify these practices and 
a symbolic process of ceremoniously perpetuating long established practices within the 
organisation. These propositions on one hand suggest rational and calculative decision­
making and on the other hand it suggests ceremonial and irrational actions. The propositions 
also suggest change and stability. Considered separately, there are some truth in these 
statements but when considered together, the arguments behind the propositions appear 
contradictory. Such contradictions are suggested here to contribute rich insights to the 
development of the IS field. In organisational and management studies such contradictions 
have been accepted and regarded as important in organisational functioning. As Van de Ven 
and Poole, (1988) notes:
“Notwithstanding these ambiguities, to accept a paradox is an enlightened conceptual stance. It is to 
acknowledge that things need not be consistent; that seemingly opposed viewpoints can inform one 
another; that our models are, after all, just models, incapable of fully capturing the buzzing, booming 
confusion no matter how strongly our logical arrogance tries to convince us otherwise”.
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A final methodological contribution relates to the study of IS in DCs and the 
appropriateness of applying theoretical models developed in different contexts. The 
applicability of some research models developed in the ‘west’ to studies in DCs have 
been questioned due to the restrictiveness of these models and differences that exist in 
social and cultural settings. In contrast, the flexible approach to the contextualist model 
adopted in this research and the use of theories such as institutional theory and resource 
based approach has contributed by providing examples of appropriate models to the study 
of IS in DCs. We find these models appropriate because they are non-specific to 
particular contexts given that all organisations, irrespective of their settings, have 
resources and established practices, and all organisational sectors and social settings have 
rules and beliefs that govern daily activities.
7.3.3 Practical contributions
The acceptance of paradox leads to a critical rethink of the assumptions that management 
and change agents hold when managing change. This critical rethink in turn leads, in the 
words of Eisenhardt and Westcott (1988), to the “qualitative and discontinuous reframing 
of a problem”. Thus, questions such as ‘how can implementation gaps or failures so 
commonly noticeable when implementing IT and IT-based techniques in DCs be 
overcome’ becomes ‘how can we manage and exploit contradictions or discrepancies 
arising from the persistence of local ways of life when implementing global techniques in 
DCs context’? Could this local persistence be seen as a source of differentiation and 
competitive advantage? Concentrating on such questions would then imply a change in 
focus from just fixing a ‘dysfunctional system’ to that of appreciating and exploiting 
what is good about the local ways of doing things. The implication of this for change 
agents, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is the willingness to value and appreciate 
local forms of knowledge and the limitations of global normative prescriptions.
In this study, local forms of knowledge and ways of doing things led to the modification 
and development of a ‘contextual’ version of the BPR technique within the Nigerian 
environment. Owing to differences between the ‘original’ BPR technique and the 
idiosyncrasies of the Nigerian banking and socio-cultural environment, a local form of
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the technique was developed which then became the standard for subsequent BPR 
initiatives. This requires some measure of flexibility on the part of consultants and other 
change agents and the willingness to accept a form of engrafting of local interests with 
the transferred global practices.
Another practical contribution of this research is the rich insight it provided to the two 
contexts of implementing IT-based techniques. The cases reveal that the idea that 
management can simply reengineer organisational processes anew starting from a ‘blank 
sheet’ is rather unreal, because history and tradition of doing things within the 
organisation influence restructuring activities. The importance of history and tradition as 
an important element in managing organisational change has been demonstrated in this 
study. Weick’s (1993) suggestion that organisational change is a bricolage makes 
management consultants or change agents bricoleurs. As bricoleurs, they make use of 
whatever is at hand to solve the problem before them, and this includes given attention to 
organisational routines and established ways of doing things.
A related practical concern, which we consider important, is the question of what 
constitutes ‘organisational context’. Different researchers have pointed to the importance 
of subcultures in organisations and in this study such concerns have been further raised 
through the study of (retail) banking institutions. Such institutions with branches that 
operate in different contexts (environment), have been able to shed further light on the 
importance of concentrating on sub-organisational contexts when implementing new IT 
and IT-based initiatives, as different branches operate differently depending on their local 
needs and preferences. The role of change plans or blueprints are highly valued in such 
contexts to ensure co-ordination amongst the different branches. However, such 
blueprints must be flexible enough to take into account the local needs and requirements 
of the different branches. Focusing on such local needs may therefore require some 
measure of modification to the implementation of new technology-based initiatives.
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7.4 Limitations and suggestions for further research
There are four major limitations to this study and each limitation has implications for 
further work. The first limitation concerns the use of the interpretive approach and the 
choice of the case study strategy. It is inevitable, in a research such as this, that the 
researcher’s own ‘bias’ will, to some extent, influence the kind of data collected, and how 
such data is interpreted. Suffice it to suggest here therefore that in reading this thesis, the 
reader should bear this inevitability in mind and make his or her own interpretation of 
events.
The in-depth case study approach is but one of a number of approaches that can be 
applied within the interpretive tradition. In this study, we viewed local adaptations to 
global trends as a process (which justified the choice of a case study approach in the first 
place) involving rational decision-making and organisational rituals. Such a focus on 
rituals and symbolism would perhaps have benefited more from an ethnographic study 
which would involve the researcher operating as a participant observer (going native) in 
the organisation and spending several months (perhaps years) in the field collecting data. 
Such an approach would provide rich insights into how the organisation’s rationalised 
myths or norms are formed and sustained (i.e. ritual activities) on a daily basis. However, 
given the length of time - with its concomitant financial implications - needed to stay ‘on 
site’ the method was not chosen. Thus, ethnographic study was deemed desirable but 
practical limitations made its choice in the present study not feasible. Therefore, a further 
study from an ethnographic stance, into how organisational norms and myths in Nigerian 
banks are formed and sustained, will provide further insight into the role of institutions 
and symbols to the study of local adaptations to global trends.
A second limitation of the study concerns the focus only on ‘old’ generation banks. The 
choice of these banks was deliberate given their long histories and traditions of practice. 
In addition, these banks are the ones at the forefront of the restructuring initiatives 
sweeping the industry at the time of collecting data for this study. However, as the 
researcher was to discover towards the end of the empirical study, some ‘new’ generation 
banks have also started plans to embark on major programmes of reform and
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repositioning. A number of these ‘new’ banks are also building their restructuring on 
BPR-type of initiatives and have engaged the services of consulting firms. As a result, it 
has not been possible to demonstrate the variability in the implementation of this 
technique in a rather different context of a ‘new’ generation bank. For instance, the Rural 
Banking Scheme, which featured prominently in the implementation and adaptation of 
the change programmes in the two case study banks, was annulled at the onset of the 
deregulation and liberalisation process. This, in effect, means that the ‘new’ generation 
banks did not have to comply with this regulation in establishing their branch network. A 
study of the implementation of global techniques in such a different context would serve 
not only to demonstrate how differences in context and management ethos influence the 
process of implementation and adaptation, but would also help to identify common 
patterns arising from the adaptation and implementation process.
A third limitation concerns the question of validity and the replication of lessons learnt. 
Although the study attempts to illustrate the implementation of global trends, 
emphasising local adaptations to such trends in Nigerian banks, the limited number (two) 
of case studies, and the uniqueness of the Nigerian context, may make the lessons learned 
not entirely transferable to other DCs organisations. Thus, it would be interesting to 
extend the study of local adaptations to global practices first, to other organisational 
contexts or sectors within Nigeria and second to other DCs context in order to further 
emphasise cross-cultural (particularly symbolic) influences. Such a study might consider 
the implementation of global IT-based practices in public institutions to study whether or 
to what extent local adaptations take place and why. This would help expand our 
knowledge of the importance of resource-related factors such as the financial strength of 
banking institutions (compared with public institutions) or institutional factors such as the 
role and influence of government agencies in the implementation and adaptation of IT- 
based practices in DCs.
A final limitation, which perhaps is akin to most study of organisational change, is the 
fact that change itself is an ongoing process. The presentation of the change initiatives in 
the two banks does not suggest that the banks have stopped changing or introducing new
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programmes. Indeed, towards the end of writing this thesis it was learnt that one of the 
banks has started the implementation of a new enterprise-wide system in continuation of 
its effort to make the bank “the number one bank in the country”. The other bank has also 
started new phases of its strategic plans involving establishing new branches outside the 
country and making the bank a “truly international bank”. In addition, old generation 
banks, generally, have begun talks with the government - through the CBN - on what is to 
be the fate of the rural banks established under the rural banking scheme (RBS). Most of 
these banks want to rid themselves of the “burden” of rural branches either by closing 
them down or selling them to interested buyers. While it is agreed that some of these 
developments will have implications for the banks’ future change efforts and branch 
network developments, however, some form of closure has to take place in order to 
complete a Ph.D. thesis within a certain time limit and space. But, in the words of Van 
Maanen (1988), “.. .we know our analysis is not finished, only over” (pg. 120)
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APPENDIX I
WEMA BANK PLC 
STRUCTURE OF BRANCHES BEFORE 
REENGINEERING
*H/0 Liaison
♦Correspondence
♦Corp. Clients Rel. Mgt/Marketing 
♦General Admin.
♦Security
♦Banking Ops. Supervision 
♦Correspondence
♦Data Processing ♦Correspondence 
♦Sec. Duties
Sundries TreasurySavingsCurrent Entries
Secretaries
Credit and Marketing
Branch Manager
Branch Accountant
Computer Operators
Credit Requests - Cash Payment ■ Cash Payment - Credit Facilities - Cash and Vault Admir . -Backroom
Processing
Credit Analysis - Cash Disbursement - Cash Disbursement - Monitoring - Bulk Cash Payment - Bank Drafts
Marketing - Customer Service • Customer Service - Bookkeeping - Bulk Cash Receipts - Funds Transfer
Debt Recovery - Drafts ■ Drafts - Interbranch - - Cash Disbursement to - Bills Payment
- Transfers ■ Transfers reconciliation cashiers - Salaries
- Clearing ■ Clearing - H/O Returns - Cheque Book -
- Salaries ■ Salaries - Periodic Returns requisition and
- Enquiries • Enquiries - Fixed Deposits - storage
- A/C opening/closing - A/C opening/closing
230
APPENDIX II
WEMA BANK PLC 
STRUCTURE OF BRANCHES AFTER 
REENGINEERING
♦Head Office Liaison
♦Marketing
♦Branch Supervision
♦Strategy Implementation Planning
♦Internal Control 
♦Customer Feedback 
♦Quality Control
♦T ellerT ransactions 
*Vault Admin.Teller and 
Vault
♦Office Maintenance 
♦General Services 
♦Security 
♦Auxiliary staff
♦Entries
♦Accounts Reconciliation 
♦Head Office Returns 
♦Backroom processing 
♦Clearing processing
Technology
Support
Risk
Managemen
Customer
Service
Accounts Admin.
Branch
Manager
Head 
Accounts and 
Administration
Internal
Control/Quality
Monitoring
Branch Banking 
Operations Team 
Leader
♦Credit Requests ♦Enquiries ♦User Support
♦Credit Analysis ♦Drafts 
♦Credit Monitoring ♦Transfers 
♦Loans and Advances ♦Salaries 
♦Debt Recovery ♦a/c opening and closing 
♦Cheque book requests 
♦Fixed Deposits 
♦Relationship Management
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APPENDIX III
UBA PLC 
STRUCTURE OF BRANCHES
BRANCH
MANAGER
* Head Office Liaison
* Marketing/Credit Requests
* General Branch Management
FUNDS
TRANSFER
CUSTOMER
SERVICES
CASH & 
TELLER
ADMINISTRATION & 
LOGISTICS
- Local funds transfer - Statement requests - Cash & Vault Admin. - Correspondence
- Bank drafts - Accounts opening/closing - Cash collection/payment - Sec. Duties
- Bills payments - Cheque book requests - Equipment
- General enquiries - Security
- Relationship management - Technology support
- Office maintenance
CREDIT & MARKETING
Corporate
Group
Consumer
Group
Commercial
Group
* Credit analysis
* Credit authorisation
* Credit monitoring
* Loans & Advances
* Debt Recovery
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APPENDIX IV
ORGANISATIONS INTERVIEWED
A). Banking Institutions
1. United Bank for Africa (UB A) Pic
2. All States Trust Bank
3. Guaranty Trust Bank
4. Wema Bank Pic
5. First Bank of Nigeria Pic
6. Merchant Banking Corporations
7. Nigerian Inter-Continental Merchant Bank
8. Diamond Bank
B). Regulatory Authorities
1. Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
2. Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC)
C). IT Vendors/Consultants
1. Unisys (Nig) Ltd.
2. ICL (Nig) Ltd
3. Inlaks Computers Ltd.
4. Andersen Consulting
5. DSC Consulting
D). Professional Associations
1. Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria (CIBN)
2. Financial Institutions Training Centre (FITC)
3. Computers Association of Nigeria (CO AN)
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APPENDIX V
INTERVIEW GUIDES
1. Questions about the wider context of deregulation, liberalisation & globalisation and 
opinions on these changes (Directors/Senior Managers; Regulatory Authorities; 
Professional Associations)
• What is the impact of government policies on the bank’s ability to 
change/restructure?
• Part of the reasons for the policy change is to increase competition, which is hoped, 
would lead to innovation and better services to the customer. Has this happened? If 
so, how? If not, why has it not happened?
• What is your assessment of the increasing presence of foreign banks and banks with 
foreign affiliation in Nigeria? Has this been particularly beneficial to local banks?
• How has the Nigerian banking scene changed in the last 5-10 years? (i.e. structure, 
size, services/products, employment procedures, composition of bank staff, training 
and management style)
• Has deregulation and liberalisation led to an increased use of IT within the industry? 
What has been the major impact of IT? What business areas has IT had most impact?
• How would you describe the relationship between banks in Nigeria? Is there enough 
co-ordination/communication? What was it like before and after liberalisation?
• Do you believe that IT is being used where it is needed most? If not why? What in 
your view has contributed to the problem? Where would you then say it is most 
needed?
• What is the nature of relationship between regulatory authorities and banking 
institutions? How has this changed in the last 10-15 years? Give examples
2. Questions about the changing nature of competition within the banking industry 
and how it affects focal bank. (Directors and Senior Managers)
• How has the bank responded to changes in its environment? In the past 10 years, has 
the bank’s strategy included the introduction of IT-related change programmes?
• Questions about government regulations including particular regulations that made 
substantial impact on focal bank’s strategy. What are the implications of these 
regulations for the use/choice of IT in the bank?
234
3. Questions relating to the process o f conceiving, selecting and implementing change 
programme in focal bank,(Directors and Senior Managers; implementation team)
• Can you tell me briefly about the process of introducing (analysing, selecting and 
implementing) the change/restructuring programme? Briefly describe the events 
leading up to the implementation of this change programme. Who was involved? 
What factors (internal and external) influenced decisions?
• What were the expectations in introducing this programme? Have they been met? 
Give examples.
• During the process of introducing this initiative, were there any transitional 
problems? Give examples. How did you overcome them?
• Did you have to make any changes during the implementation of the programme? 
What are these changes you made? Why did you make the changes?
4. Questions relating to the history of computerisation in the bank/history o f bank's 
IT department (IT Director/Manager and staff)
• When was the department established?
• What is the size/composition of IT department?
• What is the location of IT department within the organisation?
• To whom does IT report?
• What has been the history of computerisation in organisation?
5. Questions concerning the nature of changes in bank branches (Branch staff)
• How has the liberalisation drive and the increasing use of IT changed the culture of 
branch banking in Nigeria? Give examples.
• Does the branch have any particular set of customers that it caters for? How has this 
changed since liberalisation? Give examples
• What is the nature of changes that have taken place in the branch? Specific examples
• Have there been changes in the skills of branch staff; performance of staff; interaction 
with peers, superiors and customers; nature of training given to staff.
• Were there any transitional problems in implementing the changes? Give examples. 
How did you overcome them?
• Did you have to make any changes during the implementation of the programme? 
What are these changes you made? Why did you make the changes?
• How different is it to work in the branch now with the changes that have taken place?
• Was the branch manager involved in the restructuring of the branch? How?
• Observation of work processes in bank branches
6. Questions about the method/process of implementing IT and change within the 
banking system (IT vendors/consultants)
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• How would you describe your experience of implementing IT systems/change 
programmes in Nigeria?
• What sort of challenges do you encounter? How do you deal with them?
• What sort of methods/approaches do you employ during the implementation of these 
systems/programmes?
• What is the process of restructuring organisations in Nigeria (i.e. source of ideas; 
selection of particular method; implementing chosen method)
• Any standard methods or methodologies employed?
7. General Questions (Allparticipating organisations)
• Background/Description of organisation
• Mission of organisation
• Description of organisational structure
• Culture of the organisation
• Interviewee information (Name, Title; Responsibilities; Background)
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Abstract
The case study described in this paper concerns the implementation o f a planned 
information technology-based organisational change programme in a Nigerian bank. The 
change initiative is a culmination of earlier attempts by the bank to transform itself from 
a regional, government-owned bank, to a private bank with a national coverage, and a 
major player within the industry. At the time of data collection, the programme was in its 
fourth year and a substantial amount of resources had been committed to the project. 
This case provides an illustration o f how Nigerian banks are changing in response to 
global pressures o f deregulation and liberalisation, and how they are using technology in 
this change process.
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Introduction
In contemporary times, the utilisation of information technology (IT) in any part of the 
world can be regarded as taking place within the globalisation trend. The need to take a 
wider view of IT use has become important due to the effects of the globalisation process 
and the ease with which IT and associated management practices now permeate 
countries. In Africa, on the advice of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), majority of countries embarked 
upon the task of deregulating and liberalising their economies. In addition, different 
economic sectors, including banking, have over the past few years been investing 
extensively in IT and adopting western management techniques like BPR and TQM with 
a view to taking part in the globalisation process.
1 ( \A useful definition of globalisation given by Giddens (1990) refers to the concept as ‘the 
intensification of worldwide social relations that links distant localities in such a way that 
local developments become a function of events occurring many miles away and vice 
versa*. Similarly, Castells (1996) described the trend of an increasing interconnection of 
economic activities and social relations, which he referred to as a “networked deeply 
interdependent global economy”. Thus, globalisation essentially refers to a world in which 
societies (and culture) have, in one way or another, come closer together (Kiely, 1998).
It is this coming closer together and its implications, that are central to much of the 
debate on globalisation. These debates have focused on what happens to local identities 
within a globalising world (Hannerz, 1991; Robertson, 1992; Kiely, 1998). Different 
scenarios have been painted as to the possible consequences of this interplay between 
local and global tendencies. Ranging from the highly deterministic “homogenisation” 
thesis of the global institutionalist school (McNeely, 1990) to the interactive ‘mutual 
influence’ views of Robertson (1992), these views posit different implications of the 
globalisation trend on local societies. Clearly influenced by some of these debates, 
studies are beginning to examine whether the globalisation process portends homogeneity
76 While, there is a general agreement on the importance o f the globalisation trend in contemporary times, 
there still exist some debates about what the term actually mean (Robertson, 1992).
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for developing countries’ (DCs) organisations or whether these organisations can utilise 
IT and IT-based management techniques according to the socio-cultural requirements of 
their contexts (Walsham, 1998).
In his contribution to the globalisation debate, Kiely (1998) used the term actually 
existing globalisation to explain the importance of examining globalisation 'as an agenda 
for concrete empirical investigation' as opposed to viewing globalisation as a meta­
theory. What this means is that globalisation is experienced in different ways by different 
people in different parts of the world. The implication of this is that the local context 
matters; that global techniques employed in the ‘west’ cannot be implemented 
mechanistically in DCs without due consideration for the local context. Giving 
consideration to the local context may therefore imply some form of modification or 
adaptation to ‘western’ techniques when they are being implemented in DCs. But exactly 
how these modifications are achieved is still poorly understood, leaving it a fruitful area 
for research. In line with this view, this paper explores how a Nigerian bank responded to 
changes in its environment and adopted Business Process Reengineering (BPR) as its 
‘official’ response to an increasingly competitive environment. Specifically, this study 
will emphasise local adaptations to a global instrument or technique such as business 
process reengineering (BPR).
Wema Bank Pic. was formed in 1945 by a group of Nigerian private investors. It was 
among a number of banks that were established during this period as a direct response to 
allegations of anti-Nigerian activities levelled against expatriate banks operating in the 
country. The bank was established with the sole aim of assisting indigenous business men 
and women who were discriminated against in the provision of credit facilities by these 
expatriate banks (Adegbite, 1994). During its early years, the bank was beset with a 
number of problems which new banks of its generation faced - lack of a strong 
management and an inadequate capital base. In order to keep the bank afloat, it received 
support in the form of grants from the government of the defunct Western region of 
Nigeria, such that by 1969 government bought over and took full control of the bank. In
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1990, Wema bank was privatised and management decided to embark on a major re­
organisation of the bank as a response to an increasingly competitive environment. The 
bank, like many others within the industry, decided to embark on process reengineering 
as a “survival” strategy in the face of dwindling margins, increased competition and 
growing sophistication of customer demands. It is the implementation of this project (as a 
form of IT-enabled change initiative) that is the focus of this paper.
It is hoped, a study such as this would help illuminate issues in IT and organisational 
transformation within the banking industry in Nigeria amidst environmental imperatives 
of liberalisation and globalisation. The study will also contribute to the discussion on the 
impact of the globalisation trend on organisations much of which, to date, have been 
highly western-centric (Walsham, 1998). A study of the process of interaction between 
local context and global trends (i.e. BPR) constitutes a contribution in studying whether 
or not globalisation is a monolithic and homogenous process. In the next section we will 
examine the research strategy followed by the theoretical framework for our study of IT- 
enabled change in this bank. The contexts of change in Wema Bank Pic is then 
introduced to highlight the factors which were found to influence the implementation of 
the project. The next section discusses the implementation, focusing specifically on 
management decisions that shaped the outcome of the project.
Research Strategy
Traditionally within the information systems (IS) field, research strategies have been 
divided into two camps: the qualitative approach and the quantitative approach. The 
quantitative approach relies on the use of numbers, which are used deductively to explain 
and predict organisational phenomena and to provide generalisations about organisations. 
This approach has however been criticised in IS literature for its treatment of 
organisational reality which is regarded as complex and not easily amenable to statistical 
deductions. A more holistic and qualitative approach which captures the fully reality of 
organisational behaviour in "its settings" has therefore being proposed and increasingly 
being employed in IS research (Walsham, 1993). In this study we will adopt such a
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qualitative approach which will focus on how a Nigerian bank is changing in response to 
changes in its environment.
According to Walsham (1993), case studies are perhaps the most appropriate strategy for 
conducting empirical research from an interpretive stance. Case studies are defined as an 
empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary issue or event within its real-life 
context, especially where the boundary between such issues or event and its context is not 
clearly defined (Yin, 1994). Much of the criticisms levelled against the case study 
strategy relate to the fact that because it is specific to only a small number of cases, it is 
very hard to generalise to a wider range of situations. Also the richness and complexity of 
the data collected means that the data is often open to a number of very different 
interpretations, such that researcher bias is a constant danger (Conford & Smithson, 1996). 
Despite these limitations, especially that of not being able to provide generalisability in a 
statistical sense, Pettigrew (1985) still believes that case studies are useful in developing 
and refining generalisable concepts.
Data for this study was gathered as part of a study of IT use within the Nigerian banking 
system between March 1997 and August 1999. The first set of interviews were conducted 
between March and May 1997, basically to understand in as much detail as possible, the 
level of computerisation within the industry as very little existed in the area of literature. 
This was followed in the summer of 1999, by an in-depth study of three commercial 
banks, one of which is presented in this paper. Multiple methods of data collection were 
employed including interviews, documentary review and direct observation. Interviews 
were conducted at the Head Office of the bank in Lagos and also in a number of branches 
within Lagos. In all, 18 interviews were held at this bank with different grades of staff 
both at the head office and in branches. In the next section we will examine the 
theoretical framework for the study of IT-enabled organisational change in Wema bank.
IT-enabled change: Planned or emergent change?
A model of IT-enabled organisational change implies a planned approach to change in view 
of the insistence that IT can be strategically redeployed to effect deliberate, wide-ranging
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changes to an organisation (Tillquist, 1996). Planned change involves a deliberate, 
purposeful, and explicit decision to engage in a program of change (Levy & Murray, 
1986). It normally originates with a decision77 from management to improve on how the 
organisation functions, to create and communicate a vision of the change initiative and to 
implement necessary changes (Levy & Murray, 1986; Plant, 1987; Wilson, 1992). 
Planned organisational change also entails the use of external agents of change such as 
management consultants who see through the process of change (Ginsberg & 
Abrahamson, 1991). A planned approach to organisational change - because of its 
emphasis on top management decision-making- has resulted in a plethora of models 
aimed to develop and train managers in a set of competences regarded as necessary for 
managing change (Wilson, 1992). Such models aim to assist management in 
understanding and exploiting opportunities engendered by a change in the environment as 
well as avoiding threats (Johnson & Scholes, 1989).
Dominant IT-enabled organisational change models have therefore focused on improving 
management analytical strengths in understanding the environment of their organisations 
and how to exploit the potentials of IT in order to secure a competitive position for the 
organisation (Porter & Miller, 1984; Scott-Morton, 1991; Hammer & Champy, 1993). 
According to these models that argue that change can be planned in advance with 
computerisation, organisational change is the direct outcome of computerisation and 
technology is expected to take a leading role in organisational change (Short & 
Venkatraman, 1992; Venkatraman et al., 1993; Venkatraman, 1994). This implies that the 
successful implementation of IT-enabled transformation is a deliberate attempt by 
management to deploy IT capabilities and associated management techniques to transform 
the organisation and introduce new forms of strategies that will improve organisational 
functioning. IT is thus seen as “an essential enabler” of business improvements through the 
availability of powerful information and communications technology which makes essential
77 Such decisions are mainly strategic in nature in view o f the fact that they entail the organisation 
committing substantial amount o f resources, setting precedents and taking crucial actions which affect the 
long-term health and survival o f the organisation (Mintzberg et. al, 1976). In addition such change 
initiatives usually have implications for the entire organisation and its customers.
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information easily available thereby empowering workers to make more ‘informed’ 
decisions (Tillquist, 1996).
This rather teleological view of IT use implied by IT-enabled change has however been 
criticised as "black-boxing" fundamental social, political, historical as well as technical 
aspects of organisational change (Tillquist, 1996) - which are essential for understanding the 
true nature of organisational change in reality. Organisations’ actions are rarely 
unidirectional and as such an interactive or emergent model, which captures the dynamic 
relationship between the technology and the socio-organisational contexts, seems to be more 
appropriate (Markus & Robey, 1988). This therefore calls for a re-conceptualisation of 
planned change stressing the non-linear and subjective nature of change programmes.
Planned change initiatives in the form of IT-enabled organisational change can be viewed as 
strategic change (DeCock, 1996). Within the strategic management school, current 
perspectives on strategic change questions the extent to which change can be planned in 
advance and carried out in a rational and linear fashion. They point to the emergent nature 
and the subjective character of change which technical/rational models are unable to account 
for. The subjective and emergent nature of change posits that IT-enabled organisational 
change is a function of both human choice and environmental characteristics (Markus & 
Robey, 1988). Similarly Orlikowski (1991), argued that technology-based change should be 
viewed as a non-deterministic process which takes into account the role of technology, 
human choice and actions involved, as well as the socio-historical context of the 
organisation.
What this means is that change cannot always be planned in advance; that it occurs in an 
emergent fashion and that the result is not always what is intended. Mintzberg’s strategy 
typology (1978) distinguished between intended, emergent and realised strategies to 
show that strategies are as much planned as they are unintended. Intended strategy is the 
“deliberate conscious set of guidelines that determines decisions into the future” and 
realised strategy is defined as “a posteriori consistencies in decisional behaviour” 
(Mintzberg, 1978:945). This view of strategy distinguishes between decisions and
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actions, which represents intentions and realised activities respectively (Mintzberg & 
Waters, 1985).
In the context of organisational change, intended strategy relates to the planned and 
deliberate decisions by management to engage in some form of change and realised 
strategy refers to the various actions taken to implement the change initiative. This proves 
particularly useful for the study of change because it allows us to focus not only on the 
planned strategies for change, but also on the observable patterns of action; some of 
which are deliberate as a result of the intentions and others emergent arising outside of 
the deliberate plans. It therefore provides an alternative to the highly teleological 
approach of the technical/rational perspective and is more in line with the emergent 
nature of social and organisational phenomena.
Other criticisms of IT-enabled organisational change programmes focus on the separation of 
technological change and organisational change and argue that such separation is rather 
‘artificial’ and does not capture the true nature of the interaction between IT and the 
organisational context of its implementation (Avgerou, forthcoming). Based on the ideas of 
the actor network school which views the content of change as including a ‘heterogeneous 
network’ of actors and IT-supported organisational processes (Callon & Law, 1989), the 
author argued that the content of change should not just focus on IT but also on the 
differentiated network of actors and institutions within which the technology is being 
implemented. Therefore, IT-enabled organisational change is embedded in and inseparable 
from the social and organisational processes that surrounds it.
To summarise, existing literature has shown the futility of a rational and overtly simplistic 
view of IT-enabled organisational change. Majority of studies now accept the wisdom of 
adopting more "socially rich" models which capture the full complexity of organisations and 
how they change (Tillquist, 1996). Such socially rich models would capture the dynamic 
relationship between technology innovation and social changes in the organisational context. 
Pettigrew et. al., (1992: 8) emphasised the importance of complementing rational models 
with more eclectic ones able to identify the different causes of change such as the political,
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cultural as well as economic influences. Mintzberg’s strategy typology has shown us that the 
planned and deliberate approach to change doesn’t capture the true reality of how 
organisations function. That organisational change consists of both the deliberate decisions 
or initiatives of management as well as the realised decisions and actions which may differ 
from what was intended. In addition, organisational change is socially and historically 
mediated just as it is economically motivated. In the next section we will examine the 
contexts of change in Wema Bank Pic to highlight the factors which were to influence the 
implementation of the project.
The contexts of change at Wema
In this section, we will look at the broad context within which Wema bank operated 
before and during the restructuring programme, highlighting within each context, 
economic, social, political and cultural factors which the bank had to contend with in the 
implementation of the change initiative. This will provide a useful setting with which to 
describe and explain the decisions management took during the implementation of the 
programme. Table 1 presents the categories of inner and outer contexts that were found to 
be influential within the change process at Wema bank.
78Wider Institutional Context
Regulatory Pressures. On the advice of international financial institutions (IFIs) such as 
the World Bank and IMF, the Federal government of Nigeria embarked on a programme 
of reform to deregulate the economy. Just as in most of Africa, this programme was 
supported by a loan agreement from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)79. This 
programme, known as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), was introduced in 
1986 and it consequently led to the liberalisation of the banking industry. The implication 
of this was that the number of banks operating in the country increased from 41 in 1986 
to 117 in 1995. This led to an increased level of competition as old banks started 
competing with the new ones for customer deposits. Another important government
78 For more discussions on the wider institutional context o f banking in Nigeria, see Bada (2000, 
forthcoming).
79 In a study by Mohan (1996) it was revealed that 38 out of the 43 countries (or 88%) which have introduced 
the programme had entered into an agreement with the IMF as part of their SAPs.
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policy to influence Wema’s change programme was the Rural Banking Scheme. Through 
this scheme, government compelled all banks to increase their presence in rural areas by 
allocating to each bank a minimum number of branches they have to establish within a 
specified length of time in the rural areas. This was initiated to encourage rural banking 
habits and also to mop up excess liquidity in these areas and to bring them into the 
mainstream financial plan of the country. The Scheme was however abandoned after the 
industry was liberalised in 1989, as it was argued that such a policy of establishing 
branches in “unprofitable” areas conflicts with the tenets of profitability and efficiency 
which the government was preaching with the introduction of SAP. Although this scheme 
had been abolished, its ramifications are still prevalent within the banking industry today 
and featured quite prominently in the change initiative of Wema bank.
Increased Competition. A direct consequence of liberalisation and subsequent explosion 
in the number of banks is the financial crisis, which the banking system suffered in the 
immediate post-liberalisation era. As a result of this crisis, more than 60 banks (both old 
and new) were closed down by the government as they were adjudged to be in a state of 
distress80. A large number of customers lost their deposits and vowed never to use banks 
again - as such the system suffered a major credibility crisis. Surviving banks (of which 
Wema bank was one) had to find better ways of serving existing customers and attracting 
new ones. Competition was also heightened up with the influx of new banks following 
the liberalisation of the industry. A number of the new banks are subsidiaries of foreign 
banks and some are local banks with a mixture of expatriate and local management staff.
Societal expectations. Prior to liberalisation and to the coming of these new banks the 
culture of banking within the industry was described as “armchair banking”. Armchair 
banking in the sense that the level and quality of service delivery was regarded as poor; 
customers were at the mercy of banks and were forced to accept whatever level of service 
banks offered. However, with the coming of the new banks, they brought with them
80 Financial distress is defined as a situation in which a financial institution is unable to fulfill its 
obligations to its customers, its owners and the economy due to weaknesses in its financial, operational and 
managerial capabilities which in effect renders it illiquid or insolvent (CBN Briefs, 1996 Series). In 1989, 8
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completely different approach to serving customers and a more advanced level of 
computerisation - some of which was to later become the ‘standard’ within the industry. 
Existing bank customers seeing what obtains in some of these banks started asking their 
old banks for the same level and quality of service, which therefore meant that banks had 
to change.
Inner context
Management structure and style. The management structure of Wema bank can be 
described as stable. Majority of the board-level directors have been working in the bank 
for an average of 15 - 20 years and most of them have come through the ranks and have 
wide experience of the Nigerian banking scene. This stability at the top is as a result of 
the bank’s human resource policy which puts a lot of attention in to building a family of 
employees -  named the “Wema family”. This policy has seen the bank achieve a low 
staff turnover over the years. While Wema bank is not among the highest paying bank in 
the industry, this is however compensated for by the bank’s stable human resource 
policies.
Structure of branches. The structure of Wema bank branches before re-engineering 
reflects an organization highly structured along functional lines. In addition, there was a 
lot of segregation and jobs were fragmented along functional lines. For instance, cashiers 
in one department (i.e. Savings Department) are not allowed to attend to customers in 
other departments (such as current accounts) and are thus restricted to carrying out 
transactions related only to their units. In addition, cashiers’ job was purely routine with 
the implication that cashiers are not allowed to pay out any amount of money without 
seeking approval from a supervisor. All these add to the already cumbersome process of 
branch banking at Wema Bank plus the added stress of a poor service delivery culture.
Culture of branches. The culture of Wema bank branches typifies the general culture of 
banking in Nigeria before liberalisation. A prevalent issue then was the poor quality of
banks were adjudged to be distressed and were subsequently closed down. The total number of banks closed 
down increased dramatically to 63 by January 1998.
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service delivery and consequently a poor bank-customer relationship as staff didn’t see 
any need to foster a closer relationship with customers except for their personal gain. The 
average length of time for transacting business within the branch was between 2 -3  hours 
even for simple transactions such as checking account balance or for cash withdrawal. 
The implication of this is a practice known in local parlance as “man know man”. This is 
the practice whereby a customer sees it as important to make friends with one of the 
branch staff to be able to get through the cumbersome process of banking - in return for 
some form of gratification. People who are unfortunate enough not to know anyone are
o  t
thus made to suffer, as they are the ones who spend hours in the bank . A side effect of 
this practice is the lack of orderliness in bank branches and the absence of a queue 
culture. Given the fact that banking transaction is based on who you know, there was 
therefore no reason - as far as customers are concerned - to queue up in order to be 
served. In the next section, we will discuss specific content of IT and organisational 
change at Wema bank before going on to discuss the process of implementing the change 
initiative in the section that follows.
IT-enabled change in Wema bank: the BPR project
The 1980s were a trying period for Wema bank. In spite of continued injection of fimds 
by the government, the bank did not record its first substantial profit until 1988 and it was 
not until the following year (1989) that the bank was able to declare its first dividends. 
By this time, competition was becoming tougher within the industry following the 
deregulation of the economy and the liberalisation of the banking sector. In its response 
to the increased level of competition, the management of Wema bank embarked on 
strategic planning which was viewed by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at that time 
as the “way forward” for the bank. In October 1988, the Board approved the appointment 
of a multinational consulting firm to handle the project. Work on the Plan started in May 
1989 between the consultants and members of Wema Bank Pic and by the end of August 
1989, the team came up with the bank’s first strategic plan.
81 A particular advert in the local press paints this picture quite clearly where a person coming to the bank 
to do business had to come with his folded chair because he knew it was going to be a long wait and all the 
seats in the branch would have been occupied.
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The strategic plan was based on achieving substantial level of change in three key areas 
namely: Geographic Spread; Business Focus and Image Management. A shift in 
geographic coverage was to see the bank open new branches in areas other than the 
Western part of the country from which it originates and from which about 90% of its 
current branches are located. Changing the business focus entails building and sustaining 
a viable marketing culture for the bank which would portray an image of an urban bank 
and which would ultimately bring in new sets of customers. Finally, the focus on image 
management would see the increase in private ownership of the bank to 60% to further 
remove the tag of a government-controlled bank and thus improve its corporate standing. 
The sum total of these initiatives was “to see Wema rank amongst the top five banking 
institutions in Nigeria in terms of key industry indicator of size, financial performance, 
improved quality of service and overall corporate image” (Adegbite, 1994).
The 1st Plan lasted till the end of 1992 after which it was replaced by the 2nd Strategic 
Plan in 1993. Aiming to build on some of the gains of the first phase, the bank identified 
as being of crucial importance, the task of “significantly improving retail banking 
efficiency”. In other words, to focus on a comprehensive restructuring of its branch 
activities to achieve better service delivery to its customers. By the time the 2nd Strategic 
Plan was drafted, the new banks have started encroaching steadily into the market and are 
starting to ‘eat’ into the business of the old banks. The new banks employed aggressive 
marketing techniques and enticed customers with a lot of ‘sweeteners’ such as higher 
interest rates on deposits. For a while, the tactic worked as the market share of the old 
generation banks started dwindling. It was therefore not surprising to find that the main 
focus of Wema bank’s 2nd Strategic Plan was to improve retail banking efficiency with a 
view to increasing, or at least maintaining, its share of the domestic retail market. It is 
also quite worthy to note that by now the bank had started talking about “using modem 
technology” and “implementing state-of-the-art telecommunications technologies”. This 
is because the period of the 2nd strategic plan coincided with the period of increased 
technology input from the new generation of banks.
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The main focus of the 2nd Strategic Plan was the Branch Process Re-engineering (BPR) 
project. The bank, like many others within the industry, decided to embark on process 
reengineering as a “survival” strategy in the face of dwindling margins, increased 
competition and growing sophistication of customer demands. The BPR project was 
actually hinged on three smaller interrelated projects which were: branch 
computerisation, inter-connectivity and networking of branches in a Wide Area Network 
(WAN) and branch process redesign. In branch computerisation, the team of consultants 
recommended that the bank should aim to make more effective use of information 
technology in branch operations and to automate some of its head office functions. It was 
also recommended that branch process redesign should aim to achieve “quantum leap 
improvements in quality, speed, efficiency and effectiveness of customer delivery”. To 
achieve this objective, the team recommended major changes in branch operations 
including a complete overhaul of staff profile; new sets of staff, mostly university 
graduates were to be employed to work in the reengineered branches.
However, in implementing the plan, the target of branch computerisation was to proceed 
with caution. The bank appreciated the fact that despite the importance of branches to its 
operations and despite the goal of “effectively utilising all its branches”; it could not 
computerise all of them. Reasons given for this included the sheer cost of 
computerisation, buying peripheral equipment such as Uninterrupted Power Supply 
(UPS) and also the cost of linking up branches in a WAN. Other factors, which 
influenced the decision to adopt a cautious approach, were the fact that a substantial 
number of branches - especially the ones regarded as “political branches” - are loss- 
making branches, which, since the day they were opened were “yet to break-even, not to 
talk of making profits”. These branches were opened in compliance with government 
regulations under the Rural Banking Scheme that banks should increase their presence in 
rural areas to encourage widespread banking. As a result, non-economic factors informed 
the opening of the branches and they have been kept alive because government would not 
permit their closure - even after the Rural Banking Scheme had been abolished.
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The realisation of this was the total exclusion of the bank’s 21 rural branches and a three­
tiered approach to the BPR project in the remaining 51 branches. These three layers of 
the BPR project are re-engineering, re-designing and streamlining. The top end - which 
is re-engineering - involves investing in state-of-the-art technology, new banking 
application software and network inter-connectivity in a small number of “strategic” 
branches, with corporate customers and which contributes the most to the bank’s 
earnings. At the lowest end - which is streamlining -  BPR involves restructuring the 
operations of branches, but with no technology involved. Existing manual systems are re­
worked and changes are made, but essentially data is kept on card files and signatures are 
verified manually with the use of mandate cards. Sandwiched between these two, and 
with the greatest number, are branches which are regarded as of importance to the bank’s 
earnings but not “strategic” enough to warrant investing in new technology - these are the 
re-designed branches. These branches will be restructured but will not have any new 
technology introduced; rather existing software and hardware would be upgraded and 
then put back to use.
The actual process of implementation or “roll-out” (as it is referred to within the bank) 
started with the piloting of the project at two of the bank’s branches in Lagos followed by 
a period of phased-rollout to all the other branches. After a period of about 6 months, the 
project was adjudged to have been successful at the pilot sites and as such could be 
“rolled-out” to other branches of the bank. By now, it had been decided that the 
management consultants would no longer take the lead role in implementing the new 
procedures at the roll-out phase. Instead a 4-man implementation team was chosen from 
among members of staff who had undergone intensive training and worked under the new 
procedures at the pilot sites. This implementation team, which was headed by a middle- 
level manager, was to take over from the management consultants and was expected to 
take the lead in the implementation process.
The roll-out plan during this phase depended heavily on the dedicated implementation 
team who worked with the bank’s personnel department to select new personnel needed 
to handle the re-engineered branches. Management believed that to actually re-engineer a
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branch and to achieve the level of ‘rebirth’ that is needed in a re-engineered branch, a 
change of personnel must accompany process reengineering. Specifically, this was 
needed to prevent a continuation of the old practice of branch customers familiarising 
themselves with staff in order to get service quicker. In a re-engineered branch this 
culture of ‘internal help’ was deemed unnecessary, as everybody will be served on time 
and with the quality of service that they deserve.
Therefore, a complete set of new staff were selected into reengineered branches from 
other branches within the network so as to symbolise what branch re-engineering was all 
about and to drive home the point that reengineering was indeed aimed at breaking away 
from the old ways of doing things. According to one member of the pilot team at 
Dopemu branch:
“We favour moving people when we want to convert because under the old dispensation 
nobody cares about service delivery, nobody really cares as to whether customers get 
served or not and so you discover that that system actually gives room for what we call 
"personalised customers". So we feel that if  we allow such staff to still remain within that 
branch at the early stage it will go a long way to derailing the system. We want 
customers to go as they come in - first come; first served”.
Reengineering brought about a number of changes in terms of how the branches are 
managed, the physical layout of branches, and in banking processes. With regards to 
changes in processes, the major changes experienced involved the redesign of the work of 
cashiers to expand the scope of their duties. Prior to reengineering, cashier’s job was 
highly segmented with different cashiers performing different functions. After 
reengineering, a new concept of “universal tellering” was introduced to signify that one 
teller can now perform all of the previously segregated functions. In addition to the 
expansion of duties, cashiers were “empowered” to pay out cash within a certain limit. 
Previously, a cashier had to obtain authorisation from a senior staff member before any 
money is paid out at all. This slowed down the process of cash withdrawal. However, 
with reengineering, cashiers were given authorisation to pay up to 5000 Naira after which 
they will need authorisation.
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Discussion: Another look at BPR implementation at Wema
The BPR project at Wema Bank Pic was initiated by management as “a statement of 
intent” to transform the fortunes of the bank. However, in implementing the project we 
discovered a gap between the intentions and what was eventually implemented. It may 
have been easy to dismiss this gap as another example of implementation failure. 
However, Mintzberg’s strategy typology which distinguished between intended and 
realised strategy helps us to reconsider the gap between the two not as a sign of 
dysnfunctionality but as a creative opportunity for learning what organisational change 
and IT-related organisational change actually consists of in specific organisational 
contexts. In addition, implementation decisions and actions have been influenced by the 
resources of the bank on the one hand, and the pressures of the wider context on the 
other. For instance, the BPR project has as its predecessors, previous attempts at 
introducing strategic management in response to changes brought into the banking 
industry by the deregulation and liberalisation of banking services in the country. Such 
changes saw a new breed of banks -  referred to as new generation banks -  come into the 
industry with a lot of new ideas and approaches to serving customers.
This changed customer’s expectations of service delivery and they therefore demanded 
more from their banks. It was this expectation, and the fear of losing customers amongst 
others, that fuelled Wema bank’s desire to transform itself from a regional bank to a 
national bank with a ‘corporate’ outlook. In doing so, the management of Wema bank Pic 
chose to restructure branch activities and therefore called in a team of management 
consultants to advise them on how to proceed. The management consultants chose BPR 
and advised management on the actions and steps that needed to be taken. However, we 
found out that in carrying out the recommendations of the consultants (i.e. implementing 
the plan), a number of modifications were made.
Further examination of the implementation process revealed that the modifications, 
which took place at different levels of the bank, were influenced by a number of factors 
including economic, social, political and cultural influences from within the organisation 
as well as the external environment. In discussing the implementation process, we have
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identified three classes of improvisations. (1) Improvisations at the management level 
when management redefined BPR to suit organisation’s strength and weaknesses. (2) 
Improvisations at the branch level where the original plan from management was 
redefined by branch management to suit how the branch operates and the nature of the 
branch’s customers. (3) Improvisations at the individual level where individual staff 
tailored parts of the plan to suit their working conditions.
1). Improvisations at the management level 
The three-tiered approach to restructuring
The first decision involves the adoption of “a careful and calculated approach to 
computerisation” and branch reengineering. This would involve a cautious approach to 
branch automation and investment in information technology. According to the CEO of 
the bank in a company bulletin:
“Although, we aim to invest in technology, we are not specifically aiming to lead the 
industry... We will be pragmatic as to the choice o f technology and the extent of 
automation ”.
In practical terms, the bank’s pragmatic approach meant that the BPR project addressed 
the diversity of branches in its network. The bank introduced new computer systems only 
in selected branches, and the level of restructuring that took place was based on the size 
of the branch, the volume of transaction, the types of customers and whether it was a 
rural or urban branch. This entailed a redefinition of BPR, quite different from what was 
envisaged and it therefore led to the total exclusion of the bank’s 21 rural branches and 
the three-tiered approach to restructuring the remaining 51 branches.
This particular decision was influenced by both organisational and external factors. 
External influences that were found to be at play included the directive from the 
government that, despite the abolition of the Rural Banking Scheme, all branches opened 
under the scheme are to be kept opened. A resource-related factor was the sheer cost of 
computerising the branches, the financial strength of the bank and the productivity of 
each branch. Given that it cost between 12 and 15 million Naira to implement the new
82 100 Naira = U.S. $1 (Nov. 1999)
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banking software (Globus), the bank decided to introduce Globus only into those 
branches regarded as “strategic” in terms of volumes of transactions and contribution to 
the bank’s overall earnings.
Rotating staff for reengineering
At the onset of the project, the bank was advised that they would have to sack members 
of staff without a university degree, as they are perceived as not qualified to work in the 
new environment of a reengineered branch. However, management took an important 
decision not to layoff any member of staff, but instead to adopt a system of rotating staff 
and moving them around the branches. In effect, this approach saw that reengineering at 
Wema Bank did not result in any massive layoff of staff as was the practice in other 
banks - which resulted in serious collision with the unions and in one case a total collapse 
of the BPR project in that particular bank.
A contributing factor to this decision is the culture of the bank. Given the tradition of the 
bank in terms of its recruitment policy and practices which had led to what was known as 
the culture of a “Wema family”, the bank realised it was going to be difficult to adopt the 
consultants’ suggestions. This was in view of the fact that over the years its recruitment 
policy had been geared towards building a team or a ‘family’ of employees not purely 
based on academic qualifications or any other formal methods of recruitment. This 
“Wema family” has led to a relatively stable workforce and a low employee turnover that 
has led to a vastly experienced team of professionals, some of whom have been in the 
services of the bank for more than 20 years. This experience and stability has over the 
years served the bank well and has constituted a major source of strength for the bank. 
According to one of the Managers interviewed:
“If you look at the staff profile, you discover that even some o f the Directors don't have a 
BSc. So what do you? These people are vastly experienced in banking, they can tell you 
banking -and especially as it relates to the Nigerian environment - in and out, but they 
don't have a BSc. However, their experience are extremely valuable and you cannot just 
wished them away ”
Management therefore redefined the concept of BPR as stipulated by the consultants 
based on their own construction of Wema ‘reality’ in terms of the bank’s recruitment
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policy. The management consultants on their part, defined Wema bank’s needs in terms 
of overhauling the entire staff profile but to management this conflicts with their long 
established policy of promoting a ‘family’ of staff.
Selecting the implementation team
In selecting the implementation team, the original plan was to appoint a senior manager 
to head the implementation team so as to give the team the “necessary power and 
authority” to carry out the expected changes. However, based on management’s past 
experiences of dealing with the union and based on the experience of other banks’ 
confrontation with the union, a member of staff from the middle management cadre - 
who was still a member of the union - was appointed to head the BPR implementation 
team. The importance of this was that anytime the union tried to raise some concerns, 
management was quick to put point out to them the involvement of their members in the 
project and the fact that one of their members actually head the implementation team.
At a particular meeting between the board and the union, union members wanted to know 
why, despite the huge profit declared by the bank, only a small fraction went to staff pay 
rise. The MD/CEO directed the union members to ask the head of the implementation 
team (who is also a member of the union) for an explanation and that he will explain to 
them (the union) that the bank had been spending money on BPR and investing in new 
technology. According to the team manager:
“The whole idea is that as a union member, what ever I  say will be believed by the union 
leaders as they would not start thinking that I  am working against the interest of the 
union ”
According to the manager, this may not have been possible if the head of the 
implementation team had been a senior member of staff who is no longer a member of 
the union. In this particular example, management was able to use their ‘knowledge of 
the terrain’ to checkmate the union and to cover their backs. This was mentioned as one 
of the factors responsible for the smooth implementation of the project at Wema, as most 
of the problems other banks had was with the union.
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2). Improvisations at the branch level
Accommodating old branch practices.
One of the important tenet of BPR at Wema was in the desire to eradicate the practice 
known in local parlance as “man know man” and the idea that with reengineering, 
everybody gets treated equally. This equal treatment was meant to translate in practice 
that it was not necessary for customers to know anyone in the branch before conducting 
business, and all that was necessary was for customers to take their turn by queuing up 
until they get served. However, the reality of the situation is that given the culture of the 
Nigerian society, certain groups of people with leadership status within the society are 
not expected to queue up in bank branches. Therefore, there was a need to accommodate 
such people even within the reengineering initiative. According to one of the branch 
managers interviewed:
“Given the type o f our branch and the type o f customers we have, we still try to 
accommodate some set of people, like for instance, the chairman o f the local government 
council or the traditional head o f this community. If such a person comes in to the bank 
we cannot ask him to queue. What we do is to send him up to the bulk room away from 
the main banking hall and from the glare of other customers; here he can get service 
quicker”.
In other branches of the bank (such as the corporate branch) that we visited, this was not 
the practice and branch management did not see a need for this, given the type of 
customers they serve. In effect, this local form of accommodation leads to a toning-down 
of the initial plan to serve every customer equally. Given the demands of its cultural 
setting, a branch of the bank had to find ways to accommodate some of these 
idiosyncrasies of its local context.
3). Improvisations at the individual level
Semi-automated authorisation
Another important expectation from implementing BPR was the adoption of an “efficient 
and effective computer-based controls” in the form of on-line approval based on new 
authorisation limits at reengineered branches. These new authorisation limits was in line 
with the ‘empowerment’ initiative of reengineering as more customer-facing staff (such 
as tellers) are given more autonomy in carrying out their duties - especially in paying out
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cash to customers83. Authorisation limits were programmed into the banking application 
software and thus only allow staff to authorise the limits awarded to them. Any claim or 
transaction in excess of 50,000 Naira will go to the branch manager who has the highest 
authorisation limit within the branch. However, this translates to some form of restriction 
for the branch manager who, based on the new reengineering initiatives, was expected to 
focus more on marketing-related activities and building strong and viable relationships 
with customers. This focus on marketing and customer relationship means that the branch 
manager operates more outside the branch than within and so a potential situation exist 
where the branch manager would be out on marketing duties and there are cash 
withdrawal requests of over 50,000 Naira waiting to be approved. In a high inflationary 
economy such as Nigeria’s, cash withdrawals of over 50,000 Naira is a very common 
phenomenon.
To get round this problem, in one of the branches visited, a branch manager took the 
decision that his Branch Banking Operations Team Leader (BBOTL) should take charge 
of such situations and authorise these payments in his absence. Although the software 
would not allow the BBOTL to authorise the transaction electronically, he can still give 
the go ahead and do a manual authorisation pending the arrival of the branch manager 
who will do the electronic authorisation on his return. In the branch manager’s views the 
new authorisation limits present a constraint to service delivery because customers would 
have to wait for his approval - which may compromise the faster response time promised 
with reengineering. In effect, what we have is a mixture of both on-line (electronic) and 
manual authorisation as opposed to the all electronic authorisation envisaged at the onset 
of the project. Here we have the Nigerian economic situation (in terms of high inflation 
and the large number of over 50,000 Naira withdrawals) influencing the manager’s 
decision and leading to a need to adapt the original plan.
83 With reengineering, Tellers could pay out as much as 5,000 Naira without getting authorisation. If the 
amount to be collected is in excess o f 5000 Naira, then Tellers are expected to refer to the Head o f Tellers 
(whose authorisation limit is set at 25,000 Naira) for authorisation. If the amount in question is more than 
25,000 Naira, then approval is sought from the OTL whose limit stands at 50,000 Naira.
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Conclusion
The implementation of BPR at Wema had taken place rather smoothly, not from a 
mechanistic transfer of the technique, but through a lot of modifications of the technique 
of BPR to the local context. Such modifications and adaptations were influenced by both 
the resources of the organisation as well as wider institutional rules and expectations. For 
instance, the pragmatic approach to computerisation means a realisation that despite the 
importance of branches to the bank and the idea of “mobilising rural funds”, 
computerisation may not necessarily be the only answer as some of the rural banks will 
not be computerised. This led to the idea of a 3-tier BPR. According to one of the 
managers, the management consultants came in with “a lot of Hammer and Champy in 
their head” but the realisation is that the Wema situation is different.
History and culture intervened in the decision not to layoff staff, in terms of the “Wema 
family” and the bank’s recruitment policy. It intervened when the decision was reached to 
move staff around instead of sacking them and it also intervened when the consultants 
suggested that they should sack all staff without a university degree but they didn’t. 
Political factors intervened in the form of the Rural Banking Scheme and the setting up of 
“political branches”. Tradition intervened in the form of using the bulk room to 
accommodate chairmen of local government authorities and traditional rulers who may 
not want to queue up in the banking halls. Management capabilities was displayed in 
their constitution of the team that handled the project and in their dealing with the trade 
unions.
The practical implication of the lessons learnt from this case study is that even rational 
decisions of management are made within a social context which has to be taken in 
account. It would have been easy for the management of Wema bank to appoint a senior 
manager to head the BPR implementation team but such an appointment would have led 
to a series of confrontation with the Banking Union. The implication for the transfer of 
western management practices is that the social context and tradition of doing things 
within the organisation will have to be taken into consideration as an unquestioned 
transfer of these practices may conflict with the culture of the organisation. Consultants
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and other agents of change need to be sensitive to the local ways of doing things. 
Implementation of BPR or indeed any other western management technique in any 
organisation should be seen as a unique task that will differ between contexts.
Following Ciborra (1996) and DeCock (1996), we believe IT and IT-based management 
techniques are flexible, and that this flexibility should be exploited when they are being 
implemented. If the bank had agreed to carry out the recommendation of the management 
consultants to sack all staff without a university degree, a substantial wealth of 
experience would have been lost, which the bank may have found difficult, perhaps 
impossible, to replace. The broad implication for the local-global interaction is that such 
interplay does not necessarily imply homogeneity; that the local is able to mediate global 
influences. Evidence from this case study suggests organisational enactment (Weick, 
1977; Weick, 1992). At the junction of the local-global interaction is a process of 
enactment where each participant interprets and define their situations based on their 
professional ideologies and values, history and tradition of doing things, and other 
contextual considerations such as available organisational resources (Scheid-Cook, 
1992). In enacting BPR, participants drew upon their own beliefs and understanding of 
what is feasible and desirable in implementing IT and IT-based management techniques. 
This leads to a suggestion that organisational change is a function of an enactment 
process, which leads to local improvisations to global trends.
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Table 1: The contexts of change at Wema Bank Pic.
Category Attributes Factors of interest
Wider
Context
(International/National/
Industry)
Regulatory Pressures Prevailing global wisdom of the purity o f market forces in running 
national economies
International Financial Institutions (such as World bank and IMF) gave
support in the form of loan to the Nigerian government
The adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in Nigeria
Liberalisation of banking and explosion in the number of operating
banks
Rural Banking Scheme and the regulation that all banks must establish 
rural branches
Competition Financial distress and the subsequent closure of banks
Credibility crisis as people who lost money vowed never to use banks
again
Influx of new banks (some are local affiliates of multi-national banks) 
with smaller number o f branches and more advanced technology
Societal expectations Move from old culture o f “armchair banking” and protracted banking 
transactions to customers demanding a faster response time and better 
quality of service supported by information technology
Inner Context Organisational Assets Geographic spread of branch network 
Organisation’s financial base 
Stable Management structure 
Low staff turnover 
The culture of “Wema Family”
Branch Structure Hierarchical structure where jobs are fragmented along functional lines. 
Cashiers’ jobs are highly routine and mundane
Branch Culture A poor service delivery culture -  “armchair banking”
Poor bank-customer relationship leading to what is known in local 
parlance as a culture o f “man know man”
A rowdy banking hall due to a lack o f orderliness and queue culture
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